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operating beyond 1975 over the contiguous United States and adjacent oceanic
transition regions, and to determine if and how satellite technology can meet
these requirements in a reliable, efficient, and economical manner.
Major results and conclusions of the study are as follows: ,.q
•	 The highest priority satellite applications are surveillance it
and rapid collision warning communications. }	 '
,
•	 The necessary technology is available at the present time
and an attractive system concept_ based on this technology N
has been synthesized. ..
The satellite-based air traffic control concept described in this
report, consisting of satellites, ground stations, and electronic hardware,
provides support fora wide range of aircraft.
	 All users will have `a t
Location/ Identification Transmitter (LIT) and antenna for surveillance which
is unique to the satellite system.
	 This low-cost lightweight transmitter will
permit identification and three`--dimensional location of all airborne aircraft IQ
approximately every second; and most of these aircraft will also be equipped
with LIT backlink receiversrovidin
	 shortp	 g	 access time mid -air .collision
warning.	 'In addition, higher cost aircraft will have an option of satellite
navigation equipment which can provide highly accurate three-dimensional '...
position and velocity information.- The use of satellites for rapid and reli-
able data communication from any place in the country to an aircraft any-
where over the country also is discussed.
This document consists of three parts: Volume 1 i.s the basic Final
Technical Report and Volume 2' contains appendices supporting the discus-:'{
sions of Volume 1.	 In addition, an independent Executive Summary report
has been prepared for convenience to highlight the study results.	 In this
connection it should be noted that no unique material , is presented in the
Executive Summary and that Volumes 1 and ;2 are, therefore, complete
in themselves t
t
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1. PREFACE
1. 1 INTRODUCTION
"Air traffic is in crisis. 	 The crisis now manifest at a few high
l
density hubs is the direct result of the failure of airports and air traffic
.
j
control capacity to keep up with the growth of the aviation.. industry. 	 With
s proper leadership, funds, a sense of common purpose in the aviation com-
munity, and steps taken to promote coexistence between airports and their
neighbors, this deficit can be eliminated through intelligent application
of recent advances in aeronautics, elec =tronics, and computer science, j
Unless strong measures are taken, forces presently in motion will blig ht
the growth of American aviation."	 (Ref. 1) -
This foregoing quotation from the report of the Department of trans-
portation Air Traffic Control Advisory Committee also might well have
come from the final report of the Curtis Committee in 1957 (Ref. 2) or
from the report of the Hough Committee (Project Beacon) in 1961 (Ref. '3 ). #
Clearly, it has been extremely difficult to provide an ever-expanding high
quality air traffic control service to theextremely dynamic and rapidly
expanding aviation community.
Satellites offer the possibility of realizing a significant improvement
a
r in air traffic control capability, 	 The use of satellites for aircraft corn- r=
^;
munications, navigation, and surveillance, nevertheless, must be justified !u
r on the basis of reduced costs, -improved, reliability, accuracy, availability,
if
a and coverage with `respect to alternative systems and procedures.	 Accord- € ,
ingly, NASA L
 s stated -objective of this study is to determine on a priority SP
basis the communications, navigation, and surveillance requirements for k
aircraft operating over the contiguous United States (including oceanic
transition regions) in 1975 and beyond, and to determine if and how satel-
lite technology can meet these requirements in a reliable, efficient, and
i
economical manner.
ks
µ 1. 2 APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM
The Satellite Communications, Navigation, and Surveillance (CNS),
y	 -	 specificallystud	 has been  cal ,v tailored to meet the following objectives:'
First, a brief initial -description of the Satellite. CNS concept is presented
in Section 2. , Section 3 then elaborates the detailed Requirements Analy-
sis which included investigation of present and projected air traffic loads
1
t.
t
o
y
a,.
. and services; studies of aircraft maneuvers and of mid-air and near
mid-air collisions; and performance and functional analyses relating sur-
veillance, navigation, separation standards, automation and control and
communications.
	
This work is summarized in terms of stated Require-
ments and Criteria in Section 3. 4.
Section 4 concentrates on evaluating the capability of satellite tech-
nology to meet requirements. 	 This work led to recognition early in the
effort that the one particular satellite concept which appeared to be most
attractive for domestic use also would require a great deal of study.
` Detailed description of this Location Identification Transmitter (LIT) con-
` cept thus makes up the bulk of Sections 4 and 5.	 Section 5 also includes
the recommended priorities of satellite applications; a description of the
Satellite CNS System (including aircraft avionics, satellites, ground sta-
tion designs); a brief outline of the postulated Satellite CNS program; and
an overall system effectiveness evaluation. 	 It should be noted that the
effort described in this document has been a requirements and feasibility
study yielding a conceptual design and that a preliminary design study
would yield a much more nearly optimum design approach„
•a Because this- report of necessity contains a wide variety of technical
terminology, acronyms, and abbreviations, a glossary is provided in this
tfk volume.	 Appendices containing supporting information are published
separately in Volume II.
1.3 SUMMARY OF MAJOR CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
j
1. 3.1	 Priority of Satellite Applications
4 The two applications of utmost priority for the Satellite CNS System
are surveillance of virtually all airborne aircraft over the UnitedStates
r - and provision of short-access -time collision warning for equipped a.ir-
craft in a potential mid-air collision situation.
	 It is recommended that
navigation and other communication functions be provided by the Satellite
CNS System, but the need for these services is not as urgent as the sur-
N,
veilla.nce and collision warning applications.
1. 3. ,2
	 Technology
Communications, satellite, computer, and avionics technology can
meet the CNS requirements developed .
 herein in the post
-1975 time frame.	 ^`r
Ltl]
t
2
r
1
r
i
i
I
	
k	 I
1.3.3 Feasibility
r' An attractive Satellite CNS System concept has been formulated and
	
x ^+	 its feasibility has been established, although the system as described in
this report is by no means optimum. It is clear that satellites can play a
part in achieving a reliable, efficient, and economical domestic air traffic
Z
control satellite system in the post -197 5 era.
1. 3.4 Recommended Further Efforts
A number of near-term efforts to support development of this impor.
tant capability are recommended.
	 hey include:
• A more detailed requirements study concentrating on 	 C
surveillance system accuracy, capacity, and separation
standards_
• LIT preliminary design studies
sf.
f
2. THE SATELLITE CNS CONCEPT
The system described in this section consists of a satellite
constellation, user aircraft, and ATC ground centers. 	 The satellites
operate in 24--hour orbits with continuous coverage of the Continental :k
United States (CONUS) and provide communication, navigation, and sur-
veillance (CNS) services for ATC. f
For surveillance, each aircraft in the system transmits autonomous
coded-pulse bursts which are relayed by the satellites to the ground cen-
ters.	 The centers identify the aircraft from their codes and locate their }
position in three-dimensional space by multilate ration with respect to the r
satellites.	 This surveillance concept is identified as the Location Identi-
fication Transmitter (LIT) concept.
For navigation purposes, the satellites emit ranging signals.	 Using
different signals from the same satellites, aircraft can navigate with con-
siderable accuracy in thr,^e dimensions. 	 Only higher-cost aircraft are
likely to use this service because of the high cost of the avionics naviga-
tion equipment.
The satellites are also equipped to provide communications betweexa, ;'
aircraft and ground centers.
	 Two types of communication links have been ?"
studied in this connection. 	 The first is a simple low-data-rate collision
warning link from ATC ground centers to aircraft which works in conjunc-
tion with the LIT system. 	 The second is a two-way 1200 bps data link
which only large= commercial or military _type aircraft are likely to use.
2.1 SURVEILLANCE SYSTEIV!
All aircraft will be equipped with a small lightweight antenna and
ran mi	 er`' which will-o	 ,rate through a satellite
	
rt	 s	 tt	 w	 t	  t l it  netwo k.	 This s temP	 g _y ^
will be characterized by the following:
^.	 All airborne aircraft locationsprecise y known in
_three dimensions ' (50 to 3-00 ft with updating about) I
once per second.
a	 Identification of all airborne aircraft.
r	 17niform coverage over the entire CONUS. r
Or contiguous which —more precisely conveys the idea of the-48 states. T^
.I
4
r.
•	 Feasibility of maintaining system saturation point
well above projected traffic forecasts for this
century with a relatively modest use of RF spectrum.
•	 Low-cost avionics.
The foregoing system capability spectrum should be contrasted with
that of the current radar system, which by itself yields no altitude infor-
mation and has position errors which are much larger. 	 With the applica-
ble National Standard (Ref. 4) specifying an accuracy of ±1000 feet and
±1. 00 at the display, radar-system measurements to date (Ref. 5) under
idealized conditions indicate that its accuracy is ±380 ft in range and
w0. 1 0 to 0, 250 in azimuth, amounting to position errors of approximately
900 ft and 1600 ft at 30 n mi and 150 n mi respectively.	 In addition, to
uniquely identify all airc raft by radar would be difficult, and proposed
improvements to the ATCRBS will not be without problems. 	 Improved J
accuracy, higher data rates, and identity and altitude reporting are all
considered feasible, but impose the expense of new interrogators with
electronic scanning devices.*
	
Further, uniformity in altitude determine- 	 e
tion will remain difficult to achieve.	 Finally, the current total number
of air traffic control radars in use is about 204,- resulting in high replace- 1	
t	 ii
ment, maintenance, and operations costs. 	 In addition, radar's line of -
sight limitation and geometrical considerations make it impractical to
obtain uniform coverage ov-,r large volumes of airspace.
Operation of the satellite surveillance system is indicated in
Figure 1.	 The goal to minimize thy; user, avionics price has led to a sys-
ter design in which the aircraft's role in the surveillance scheme is
limited to the autonomous transmission of a simply generated code burst.`
Each satellite in the network 'relays the signals that it receives
from aircraft to a ground station.
	 The time of arrival of each signal is k
then measured at the ground station.
	 If; the satellite orbits are known
the time difference from a ,pair of satellites defines the range difference
between the aircraft and the two satellite locations.
	
Thus, a hyperbolic
surface is defined in much the same manner as with the LORAN, DECCA,
and OMEGA navigation systems.	 From measurement of the range differ-
ences between three pairs of satellites (a total of four satellites is needed), r
k^.
5
RI
the ground station computers can determine the location and altitude of
each aircraft (i. e. , the aircraft is located at the intersection of three
hyperbolic surfaces). The locations (or orbits) of the satellites which are
..t	 necessary to these computations are known through simply-obtained track-
ing data.
iR
calibration of the aircraft's oscillator or clock so that the ground station
knows the aircraft transmission epoch to less than a microsecond.
	 This
t information is used to aid in tracking the aircraft and to provide a low
data rate communication link to aircraft (see Sections 2. 3 and 4. 3. 1).
In addition to the four operational satellites, there will be at least
two in-orbit spares to provide the necessary high level of availability of
at least four operating satellites, ti
The transmitted aircraft signals consist of 51.'1- µsec carrier bursts 'f
L
which are biphase-modulated by a 511 bit code.	 Each aircraft is assigned
. a unique combination of code and pulse repetition period (PRP) which i
together are used to uniquely identify an aircraft.
	 The PRP's are assigned }
in 10 µsec increments between 1, 0 and 1, 3 seconds with a total of
31, 255 available.
	 In addition, there are 16 different biphase codes so
that a total of 500, 000 assignable aircraft identifications (ID's) are avail-
able on each surveillance channel. 1.
The capacity of a surveillance channel is 50, 000 pulses/sec or
50 ) 000 aircraft updated in position approximately once per second (1, 0 to
1. 3 sec PRP's).
	 With a frequency division multiplexed multichannel sys- A
tem, aircraft ID's can be duplicated on each channel so that a total of
500, 000 N ID's are assignable and the total capacity is 50, 000 N pulses/ r:
,
sec where N is the number of channels,
Traffic forecasts indicate that by the year 2010 there could be as
many as 10 6
 registered aircraft in CONUS and the peak traffic would be'^
- 105 aircraft airborne.
	 Therefore, two LIT channels would be required
1
to handle peak traffic and to have enough ID's available for permanent
assignment to all aircraft.
	 Each channel occupies 20 MHz of RF band-
width so that	 with 5 MHz guard bands -a total of 50 MHz RF `s pectrum ig	 ^	 t	 z	 p	 s
required.
The ground station identifies each aircraft by determining the code r`
and pulse repetition period of all arriving pulses.
	 This is accomplished
by a bank of matched code filters in the receiver which compress` the4
51.1 µsec puls e s to 0. 1 µsec and divide the pulses into 1 .6 separate  groups 1
(one for each biphase code).	 Pulse sorting computers are then used with
each group to identify PRP's.	 The significant feature of identification
7
----	
— ._. .
by these techniques is that no additional energy is radiated by the aircraft
beyond that required by the pulse signal for location.
When an unidentified pulse appears at the output of one of the code
filters, the PRP sorting computer looks at the next 1 to 1. 3 second time
frame and associates all unidentified pulses occurring in that frame with
the pulse to determine the possible PRP's. Unidentified pulses in the
subsequent time frame are then examined to reduce the number of possi-
ble PRP's. This process continues until only one possibility remains.
Once the PRP is identified, the associated pulses are removed from this
search mode and placed in the track mode.
In the track mode, a computer predicts the time of arrival of subse-
quent pulses based on the known PRP's; and if pulses from each satellite
f' r
' arrive at the proper times (within a tolerance band), the track is main-
tained.	 If pulses are not detected at the propertimes due to misses, {
ha interference, or cessation of the aircraft transmissions, the track is
still maintained for three frames.
	 If no pulses are detected during these t,.
three frames, the PRP track is dropped and the ATC system is notified.
i'a i Analysis shows that the PRP sorting process converges to a solu-
tion surprisingly fast.
	 For instance, if 1, 000 unidentified pulses existed-
., at one time frame, on the average, only two or three frames (pulse
-3 periods) would be required for successful identification of all the pulses.
Al
However, because computer storage requirements become excessive, -
• all pulses would not be identified in parallel but instead in small groups
of 100 pulses. The first 1 0 pulses can be identified, on the average,; in
about 2, 5 seconds. 	 The process would speed up as pulses were identified
nd the entire 1000 would be identified in less than 25 seconds.
	 It should
noted that once the PRP's are identified from one satellite, this knowl-
;e will aid in simplifying the PRP sorting of the other satellite signals.'
G-
K' Finaily, a position computer computes the location of all tracked. r	 -
a-	 raft from :the times of arrival of the identified pulses from each
lite and stores this information.
	 Updating occurs as often as the r
system desires (limited to multiples of the PRP). x
tr
8
for the frequency range considered, y
u
2. 2 Navigation System
The navigation system has been under study for several years and
r.
{
is discussed in considerably further detail in Reference 6.	 Hence, the I
discussion in this section will be brief, and the analysis of this concept
is not included in this report	 i	 's available	 n h	 cited	 	 i	 	 	  as	 t i	 a 	   i	 the c t d j.
The same network of satellites used for surveillance will also radi- j
ate independent navigation signals, as shown in Figure 2.
	 The navigation !
process is the reverse of the LIT surveillance process in that, with the
navigation system, the satellites radiate to aircraft instead of aircraft
radiating to the satellites.
	 Similar position location principles apply,
however, in both cases.
	 The navigation user measures the times of
arrival of .ran. m	 signals from,'	 -four satellites and com ug" g	 	 putes his position ^
in a manner similar to the surveillance computations of the ATC ground
station.	 His task is, ,
	- much simpler since he obviously does not
have to go through the pulse sorting and identification task of the surveil-
lance system, and he computes only his own position.
Using the same
,
 network of satellites as the surveillance system,
the navigation system provides the following features;`.
•	 Unsaturable, all-weather operation t
•	 Common grid for all airspace ,r
• Accurate position and altitude (50 to 300 ft) determined
onboard the aircraft (area navigation) }
•' Accurate velocity and rate of climb information also
available onboard the aircraft. .
mow
fi-
t
^.
ZM5^
i/
Nap-
r\
iThe avionics required for the navigation user consists of a
one-channel receiver and data processor, computer, and display.
	 A
2- single upper hemispherical coverage L-band antenna is required to ;
receive the L-band satellite ranging signals.
	 Because of the cost of the
k avionics package, the system will not be a replacement for the VOR sys-
tem.	 However, it should be competitive in cost and superior in perfor-
mance to the VOR/DME area navigation systems now coming into use.
2.3 COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM
Today, practically all air-ground communications for aircraft in
the U. S. are conducted on VHF and UHF bands; the latter being reserved
primarily -'.)r governmental and military use.
	 The communication fre-
quencie^ of interest to air carrier and general aviation lie between
118 MHz and 136 MHz.
	 This band presently contains 360 channels
50 kHz s acm	 ,	 g	 p	 ticular uses(	 sp ing), with various segments allocated for 	 ar
such as airport towers
	 enroutep	 ,	 " ATC, approach .control, flight service t,
stations,_ aeronautical-enroute stations (air carrier), and the emergency x
frequency of 121. 5 MHz.
	 Navigation aids in the VHF and UHF region
such as the VOR and ILS localizer facilities (108. 1 to 11 - 7. 9 MHz) also
contain voice capability; for ground-air communications..
Given the cost of satellite communications and the current invest-
ment m	 round-based facilities
	 it is likely that the present air-groundg
VHF communications system or -a, modified, form of it will continue for
many year	 The role of satellite communications, therefore, would be ..
that of supplementing the present system.
Data rather than voice communications is the most promising tech-
ti,!
nique for satellite-to-user links because data communications make much
more efficient use of the satellite links than voice.
	
Automatic data link
techniques, if used correctly, can significantly reduce pilot and controller
y
}
workload.
	 A very few emergency voice links may still be useful for the
r
,.1
ri system if for no other reason than to handle unforesee n circumstances
' not provided for in a data link.`:
Two types of communication links have been designed for the CNS
i` satellites as shown in Figure 3.	 The first is ;a two-way data link at ,
1200 bps each way for large `aircraft '(Ref. 7. -). Each 'satellite has capacity
i ^:
for two of these two-way links. The second is a rapid-access low-data-rate
collision warning link in which aircraft can be sent 14 different messages
for collision avoidance. This lire. works in conjunction with the LIT sur -
veillance link, in that the ground center utilizes knowledge of an aircraft's
position and time of LIT pulse transmission to address that particular air-
craft. The center transmits three RF pulses through three of the CNS
satellites. The pulses are timed to arrive at the aircraft at times unique
,r
to that aircraft's position and LIT transmit time. Reception of all three
pulses in a window alerts the aircraft that it is being addressed by the
ATC center. The window is then extended and the presence or absence
of pulses in subsequent time slots establishes the message being sent to
the aircraft. The link has been appropriately named the LIT backlink and
:	 is described in .greater detail in Section 4. 3. 1.
\\ egckZ.
LIT	 'IV
BACKLINK ^ ♦^p^ ^Tq^^	 j.	 f
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Figure 3. Satellite Communications Network
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3. REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS
This section identifies_ the principal elements and characteristics
involved in the communication, navigation, and surveillance functions of
domestic air traffic control, and shows how their characteristics need to ia.
be considered in the design of an ATC system utilizing satellites. The
following elements are of primary concern:_
1,, Controllers
F
2.	 Controller equipment
3.	 Air space
4.
	
Procedures
5.	 Regulations
a 6.	 Airmen
7.	 Aircraft
8.	 Aircraft equipment
9.	 Airports
s The first five of the above elements are encompassed in what is formally -
called the National Airspace System, whereas Items 6, 7, and 8 may be 1	 +
thought of as constituting the users.
	
Although airports, Item 9, impose
distinct demands- and constraints on the other elements, they are not i
.	 ,.....
treated as a'separate topic but are discussed in connection with related-i	 ,
considerations throughout this report.g {
Interactions among these elements is complex because of the wide
variety of characteristics each possesses. 	 Controller capabilities vary e
as do those of the airmen they serve; ATC effectiveness is limited by the
capacity, coverage and accuracy of the controller equipment;	 the aircraft
z can impose a,great range of demands, depending upon the types, numbers'
and distribution of aircraft in the system at any given time; and the amount
and quality of the airborne equipment available to the aircrew can ease or
4
sJ
aggravate air traffic controller workload.
The section examines the highlights of these ATC elements in order
to develop a picture of the _present and future overall ATC function, its
characteristics, and its problems.	 The section consists of four parts:
An ATC Mission Analysis, a Special Studies group, a Functional Analysis,
13
-	 t
and a Requirements or Criteria Analysis which together attempt to provide
background and guidelines of the satellite system analysis that follows.
The Mission Analysis subtask 	 which defines the services which
might be asked of a satellite-based CNS system, includes.
•	 describing the present aviation picture, including
aircraft and aircrew characteristics and the National
Airspace System
' •	 estimating projected future air traffic loads
1
•	 describing present and projected air traffic
r services such as navigation aids, air traffic
control, and search and rescue alerting.
The product of the Mission Analysis subtask is a description of the loads,
^y
services and constraints associated with air traffic control in 1980 and
•
-
beyond.
The Special Studies subtask is an extension of the Mission Analysis`
which covers several specific topics which are important input elements
to the Requirements andCriteria analysis.
	 These specialized studies
inc Jude
•	 an analysis of air traffic control services in remote
.: or non-hub areas
•	 an investigation of the nature of aircraft maneuvers
t; in normal and unusual flight conditions r
i	 I
h	 •.
•	 an examinationof CNS implications of mid-air
collisions and near mid-air collisions reported
by the National Transportation Safety Board and
the FAA.
".„ e	 Air Traffic Control and user investment studies'
`.	 3 which examine the government costs associated t{ with ATC and the limitations on user avionics
investments; i, e. ,- acceptable figures for weight,
U power, volume and -cost,
,q. The Functional Analysis subtask attempts to describe how the new
system will perform by developing relationships between Navigation,
Guidance and Control (NG&C) accuracy; surveillance' accuracy and capacity;
and separation standards; and identifying those communication services
which may effectively utilize satellite links. 	 In addition, ,the Functional
4
14
;
ti
Analysis involves estimates of the size of the data processing task for the
air traffic control system.
These three subtasks, together with a broad system concept of the
satellite CNS system and preliminary guidelines for the design and evalu-
ation of the CNS system, were used in the development of the study
Requirements and Criteria. Specified desired system r-haracteristics and
performance criteria are stated from which ultimate hardware and pro-
cedura 1 re uirements can be inferred
^ q
3.1 MISSION ANALYSIS k
;i
3. 1. 1	 Description of Present Aviation
The future system can best be described in terms of the present 3;
system and the innovations which are planned or otherwise anticipated.
The mission analysis, consequently, starts with a brief description of
today's systern in terms of the elements mentioned earlier. 	 The principal .
x characteristics of each element are described qualitatively together with
1 their relative impact on the ATC functions. 	 Statistics of ATC facilities
411 aircraft, airports, etc. and their activities are given to provide a basis
'41 for comparison of those same quantities extrapolated to the future. .
3. 1.1.1	 Pres ent User Characteristics
a Users of the Air Traffic. Control (ATC) system consist of a variety
of airmen	 aircraft and associated airborne a ui ment.
	
The airmen b
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virtue of their qualifications, experience and purposes, and the different
M , types of aircraft, by virtue of their flight characteristics and communi-
cation, navigation, and surveillance equipment,
	
impose a wide range of
demands for air traffic control.
Airmen
t The principal pilot qualification which distinguishes the load he
F„ exerts on the ATC system is whether or not he is instrument rated. 	 The f
lack of such qualification constrains the pilot to have outside visual refer- v,
ence at all times and to abide by the applicable procedures and rules
r n Airborne surveillance equipment such as weather and ground map radars
are not germane and will not be discussed.
1..
i
established by the FAA, which are called Visual Flight Rules (VFR).
.	 Possession of such rating indicates 'that he has demonstrated his capa-
bility of operating an aircraft without outside visual reference and that
he is acquainted with not only VFR procedures but also the additional
navigation and communication procedures and rules called Instrument
Flight Rules (IFR), which govern flights under adverse weather conditions
wherein VFR flight is not possible. The principal aspect of IFR flight,
regardless of weather conditions, is that the flight is under direct, rear.
time control by ATC.
The fact that there were some 122, 000 IFR pilots and 4.96, 000 VFR {
pilots in 1968, as indicated by Table 1, is only a measure of potential 5 .demands, and is not as significant with respect to ATC loads as is the
activity level of these pilots. The manner in which this a.cYivitv level mani-
fests itself is described in Section 3. 1; 2 and in Appendix C of this report.
Table 1. 1968 Pilot Statistics
Certificate Type Number Instrument Rating
Student 181,287 0--
Private 252,312 7,558
ATR 25, 817 25,817
Commercial 150,135 86,491
Helicopter 2,573 705
Glider 1,866 2
Other 2,941 0
Total 617,931 122,573
J
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The formal certification of pilots as to student, private, commercial
and airline transport are indicative of pilot experience. Within a given
certification or rating, say IFR, pilots may have experience factors rang-
ing from hundreds of hours to tens of thousands of flying hours. Whereas
air traffic controllers are not directly concerned with these statistics,
they are continually confronted with their effects. Flight technical error,
if the term is redefined to include blunders, can impose serious perturba-
tions on the ATC system, often of the worst type, since they are unantici-
pated by controllers. As evidenced in many studies (Reference 8) the
pilot experience factor is an important parameter which must be included
in the construction of models for analyzing ATC system performance.
Aircraft
Statistics of U. S. civil aircraftpublished by the FAA (Ref. 	 9) are
4 grouped in a variety of ways.
	 Principal classifications are by aerodynamic
type (fixed wing, rotocraft, lighter than air) and by type of propulsion
(turbojet, turbo 7 prop, piston).	 Within these classifications and types may
be found several subgroups describing number of engines and horsepower,
number of seats, etc. which are pertinent to various interests in the avi-
ation industry.	 Characteristics associat(--1 with these classifications,
4
such as the wake turbulence of large aircraft, do contribute to ATC prob-
lems.	 However, from the standpoint of direct air traffic control involve-
ment, these characteristics are less significant than the normal flight
performance characteristics they imply. 	 It is the aircraft operating
characteristics of speed, acceleration, and optimum cruising altitude
which directly impact the airspace utilization and air traffic control
strategy requirements.
Flight technical error:	 Br .oadly, the inability of a pilot or autopilot to
follow an intended flight path.
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Aircraft maneuver attitudes need to be considered since they can
cause disruptions in communications and surveillance. due to aircraft
antenna shielding. :
	This is a relatilrely serious problem for the present
ground-based ATC surveillance system and it can also be a significant
factor for a satellite-based system.	 Further discussion of this problem
is given in Section 3. 2. 2.
Air carrier and general aviation are the two major classifications
of civil aircraft utilization.	 Air carriers are divided into certified route
air carriers, supplemental carriers and commercial operators; while
the principal general aviation utilization types are business, commercial, r
instructional, and personal. 	 Excluding priority considerations,- the dis-
tinction between these classifications, insofar as air. traffic control is
-concerned, is made not so much on the basis of utilization (purpose) as
it is on the basis of their numbers and types of aircraft, frequency of
operations, and airborne equipment.
	 Certainly a large general aviation
business jet and an air carrier jet would make similar demands on the i
ATC system.
Military aircraft, which constitutes the third major classification j
of aircraft, must also be considered in the overall demands on an ATC is	 {
system for the following reasons:-
1.	 They do utilize the same airways and ATC
services which serve civil aircraft.
2.	 They frequently exceed the flight performance 1f
regime generally associated with civil aircraft,
3.	 They create a major potential for priority
considerations in ATC.
Table 2 (Ref. 9) s hows some air carrier general aviation and mili-
tary aircraft statistics and Table 3 shows typical ranges of performance
characteristics.
fi.
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Table 2. U.S. Registered Aircraft 1968 	 }
i
1
}
i
F
t
k
Table 3. Typical Aircraft Performance Characteristics
	 }
Aircraft
,hype
Turbine
Piston Helicopter Other Total
Jet	 Prop
Air Carrier 1344	 444 642 22 -- 29452
General Aviation 1281
i
109,910 1899 1096
.F,
114,186
Military 9000	 1000 5,000 5000 -- 201000
Aircraft
Type
Speeds Cruise
Altitude(ft x 103)Cruise Loiter Approach Climb(kt) (kt) (kt) (fpm)
Turbojet 500 250 150 200 - 300 20 - 40
Turboprop 350 200 130 150 - 250 10 - 20
Multi-Engine, 250 100 - 150 110 100 - 150 5 - 15
Piston
Single-Engine, 100 - 200 70 - 120 70 - 120 70 - 120 2 - 10
Piston
STOL 120 - 150- 100 70 70 - 100 2 - 10
1!
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3. 1. 1. 2	 The National Airspace System
The airspace system as it exists today reflects the evolutionary
development of ground facilities and strategy designed to exploit the
greatest potential of air travel consistent with ever-increasing user de-
mands and technological advances in aircraft performance and airborne
a	 navigation and communication equipment. 	 Since the practical implemen-
tation of technological advances has not been able to keep up with the
demand, there has been an increasing reliance on new strategies to accom-
modate the air traffic in a safe and orderly manner.	 Examples of these
strategies are the quota system and recently-instituted Terminal Control
Areas (TCA's,) in major air terminals. ,.
Airspace
Within the broad definition of the National Airspace System, which
includes pertient rules, regulations and procedures, all airspace over the
U. S. is regulated in one way or another with respect to aircraft usage.
Different degrees of control have been specified for different portions of
the airspace and they can vary from direct, real time vector commands
from ground controllers to simple ,right-of-way procedures which are a
promulgated through published Federal Aviation Regulations. ,:	 -f.r	 ;,
Although several proposed variations of airspace apportionment
have been delineated by various sources (Ref. 12), there are three basic
categories of airspace presently defined by the FAA. 	 These are uncon-
trolled airspace, controlled airspace (sometimes called mixed airspace)
and positive control airspace.
	 The important destinction to be made' t
among; these categories is the manner in which the airspace may or must
be used.	 In uncontrolled airspace, VFR and IFR flights operate without
ATC approval or control and the control exercised is simply procedural. r
No separation service is provided by the air traffic controllers in this
r
~.	 ,..
case, primarily because the cost-benefit relationship, has not warranted
the installation of CNS facilities to cover these areas.
	 In controlled air-
space all flights operating under IFR are subject to prior approval and
direct control of ATC.
	 Aircraft operating under VFR> may operate without
such approval or control but must still adhere to the applicable 'procedures
for this area., In positive control airspace all flights must operate under
20 ;
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instrument flight rules and are subject to prior clearance and real time
control, regardless of weather and visibility conditions.
The basic categories and several sub-categories of airspace are
,.,
portrayed in Figures 4 and 5.	 Figure 4 happens to be a section through
an airway; consequently, the only uncontrolled airspace shown is that
which lies just above ground level up to 700 or 1200 feet. 	 All the remain-
ing area over terrain is controlled or positive controlled. 	 Figure 5 is a
plan view of a terminal area where the broader expanses of off-airway 3
uncontrolled airspace maybe seen. 	 This airspace terminates vertically
at 14, 500 feet, which is the floor of what is called the continental control
area.	 The continental control area is a general coverage controlled air- n
space over the entire CONUS.	 It's floor was established at a level which
coincides approximately with the highest terrain elevation and the airspace t'
extends upward from this level indefinitely. #-
The early airways established were mainly in areas of flat terrain
where the base of the airways (700 ft and 1200 ft above ground level) was i
fixed to accommodate low flying IFR aircraft.
	
In mountainous areas, 'T
airway floors are often set at a mean sea level altitude consistent with the
minimum (IFR) enroute altitude (e.g., some airways crossing the Sierras
in California have floors at about 10, 000 ft MSL even though the elevation
of the terrain underneath maybe at only 2000 to 3000 ft).
	
The airway
floors and the safe tninimum enroute altitudes within the airways are
established, not only with respect to obstruction clearance but also with
,respect to ATC communication and surveillance coverage capability and t
aircraft reception of navigation aids.
	 Obviously, such coverage is diffi-
cult to obtain at low altitudes in mountainous terrain.
Other than the low-frequency airways, which are expected to dis-
appear by 1980, there are presently two principal sets of airways-estab-
lished.
	 These are the low-altitude ,VHF "Victor" airways and the high- v
altitude jet routes.	 Vertical boundaries also are shown in Figure 4. 	 Both
jet routes and low altitude airways join navigation aids (primarily
VOR/ VORTAC) or other points defined by intersection of the navigation aid
signals..
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JFor the low altitude airways, typical combined' errors of the ground
facility (VOR), airborne VOR equipment and flight technical error are
used to establish the width of these airways. Near the VOR's, the airway
width is four miles each side of the centerline. Beyond 51 miles from a
VOR the width is expanded in accordance with an assumed f4. 5 -degree
error.
jThe control zones, control areas, and transition areas are estab-
lished for the purpose of providing air traffic control for IFR traffic at or
in the vicinity of an airport. As the airport density increases, the control
' L?j areas (underneath the continental control. area) become contiguous and as
:.	 a consequence can cover broad geographical areas. For example, the	 i
	
y^	 p
entire coastal area of California is covered (above 1200 ft above ground)
	
g
:.	 with continuous controlled airspace which extends to 50 to 100 miles inland 	 !
•..,kt
in places. In the southeast portion of California and the western portion
of Arizona, such coverage is less than 50 percent of the area.:
Area navigation as established by the FAA in 1969 (Ref. 13) has
opened up additional airway routes which are more direct and which do
not have to follow VOR radials. Initially these routes will parallel exis-
n	
'
;,.	 ting victor and jet airways and later will be expanded to permit more
q`	 direct flights between terminals. Width of area navigation routes is de- 	 :.
termined in a manner similar to that of present airways but now includes	 ?` .
*	 t	 the additional errors due to DME_ground and airborne equipment and the
	
4^	 }
area navigation computer.
A recently instituted airspace strategy is that of the Terminal
Control Areas now established at Atlanta, Chicago and Washington, D C.
The principal object is to designate more of the airspace surrounding
large aviation terminals as positive control in order to achieve separation
	 !'
of VFR and IFR traffic in these congested areas. These areas with mixed
	
'	 VFR and IFR traffic are the most dangerous with respect to potential
mid-air collisions, particularly in marginal weather conditions. VFR	 +
pilots are often unaware of the "fixes" and patterns used by ATC to control'
IFR traffic in and out of these areas. On the other hand, -IFR pilots under
ATC control may be lulled into a false sense of security despite the
	
^	 highest-priority regulation of "see and avoid" whenever possible. Finally,
	
It	 rs these areas have a high percentage of climbing and descending traffic
	
r
which makes "see and avoid" ` a difficult process.
23
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The status of some existing airspace sub-categories and plans for
future changes are shown in Table 4.
Table 4. Present and Planned High and Low Altitude
Airways and Terminal Control Areas
pp J
Airspace Designation Existing Number(1970)
Future Number
(1980)
Jet Routes - 185 100
Jet area navigation routes 18 300
VHF Airways 435 250
Area Navigation Airways -	 10 200
Terminal Control Areas 3 64
f
f
I
{ _ t
3. 1 2 Future Air Traffic Loads	 -
Air traffic projections considered as fundamental to the design are ?
shown in Table 5.	 Aircraft fleet size is important because it gives an
r indication of the size of she avionics market and points out the fact that
r
} the vast majority of the aviation fleet is 	 and will continue ti be, general '
t aviation.	 The total number of annual flights is of interest for two reasons: ;
first, about two-thirds of all flights are itinerant; second, the number of
IFS. flights will increase from less than one-third of the current itinerant ;Xi
flights to almost half of a: much larger number of future flights. 	 Thus,
the Air Traffic Control Systerxz load (which is related primarily to con- }
 gtrolled or instrument ope rations)_ will	 row to an even greater extent than
r. the increase in aircraft population itself would imply. {
Of considerable significance in the description of air traffic, as it #	 "
relates to a- satellite-based system, is. the peak instantaneous. airborne .
aircraft count.	 Assuming an initial operational capability for the system
of 1980, and a 30-year design life for the system, it can be inferred from
Table 5 that the system, _ if it were to service the majority of airborne
aircraft, should be capable of handling about 100, 000 airplanes at one m:.
time. It should also be noted, however, that the capability of Handling'
this many aircraft need not be but
	 into the syste
-jam	 £^^' 	 ufivr nmFf^ ^2`,^'	 .Y „	 "F?^1^
_.4
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TYPICAL LIFETIME OF A MAJOR AIR
	
r
TRAFFIC CONTROL SYSTEM CONCEPT
.	 I	 i
2010
1968 1980 1995 (Extrapolation)
Aircraft Fleet Size
Air Carrier 2,500 3,500 6,500 13,000
General Aviation 114,000 214 , 000 500,000 -1,000,000
Military 20,000 20,000 20, 000 20,000
All Users 136,500 237 , 500 526, 500 -1,000,000
Annual Flights (In Millions)
Itinerant 23: 6 (29% IFR) 46.4 (43% IFR) 109.5 (49% IFR) 200 (>557. IFR)
Local 12. 1 20.7 47.9 100
Total 35.7
_6_CT 157.4 -300
Peak Airborne Aircraft
Air Carrier 1,300 2,100, 4,600 9,000General 8,000 16,800 46,300 84,000
Military 3,500 3,300 3,500 7,000
All Users 12,800 22,200 54,400 -100,000
Itinerant 42,400 (-31, 800 Enroute)
Local 12, 000 (-22,600 Terminal)
=F
I'
i
r^
Table 5. Aviation Projections (Adapted from Ref. 14)
It should also be noted not only that of the 54, 400 aircraft airborne
1
' at the peak instant in 1995, 42, 400 will be on itinerant flights, but thatt
t
over 10, 000 of those will either have not yet departed the terminal area
or will have already arrived at their destination terminal area.. 	 Thus, x	 a
{t over 40 percent of the traffic will be in terminal areas, which are,the areas '`	 {.^
of greatest likelihood of mid-air collisions.	 Thus, the satellite CNS'
Y.
_system will be far more useful if it can service terminal areas, where the
'accuracy requirements are more stringent, than if it can simply service s
enroute areas.	 - Lt
Although the ATCAC report certainly serves as the standard base.-
line on this subject, a related analysis of future ATC loads which was
initiated as part of this study prior to completion of the ATCAC report
also is available (Ref 	 14 Appendix C). z
:
3. 1 3	 Air Traffic Services
The following desr.riptions define the basic operational services pro-
vided by the Federal Aviation Administration (Ref. 15);
Air- Traffic Rules.	 The rules governing the flight of aircraft
serve the pilot by allowing him to anticipate the actions of
others.	 Where control service is provided, rules offer a
better means for the ground-based system to predict the
future actions of the pi..ot.
w
i
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Ground-Based Navigation Facilites. Navigation facilities
provide the pilot with accurate guidance and establish a
common system of reference for the pilot and the controller.
Aviation Weather Information. Current and forecast
meteorologic information is required for preflight planning.
Pilots in flight need current meteorologic data to continue
flight in a safe and efficient manner.
Flight Planning and Inflight Information. Through flight
service stations, Notices to Airmen, and regular pub-
lications, the pilot is aided in selecting routes and air-
ports most suitable for the safe and effective performance
' of his flight.	 While in .flight, pilots receive timely noti-
fication of hazardous weather and significant status reports
on navigation facilities and airports.
Search and Rescue Alerting	 The filing of a flight plan and
subsequent followup action afford a means for assuring that
i search and rescue services will be alerted whenever a
flight is overdue.
Air Traffic Control
	
The ground-based ATC subsystem
offers increased safety by keeping controlled aircraft
J
separated from each other and from hazardous areas.
i Examination of "The National Aviation System Plan, 1971 -1980" (Ref. 16)
indicates that although the emphasis has changed somewhat, these basic
^ F
services- remain the essence of FAA's role in air operations. 	 Several	 x
x of these services merit further discussion here.
	 Air Traffic Rules are
treated in Appendix B.
3, 1. 3, 1	 Navigation Service
Quoting from the "National Aviation System Plan, 1970- 79 11 ) (Ref. 17).
"The agency has a statutory responsibility to provide (develop,
procure, install, and operate) within the limits- of appropria-
tions by Congress a system of ground-based navaids.
	 These
I: a'facilities will enhance the safe and efficient utilization of-air-
	
.._
space and the effectiveness of air traffic 'control by making
4 available to pilots and controllers an electronic environment
of common references for position reporting, routes of flights
departure and landing guidance under all types of weather and
ground siting conditions.	 Present agency policies call for 	 i
extending these. services to new airspace segments, airports,
and runways as justified by increasing traffic and for improv- _
ing safety and reliability of operation.
	 Inherent technical	 xlimitations of existing navaids inhibit long-term dependence
on current technology to meet future service needs.
	 Long-
rang agency requirements include the investigation of advances
	 :.
r
in technology for the purpose of selecting alternate or replace-
ment systems to improve the, quality, effectiveness, and
reliability of navaid services to airspace users.
	 r
26
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This study interprets the term "ground.-based" in the third line above to
mean "station-referenced" as opposed to on-board navigation devices such
as doppler and/or inertial navigation systems. Thus any navigation
system considered as part of this study should be consistent with the re-
quirements and philosophy spelled out in the foregoing paragraph.
One of the most significant changes in the air transportation. picture
which will occur in the next few years with the expansion of area naviga-
tion. Area navigation is defined by the FAA (Ref. 18) as, "The ability to
follow a selected course to a predefined point unconstrained by directional
characteristics of external guidance sources. 1 ' Clearly, area navigation
offers great promise in both increasing flight safety and the capacity of
our national airspace. This fact assumes ever greater importance when
one considers a large projected growth in the number of airports and
runways. Without area navigation, the queues would form no _longer on
the taxiways, but almost entirely in the airways, a trend which would be
both expensive and dangerous.
In an excellent study recently performed by the FAA Western
Regional Headquarters (Ref. 19) it was pointed out that:
"An area navigation system is required to provide direct
4	 q
c	 flight between any two geographical points and the flexibility
`: p	 of IFR operation at all existing secondary airports and
vertiports.	 This type navigation system lends itself to
adding or deleting service stops dependent upon public
demand without additional costs for navigational facilities.
It is- readily adaptable to any airport system that may be
developed to meet future changes in air transportation
needs.
The Satellite CNS System is, by its nature, an area. navigation
system. 3
3. 1. 3.2 Air Traffic Control Service
Again quoting from Reference 17
4
"The principal mission of the air traffic control system is
to provide for the safe and efficient flow of traffic including
the establishment_ and operation within the limits of avail- f
able 'appropriations made by the Congress of the necessary
air navigation and air traffic control facilities. 	 In the con-
duct of this mission the system is galled upon not only to '=
provide aircraft clearances and instructions to maintain z:'
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safe separation between aircraft flying under instrument
flight rules (IFR) but also to perform a variety of other
services. Increasingly, the air traffic control system is
providing advisory services for separating VFR and IFR
traffic, disseminating meteorological information, assis-
ting in aircraft navigation, and participating in functions
not related solely to aircraft separation. "
Thus the CNS system requirements must be specified in terms of:
• Surveillance (accuracy and capacity)
• Conflict detection and resolution (computation
load and operational suitability)
• Command and control (communications capacity).
3. 1. 3. 3 Search and Rescue (SAR)
SAR statistics for the past decade show that the great majority of
SAR incidents involves downed aircraft. The survival of victims of such
incidents is strongly correlated with the search time required before
rescue may be implemented. In the case of VFR flights without flight
plans, several hours may elapse before establishing that the aircraft is
missing. Following current procedures, severai additional hours or
even days may elapse before the search party is organized. This usually
involves alerting the Civil Air Patrol (CAP) in the appropriate geographical
section. Subsequently a search strategy is planned which will minimize
the search time as well as the possibility of further accidents. In the
case of IFR flights, the alerting time is shorter, but the search may be
even more difficult and time consuming due to poor (instrument) weather
conditions. Considering the loss of human lives due to the delays incurred
as a result of the inherent delay in current SAR operations involving air-
craft, it follows that significant improvements in SAR efficiency may be
achievable by exploiting features inherent in the satellite CNS system.
.	 The surveillance function, accomplished from a central location, can
rapidly detect the occurrence, or impending occurrence of an emergency
situation resulting from sudden or unexpected changes in the dynamic
behavior of controlled aircraft. This is, of course, assuming the absence
of any other form of aircraft-to-ground communication. Such emergency
situations can then be quickly evaluated and appropriate SAR. authorities
notified.
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The central ATC surveillance function is key to this SAR concept
in that it precludes the need for coordination among different centers.
_ It is also conceivable that the alerting process may to some extent be
y automated by incorporating elements of vital SAR agencies into the system(i. e, local CAP headquarters, Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service).
'	
r 3. 2 SPECIAL STUDIES
3. 2. 1	 Air Traffic Control in Non-Hub Areas
j The principal problems of future aviation and air traffic control are r
concerned with the cities which are major air transportation hubs with
their high concentration of aircraft. 	 Appropriately, these areas have
been highlighted by most of the ATC studies performed in recent years.
r:
The population growth rate (and corresponding aviation activity) in Hub I
areas is greater than the rate of geographical expansion of the areas and, !	 '
consequently, limited airport and airspace capacity will continue to aggra-
vate the air traffic control problems in these areas.	 Somewhat less !`
treatment has been given to air traffic control problems associated with,4
non-Hub areas, which is reasonable in view of the recognized density-
hazard relationships inherent in aircraft activity (Refs 14 and 20).	 Never- t
theless, just as there will be an additional 14 Hubs (exceeding 7 million
t
annual enplanements) in the next 10 years, so will there be a large number
of small communities maturing in aviation activity which will demand
more and more air traffic control services.
	 There are reasons to ex-
pect that aviation growth in remote areas might accelerate even faster k	 .,.t
than anticipated: ;¢
•	 Increased use of remote areas for personal flying
due to congestion"' in the Hub areas
•	 Increased access demands to recreation areas, of
which a large portion are remotely located, by both
general aviation and air carriers
•	 Increased use of aviation to se.-ve small communities
with mail and commercial goods.
rt
r
`Despite new general aviation reliever airports in Hub areas which will
i be beneficial primarily to business flying.
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Growth in most of these areas will not create the density problems asso-
ciated with large Hubs, but collectively will make considerable demands
on facilities expansion and ATC coverage. The problem is not new to the
evolutionary growth of aviation in the U. S. , but it might be questioned as
to whether the appropriate solution should be the continued expansion of
the present distributed system of facilities.
As aviation activity at a given location or airport grows, some form
of air traffic control service is normally provided by the FAA in accor-
dance with prescribed criteria. 	 For such an airport, the growth process
and corresponding facility expansion might be depicted conceptually as
shown in Figure 6.	 In any existing (small) airport, local and transient a
operations build up due to growth of local aviation interest in the sur-
rounding community and from other causes such as those given above.
The first added service might be a Flight Service Station (FSS) to accom-
modate VFR activities. 	 The second addition might be the establishment I•
of an IFR approach procedure in the case of a suitably located, existing
VO,R. or with the concurrent installation of a Terminal VOR.
	
In time, an
airport traffic control tower would be added, followed by an Instrument
Landing System (ILS) and eventually the requirement for terminal control
of IFR traffic with the associated Airport Surveillance Radar (ASR) and
Remote Transmitter/ Receiver (RTR) facilities. It is not difficult to imagine
{
this process having taken place at a location like Las Vegas which, although r
not in one of the major Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSA's),
now qualifies as one of the 22 largest air traffic Hubs in the U. S
	 Although
Las Vegas might be considered too unique for an example it is, never-
theless, representative of the kind of area which is remote, but yet com-
mands a high level of transient traffic.
	 There are many other similar
areas,- primarily recreational, with the potential for similar growth.
The facility establishment rate anticipated in Figure 6 would be hastened
by the commencement of air carrier operations, but in any case, activity :.
levels will be further stimulated by the improved facilities' themselves. p
This should be clear from recent aircraft activity statistics which show-
_an appro=ximate 50:50 itinerant-local operations relationship percentage
at airports with FAA towers and a 21;70 itinerant-local operations
relationship percentage at nontower airports.
r
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Figure 6. Anticipated ATC Facilities Expansion
i,
Some of the prominent criteria used by the FAA to establish each
YP	 r'	 b	 in Table 6. Thet
	
	
Ge of facility
 and service at a even location .are shown
table also snows the present number of airports and facilities and those
planned throughout the 1970's. It would appear that there is some diffi-
culty in expanding ATC facilities at a rate commensurate with the de-
mand. As an example, it has been indicated (Ref. 14) that there are
approximately 400 airports, located in uncontrolled airspace, which have
	 +^
approved instrument approaches. About 50 of these airports are presently
accommodating air carrier operations.
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Table 6. Facility Establishment Criteria
Facilities
Airport Traffic Control Towers
Remote Transmitter/Receiver (RTR)
Airport Surveillance Radar (ASR)
Automatic Terminal Information Service (ATIS)
landing Aids
VORTAC(4)
ILS (Conventional)
Non-Precision (1 VOR)
DME
Governing Criteria
124, 000 AIO(1), Air Commerce
Z50, 000 AIO, General Aviation
At least 1 VHF and/or UHF channel per term
control position
150,000 RIO, including =10,000 scheduled air
carriers (3
2100,000 AIO
1200 AIA (5) or 11824 annual passenger
originations
25, 000 AIA at primary commer^ p airports;
700 ALA under other conditions ( ►
Same as :VOR(9)
Where needed in place of marker
11400 AIA if DME gives lower minimums
	
Facilities	 Total
	
Planned	 Facilities
1970/71-1980	 1980
159
	
487
130(2)
	
584
103	 262
84
	 165
43
	 892(6)
480
	 890(7)
90
	
146
	146 (at TVOR)	 146
386 (at ILS)	 399
Facilities
Existing
328
454
159
81
849
410
56
0
13
Procedures
FSS00)
Level I (Unmanned)	 Public airport with no weather: 15000 AIO Unmanned 13	 387	 400
Level II/III 115, 000 AIO ( 1 i)
 plus instrument approachManned F°
Level IV Same as Level II/III w/r to AIO Manned	 2,18	 274
	
572
Communications (VHF-UHF) t
On-Site
Remote Controlled Outlet (RCO)
Limited Remote Controlled Outlet - 1t
at VOR (-LRCO-A)
Limited Remote Controlled Outlet - Provide reliable communications coverage 7	 194	 7
separate facility (LRCO-B)j s'
Single Frequency Outlet - coverage t
extension (SFO)
Self-Sustained Outlet - extreme remote h
area (SSO)
Notes:
(1)AIO : ,Annual Itinerant Operations 	 (i0)Leve1 1 Self-briefing facilities operated by the airport,
(2)Includes some relocations with telephone facility to higher-level FSS.
z	 (3)	 Level II/IIINew goal is 20, 000-30,000 AIO depending on nature of requirements. Attended during busy hours; Includes weatherteletype circuit and (in some cases) aircraft
d
_	 (4)Primarily enroute facilities, some are used as landing aids: movement circuits.	 Level III provides addi-
i+( '5) AIA:I : Annual Instrument Approaches. service of local airport advisories.
(6)	 Level IVAll include either DMEi or TACAN facilities Provides (in addition to Level II/III) enroute
(7 )At
communications, in-flight services and
d 647' airports; includes 200Cat. lI. ILS and 21 Cat.. III A. centralized functions for the entire FSS
) Support ce iling and visibility minimums and provide for 	 (11)5-year operations growth.	 Level Il tower airport and AIO do not include air carrier }
(9)operations.Airports not qualified for ILS. 	 Level III non-tower airports and AIO include air carrier
operations:
se.
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Elimination of this situation will require establishment of controlled
airspace to and at these airports and the initiation of communications,
navigation and surveillance services consistent with safe operations at
the desired activity levels. The accommodations are more easilypro-
vided in the coastal and plain areas where the judicial placement of facili-
ties can cover a number of community airports and inter-airport airspace.
In more hilly or mountainous terrain, the facility costs per given area
coverage will increase sharply due to limited line of sight coverage.
An example of the evolutionary process and facility establishment
problem is seen in the aviation activity at Bishop, California. Bishop is
situated at the north end of the Owens Valley which lies between two chains
of high mountains (10, 000-15, 000 ft) which extend some 120 miles to the
South.	 From the standpoint of tourist appeal and air traffic growth,
•. Bishop has potential similar to Las Vegas in many respects.
	 Throughout
A these mountains, especially in the vicinity of Bishop, there are numerous {''
recreation areas and facilities which have been growing at an accelerated
pace in recent years.	 As is to be expected the air traffic to Bishop from
o
{ the Southern California populous regions has also increased. 	 In VFR
weather there is easy access to Bishop up the Owens Valley, since the
t:
- valley floor is approximately 10 miles wide and is at only 3000 to 4000 ft I.
elevation.	 Several years ago a remote FSS outlet (from Tonopah, Nevada) 3	 ,
was established at Bishop, but until 1970 Bishop was still in uncontrolled {-;
airspace-.	 At that time a VO	 station was installed by the State ofR r "'^ California and commissioned.
	 Subsequently, a VOR. IFR approach pro-
cedure and controlled airspace were established by the FAA, connecting
Bishop with airways V244 and V105. - These airways have minimum` r
enroute altitudes (TMEA's) of 15, 100 and 11, 000 feet respectively.
	 The
problem of establishing ATC communications and surveillance facilities
at a location such as Bishop is that it wouldhave such limited 'coverage at
.' the lower altitudes.
	 For example, an adjacent valley just 25 miles away x
would not be covered. 	 Here the coverage advantages of a satellite system
are obvious.
	 Thus, it is seen that the continued expansion of distributed .,
facilities in future years will be costly in any case, but even more aggra-
vated as ATC attempts to embrace the aviation activities in the rougher a
geographic regions of the United States. 	 Section 3. 2. 4 discusses briefly
t
s
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the costs of the existing ATC facilities.
	 An accurate extrapolation of
these costs to the future is warranted in order to determine quantitatively
the cost advantages that would accompany the introduction of a satellite
based ATC system in these remote or non-Hub areas.
3. 2. 2 Aircraft Maneuvers
Definitions and Scope
Any separation strategy for ATC must consider both the accuracy
of navigation systems and/or surveillance systems and the data rates of
-i such systems.	 Both accuracy and data rate will interact in determining
., a safe separation interval.
	 In considering the data rate portion of a sepa-
ration strategy, it is important to include the possible causes of data F
dropouts or data loss.
	 This section will consider one possible type of
dropout which is associated with the variations in look angle between an C -
aircraft antenna and the satellite constellation. 	 A typical aircraft antenna
pattern is discussed in Appendix K to this report.
	
Assuming that thef
satellite constellation is chosen to cover the entire continental United
States, the principal cause of dropouts can then be restricted to the chang-
ing spatial orientation of the aircraft.
	 For example, an aircraft whose ' S
j antenna provides upper hemispherical coverage could encounter antenna
shading if the aircraft enters a steep bank or dive to the north or a steep r
climb to the south.	 This shading could (but probably would not) cause the {r,
aircraft to drop out of the ATC system either partially or totally during
the period of time that shading existed.
	 A discussion of LIT capabilities
and limitations in this regard can be found in Section 5. 3. 2.
;iy This analysis will briefly discuss the range and duration of attitude
excursions expected and the possible contribution of these maneuvers to
satellite data dropouts.
	 Detailed computer simulation runs to determine
probabilistic data with respect to dropouts on the interrelationships of .
antenna location and coverage, satellite constellation selected, attitude i.
maneuver being executed, and location of the maneuvering aircraft would
be of significant value but such an effort is presently beyond the scope of
this study.
r
t
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Normal and unusual aircraft attitude categories are considered
since they have received consistent definitions within the aviation corn-
munity.	 The FAR's establish a specific attitude envelope as a normal,
non-acrobatic excursion range. 	 The non-acrobatic attitude range is
defined in FAR 91. 71(b) (Ref. 23) in that intentional maneuvers may
not exceed
"(1)	 A bank of 60 degrees relative to the horizon; or
(2)	 A nose up or nose down attitude of 30 degrees
relative to the horizon.
The exceptions listed are restricted to flight testing and training flights. F
Acrobatic flight is defined in FAR 91. 71(a) (Ref 23) to be:
... an intentional maneuver involving an abrupt change in aircraft's
attitude, an abnormal attitude, or abnormal acceleration not necessary .
for normal flight.
Unusual attitudes have been defined by the FAA in their Instrument }
Flying Handbook (Ref. 24) as follows: }
1t An unusual attitude is any aircraft attitude not normally required
for instrument flight. "
tf
The principal causes of inadvertent unusual attitudes may be sum-
marized as: t
a)	 turbulence
b)	 instrument failure
4
c)	 distraction from normal cockpit duties
d)	 spatial di ,orientation .
i e)	 inattention to duties,
f)	 lack of pilot proficiency. i
Turbulence-induced attitude excursions are typically transient in .
nature (e, g. , 1-4 sec) whereas the others tend to be of longer duration.
Items b) through f)`are generally involved in what is called flight technical
error.	 This error is a significant parameter, of course, in the conflict
determination process, from the standpoint ofexpected aircraft accelera-
tions or, velocities.	 However, the anticipation of data dropouts in this .;
35
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process could be handled by ATC as a reduced surveillance sample rate
with an attendant increase in "prediction" time for the determination of
=t	 hazard space.	 Thus, either adverse flight conditions or poor pilot tech-
nique could represent causes for increased separation standards.
General Aviation, Air Carrier, and Military aircraft have different
ranges of normal attitude maneuvers; so representative examples in each
category have been considered. 	 Three basic flight modes have been
picked as representative of the normal attitude range. 	 They are:
a)	 Take off and climb
b)	 Turns #r
c)	 Descent and landing,
Normal Maneuver Analysis
Several general aviation aircraft were examined based upon data f-
available in the owners manuals or handbooks for each family or aircraft.
Piper, Cessna, and Beech single-engine aircraft were considered, and
the take-off climb and approach descent values in Table 7 represent typi-
cal values for these aircraft types.
	 Air carrier samples considered were !	 ,
the DC-8, DC-9, and preliminary-design data available on V/STOL air-
craft that may shortly be joining the aviation community (Ref. 25), 	 Data
on the F-104 was obtained from Lockheed as representative of present
:.	 day high performance fighter aircraft.
	
Lockheed stated that the next 1
generation of aircraft now on the drawing boards will have even wider i	 w
attitude ranges.
Table 7	 Nominal Pitch Angles r	 '
Aircraft General Air
Type Aviation Carrier Military
Flight
Phase (e. g. , Cessna 150) (e g, , DC-8) _ (e.g. ,	 F-104)(deg) (deg) (deg)
Climb +5 +5,' +13
Descent -3 -1 -22
k
r
1
Y
r
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Look angles will also be degraded with large bank angles away from
the satellites. The angle of bank required for a turn is a function of both
the rate of turn required and the velocity of the aircraft making the turn.
Figure 7 shows the bank angle required in making 6-, 3-, and 1. 5-deg/sec
rate turns. At 250 knots (the maximum speed presently allowable under
10, 000 ft), a bank of 35 degrees is required to make the standard. rate
(3 deg/sec) turn. When the aircraft slows to 2001 knots (the maximum
allowable in an airport traffic area), the bank angle is reduced to
29 degrees.
80
f
70
6 DEG/SEC
LOAD Fp,CT
Or ^,. ^r
s '^
	
l I ^	 //ice
3 DEG/SEC
T
1.5 DEG/SEC
I	 ^	 I
I !^^ MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE SPEED UNDER 10,000 FT
MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE SPEED IN AIRPORT AREA
z
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0	 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200
SPEED (KT)
	
1.0	 1.2	 1.4	 1,6	 1.8	 2.0	 2.2	 2.4	 2.6	 2.8	 3.0	 3.2	 3.4 x,.k
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i
Figure 7. Bank Angle vs Speed and Turn Rate
Holding patterns are normally accomplished with standard rate
turns and speeds less than 200 knots but in any case with bank angles not
A
exceeding 30 degrees. The bank attitude should occur in approximately
1-minute periods with intervening 1-minute periods of level flight, unless
an aircraft is in a-compact holding pattern or circling some ground point.
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Intentional Off-Nominal Attitude Sequences
There are a number of intentional events that produce wider attitude
excursions than those just defined. These flight activities generally
involve maneuvers of significant duration and it may prove advantageous
to limit the air space volumes in which the longer term, large attitude
maneuvers may be performed; or to require that the aircraft have an
adequate number of transmitters and antennas so that dropouts will not be
significant. The former approach is being applied now in instances such
as the Edwards Air Force Base Flight Test Area which is part of over
10, 000 square miles of restricted areas in the Los Angeles ARTCC area.
r
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3. 2. 3 Near Mid-Air Collision/Mid-Air Collision Study
3.2.3. 1 Near Mid-Air Collisions (NMAC)
In the investigation of aircraft maneuvers it was thought that near
mid-air collision (NMAC) situations and actual mid-air collision (MAC) ,
experiences might reveal attitude considerations other than those pre-
.
viously discussed. The FAA report on near mid-air collisions for 1968
(Ref, 20) was examined for the conditions of flight which prevailed before
and after the NM.:AC situation was recognized. There were 1128 hazard-
ous NMAC's reported, most of them occurring in terminal areas.
Each of the foregoing NMAC situations described fell into one of
ten defined problem areas. In addition, specific causal factors were iden-
tified by the FAA under each problem area. The list of these problem
areas is given below, together with appropriate comments regarding atti-
dude implications.	 i
t 1.	 Pilot Deviation Indicated
1
This area contains those incidents in which there was
clear violation of FAR' s.	 One causal factor listed a
here was unauthorized acrobatics, which obviously <
f has attitude implications. 	 Whereas LIT surveillance q
could detect such activity, it doesn't appear appro-
priate to impose antenna requirements to handle all
such situations, but rather to handle them as dis-
cussed above.	 Furthermore, the total number of such
incidents represented 2-percent of all the hazardous Y.
NMA.0 I s.
t
2.	 Air Traffic Service System Error
r
Although there were no causal factors listed under this
j.t
area, the supporting data doe, indicate that the nature
of these errors gave rise to cor:flict situations which
did not involve aircraft attitudes other than normal
-	 climb or 'descent. x-
r.
qq
Hazardous NMAC's are defined by the FAA to involve closest proximity
of less than 500 ft except where closure rates greater than 400- knots are
involved. a
rr
3. Airspace Navigation
This area includes all those factors which place air-
craft in undesirable Proximity, both horizontal and
vertical, to each other. Altimeter error and air-
craft converging on a navigation aid are examples.
However, none of the specific causal factors have
any implications with respect to attitude maneuvers.
4. IFR/VFR Mix
The second greatest number of hazardous NMAC's(226) are involved with this problem. Attitude
implications are those associated with normal
climbs and descents as discussed previously, usually
when an IFR aircraft encounters a VFR aircraft in
level flight.
5, High Speed Versus "Low Speed
This problem is primarily one of high speed operation I
(of one of the aircraft) in terminal and low altitude
areas.	 Principal attitude consideration is high speed #	 rdeparture where climb angles are fairly steep.
	 High
performance military jet descents are fairly steep a(e, g. 22 deg) at high altitudes, but the pitch attitude ;n
at the lower levels where the fast aircraft might en-
counter a low speed aircraft are generally more at	 {
moderate (glide slope of 2. 5 to 3 deg). {
6.	 See and Be Seen
This is a broad problem area which contained the
greatest number of NMAC incidents (241), but did
not involve unusual attitudes.	 The causal factors
listed here contain many tangible NMAC contributors
such as aircraft configuration (blind spots); however,
i	 the one listed a=s "Distraction" is undoubtedly the
most difficult to cope with. 	 Many of these NMAC's
involved aircraft in airport landing patterns, as
discussed in Item 8._
	
Inherent in this factor is the
questionable validity of the historical notion of "see
and be seen".
7.	 Marginal VFR Weather
All of the factors in this problem area involve
situations (probably IER/ VFR) where the reporting ' I
pilot considered the weather to be below VAR
minimums.	 No specific attitude considerations
are indicated.
40
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8, Traffic Patterns
This problem area contains factors which are primarily
'	 (willful or oblivious) abuses of pattern procedures and
poor pilot/ controller coordination. 	 Most flights invol-
ved only normal maneuvers (descents and turns).
Mostly, smaller aircraft were involved.
9.	 Airport Proximity
This problem area concerns cominunicat ion/ coordination
factors associated with pattern traffic in closely silua-
ted airports.	 Attitude considerations arc the saine. as
those in (8) above.
10,	 Training . Flights E,
'	 Such factors as simulated instrument flight (hood)
including approaches, acrobatics, and other training !
aspects are included here.	 Attitude implications are Vs;
numerous,	 In addition to acrobatics, unusual attitudes(steep turns,	 stalls,	 etc, ) are inherent in all pilot
training as well as in cheep rides.
Summariz-zg the attitude implications of NMAC data, it appears r
E
that acrobatics and unusual attitudes were involved in a relatively small
percentage of the NMAC's. 	 In addition, abrupt evasive action, which
implies high-g maneuvers and often large attitude excursions, was taken
in about 20 percent of the NMAC's.
	
In all the other cases 1) no action
was considered necessary, 2) only minor action was taken, or 3) theme t r
was not time to take any evasive action whatsoever. 	 The alert time prior I
to evasive action was about 3 seconds' or less in 90 percent of,the -haz-
ardour NMAC's. 	 Thus, it is seen that in NMAC situations, normal air-
craft attitudes usually prevail except for a very brief evasive action
period.*	This tends to indicate that a principal problem in NMAC s,' It
'	 which is a "failure to see early enough", occurs under attitude situations
which do not preclude ef_f: ctive use of a surveillance and/or CAS system. `.
f
2 Mid-Air Collisions (MAC)
In. the 147 MAC's which occurred. between 1959 and 1966, the data
show only 27 cases where any evasive action was taken by at least one of ;$
the aircraft.
	 For the most part, the intended aircraft maneuvers 'being
performed prior to the collision continued, up-to the time of impact. }A.	 '
6It might be inferred from representative "kind of flying" statistics
(Ref. 26) without actually investigating the individual reports on associated
accidents that a much larger percentage of unusual attitudes were involved
in these cases than in the NMAC's. Of the 147 collisions, approximately
30 percent occurred during cruise or normal climb/descent. The other
70 percent included a large number of landing, Takeoff and traffic pattern
cases as well as aerobatics, air races, and aerial applications. As men-
tioned in the discussion of NMAC's, there is little a CNS system can do
to protect against very flamboyant types of flying; the most logical solution
appears to be to confine them to specially-allocated or restricted airspace.
Aircraft exhibiting moderate maneuvering characteristics (or for that
matter-off-nominal surveillance equipment characteristics) can be protected
by larger separation standards, especially if the ATC system is capable
of using variable separation standards.
Many of the takeoff, landing, and traffic pattern MAC's occurred at
uncontrolled airports. Smaller aircraft are frequently inclined to steeper
banks in these terminal operations. The inherent coverage of a satellite
CNS system could extend a separation assurance service to these situations.
Although the aircraft attitudes might result in temporary surveillance
dropouts, the flight intent is sufficiently predictable withir the airport
area that these dropouts may be tolerable.
One cannot usually generalize from individual cases or even sniall
samples. However, the precedence set by the Urbana, Ohio collision i
(which was the first GA/AC MAC resulting in air carrier fatalities); the
number of lives lost in that and the Hendersonville, N. C. MAC the same
year; and the prospect of such an incident involving a jumbo jet are suffi-
ciently significant to stimulate an examination of the accident circum-
stances as they might relate to CNS considerations.
The MAC ^-t Urbana, Ohio in 1967 between the Beechcraft B-55 and
the DC-9 perhaps more than anything else indicts the see -and -b::- seen
principle. It is quite apparent from the NTSB report (Ref. 27) that even
under the VFR conditions that prevailed that neither the Beechcraft nor
DC-9 pilots saw the other aircraft in time to attempt an evasive maneuver.
Under the preva;ling circumst.int,e, . w`i--. —k involved only a small change
i
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It might be inferred from -
 representative "kind of flying" statistics
(Ref. 26) without actually investigating the individual reports on associated
accidents that a much larger percentage of unusual attitudes were involved
in these cases than in the NMAC's. Of the 147 collisions, approximately
30 percent occurred during cruise or normal climb/descent. The other
70 percent included a large number of landing, takeoff and traffic pattern
cases as well as aerobatics, air races, and aerial applications. As men-
tioned in the discussion of NMAC's, there is little a CNS system can do
to protect against very flamboyant types of flying; the most logical solution
appears to be to confine them to specially-allocated or restricted airspace.
Aircraft exhibiting moderate maneuvering characteristics (or for that
matter-off-nominal surveillance equipment characteristics) can be protected
by larger separation standards, especially if the ATC system is capable
1
of using variable separation standards.
Many of the takeoff, landing, and traffic pattern MAC's occurred at
uncontrolled airports. Smaller aircraft are frequently inclined to steeper
banks in these terminal operations. The inherent coverage of a satellite
CNS system could extend a separation assurance service to these situations.
Although the aircraft attitudes might result in temporary surveillance
	
k
dropouts, the flight intent is sufficiently predictable within the airport
area that these dropouts may be tolerable.
One cannot usually generalize from individual cases or even small
samples. However, the precedence set by the Urbana, Ohio collision
(which was the first GA/AC MAC resulting in air carrier fatalities); the
number of lives lost in that and the Hendersonville, N. C. MAC the same
year; and the prospect of such an incident involving a jumbo jet are suffi-
ciently significant to stimulate an examination of the accident circum-
stances as they might relate to CNS considerations.
The MAC st Urbana, Ohio in 1967 between the Beechcraft B-55 and
the DC -9
 perhaps more than anything else indicts the see-and-b:>-seen
principle. It is quite apparent from the NTSB report (Ref. 27) that even
under the VFR conditions that prevailed that neither the Beechcraft nor
DC -9 pilots saw the other aircraft in time to attempt an evasive_ maneuver.
Under the prevailing circutnsta_nces, :v:
	 involved'only a small; change
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in bearing angle (DC-9 to Beechcraft) over a period of two minutes, a
ground snow cover background, and preoccupation with landing prepara-
tions, it is not at all obvious that the result would have been different,
even if the DC-9 had been within the regulation speed of 250 knots, although
the probability of detection increases with decreasing closing speed.
At the time of the accident, the DC-9 wat- under positive coitrol by
J.
RAPCON. Eighteen seconds prior to the collision the RAPCON issued
a traffic advisory to the DC-9 (the Beechcraft was operating under VFR
and was not in contact with any FAA facility, nor was its transponder
operating) which indicated a primary radar target at a near head-on
bearing and approximately one mile distant. Controllers do not normally
provide a radar vector to separate controlled aircraft from uncontrolled
(VFR) targets unless the pilot requests such service.
It would appear that the traffic advisory was ineffective since, as
the reference states, "Under- the physical conditions that appear to have
existed in this case, the maximum range of target detection would have
been approximately 4 miles". This might raise doubts about the validityj	
of a PWI concept. For example, one type of PWI available today provides
even less information than did the advisory (no bearing information is 	 l
given). On the other hand, as long as the target is within hazardous range,
that PWI gives a persistent indication which is not so likely to be set aside
in; favor of other cockpit duties. Other PWI's under design provide in
addition to bearing, information indicating whether the target is above or
below. This would increase the efficiency of visual scanning process and
reduce the response time to visNial contact. An intensive study of the
see-and-be-seen principal on a statistical basis (Ref. 28) indicates that
even with a PWI which results in detecting only twice the number of targets
than without it, there would be an effectiveness of reducing MAC's by a	 t
factor of 4 for closing rates comparable to this accident.
t
Radar Approach Control Facility (Air Force)
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An airborne CAS obviates the dependence on visual search or con-
tact.
	
Even if the DC-9 had had CAS equipment similar to the types being
sponsored today, it would have been of no use without a cooperative device
installed and operating in the Beechcraft.
Ground-controlled separation assurance also requires airborne
cooperative equipment.
	
Formerly, when primary radar was adequate to
handle the volume of traffic the minimal airborne CNS equipment consisted
of communications and an appropriate navigation receiver. 	 Present traffic
densities and facility establishment criteria dictate the need for identity-
generating secondary radar operating in conjunction with the primary
r. radar.	 Consequently, an airborne ATCRBS transponder is becoming an
essential element for obtaining ATC separation assurance. 	 With the ex-
7 pansion of ARTS and NAS capabilities, altitude readout equipment will be
required in the aircraft to participate in an automated separation assurance
system, although, it may be difficult to legislate the installation of such
equipment in small aircraft.
But in the Urbana case, the Beechcraft possessed the communications
and transponder equipment for positive control and, as stated in the NTSB
report,	 "... Hand the Beechcraft been under control of the air traffic
controller the accident could have been avoided because the controller
could have arranged to sequence the two aircraft in such a manner as toi4
avoid any converging of their flight paths... "
	 The report further states
r
that "... The Board is aware, however, that present day air traffic control
facilities are not adequate to handle the workload which would be created
by requiring positive control of all aircraft operatingin terminal areas...
r It should be noted that the controller did not have knowledge of the
Beechcraft altitude.	 This is typical with uncontrolled aircraft, which is
one of the reasons why ATC does not normally initiate vectors to separate
._ controlled from uncontrolled aircraft. S5
.
Among the implications of this accident, the lack of coll.ison warning
between controlled and uncontrolledaircraft is by far the most important.
Providing such a service is a critical requirement for the satellite CNS
syst .'
, 1	 Y
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iCircumstances surrounding the Hendersonville, N. C. , MAC were
different from those of the Urbana accident in many respects. Both the
air carrier Boeing 727, which was climbing out from the Asheville
i	 Municipal Airport, and the general aviation Cessna 310, approaching
Asheville, were operating IFR under control by the Asheville Approach
Control. Radar surveillance did not exist in the Asheville area. Both
aircraft were operating in and out of clouds prior to the MAC; so see-and-
be-seen was not a factor. The Asheville terminal is a small air traffic
hub with approximately one-third the annual instrument operations com-
pared to the number generated in the Urbana-Dayton area. 	 Although the
basic cause of the accident was considered by the Board to be a devia-
tion of the Cessna pilot from his assigned flight plan, the circumstances
_;	 t leading up to that error are sufficiently common that the plans for any
future ATC system must include built-in blunder protection. 	 Where com-
munications exist without surveillance, the only basis for ground-controlled
separation assurance are the ATC procedures-the ATC element mostj
susceptible to human error. `^ 1 	The approximate flight path for this accident 1r
is shown in Figure 8.g
Conclusions in the NTSB report (Ref. ^9) give evidence of the cir-
cumstances which possibly contributed to the Cessna pilot error and are
tabulated on the page facing Figure 8'.
fj
A brief discussion of ATC regulations and procedures is given in Appendix
:. B.	 Standards which dictate controller procedures, including such items as r'
separation distance in the absence of radar and standard communication
_phraseologies, are established by the FAA. 	 To meet unique requirements
some procedures are developed locally (ARTCC and approach control) but a	 `#
riianeuver assuring their consistency with the above standards and existing '.
Federal Aviation Regulations. 4<
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•	 "Atlanta Center advised the Cessna to expect an ILS
approach at Asheville. Y ' An ILS approach from the
Asheville VOR uses the Broad River radio beacon(RBN) to transition to the ILS loc_ iizer.
F
'	 Sj •	 Approximately two minutes later as the Cessna was
approaching the Asheville VOR, "Asheville Approach
control had its initial contact with the Cessna and no
notification was given as to the type of approach to
be used".
•	 Approximately 2 3/4  minutes later, or approximately
2 minutes before the Cessna passed over the VOR,
"Asheville Approach Control cleared the Cessna to
proceed from the Asheville VOR to the Asheville RBN,
a
but did not identify the type of approach to be used".
•	 "The clearance to the Asheville RBN was acknowledged
by the Cessna but was not read back.
	
There is no
requirement for readback at ATC clearances issued
to enroute traffic. it
'1 •	 The Cessna reported passing the VOR ... and the
crew advised ATC that they were headed for Asheville...
'j •	 The Cessna was first advised that they were to con- '.
duct an ADF-2 approach to Runway 16 approximately
;j 1 minute 16 seconds prior to the collision ... "
	
The
message was acknowledge by the Cessna.
The Cessna passed the VOR approximately 3 minutes before the
x collision and instead of turning right toward the Asheville RBN, -it turned
left more nearly in the direction of the Broad River RBN which lies on an f
extension line of Runway 16, the runway from which the Boeing had taken
4
off.	 (Post-accident investigation showed the Cessna ADF receiver turned
very close to the Broad River RBN frequency. )
i
As the Hendersonville accident clearly points out, unmonitored..
procedural separation methods are most susceptible to human error; in
fact the term "separation assurance" can scarcely be applied here.
q Unfortunately, despite the NTSB recommendation for".. , expeditious
increases in ATC radar coverage as the economics of money and man-
power .allow", there exist many such terminal areas as Asheville through- q
out CONUS where air carriers and general aviation are operating in the
same airspace without surveillance.
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3. 2. 4 Air Traffic Control System and User Costs
This section summarizes the costs which must be borne by the FAA
for the present and projected ground-based Air Traffic Control System
(ATCS).	 This section also assesses the effect of user equipment costs
on system acceptability. Using these figures, relevant cost comparisons
with the satellite CNS approach are made in Section 5.3.
3. 2. 4. 1 Cost of the ATCS
The cost and effectiveness of the existing and projected FAA radar
surveillance system cannot be compared directly with the postulated
satellite system because the performance that is inherent in the satellite
approach is not physically practical using the projected ground based
radar system. The cost comparison, therefore, does not put a value on
that additional coverage/reliability which is needed operationally and is
available only from the satellite system. Although the FAA plans call
for doubling the radar investment in the next decade, the fundamental
limitations in low altitude coverage and beacon performance, especially
in nigh density areas, will.. not be changed materially.
f	 N
The current FAA, investment in the ground element of the radar
A
surveillance system including both the enroute and the terminal area
primary and secondary (beacon) radars and associated remoting equip-
ment is about $330M at present and is projected to grow to $767M by 	 i,
1980. This projection does not include advanced_ features such as dis-
crete addressing proposed by the Air Traffic Control Advisory Committee	 `.
and approved by the FAA. These features could increase investment by 	 h
another 25 percent. In addition, the Department of Defense, which must
be compatible with the civil "common system," has a comparable invest-
ment in ATC radar facilities.
y	
-	
fit
Glen A. Gilbert stated in American Aviation (12/23/68) that "Complete
radar coverage- of all the airspace would certainly cost billions of 	 =
dollars."
^ -RD,
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CNS Investment Costs
The facilities currently used by the FAA for communications,
navigation, and surveillance are listed in Table 8, with estimates of the
total investment costs as given in indicated sources. These estimates
total somewhat higher than the book values carried by the FAA. in its
financial summary.
The location of facilities is an important factor in operational per-
formance and in the establishment and support costs. The desired
coverage is usually impossible to obtain from accessible sites using a
practical number of facilities and the resulting flight paths reflect these
compromises.
Most facilities have redundant electronics except for antenna sys-
tems and associated r-f feeds. The in-service availability of these
facilities usually exceeds 99 percent (Refs. 30 through 40). However, in
considering this overall statistical performance, a few individual facilities
have experienced extended outages which have caused serious disruptions
in operations. These problem outages have been principally at critical
locations in the flow patterns, such as in one of the 11 ",major hub" ter-
minal areas that handle 50 percent of the nationwide traffic.
Surveillance Recurring Cos ts
i	 The data given in Table 9, as extracted from FAA planning docu-
ments, compares projected recurring expenses for surveillance in 1-971
.and 1980. During this decade, the annual operating and maintenance"
(O&M) costs of these facilities could increase from $25 to $42M. When
L
annual costs of acquisition and modernization of facilities and equipment
(F&E) are included, these. figures became $37M and 4115M, respectively.'
w	 That portion representing facilities and equipment replacement and
modernization can be expected to continue as long as these facilities are
of major importance; and although the individual expenditures from year
to year vary appreciably, these averages are considered to be re resenta- 	 tY	 Y PP	 Y^,	 g	 P
tive. An appreciable factor in this cost is the =isolated location required
for many facilities so as to provide the required line-.of-sight radio
coverage. Mountain top radar stations, inp articular, present costly
all-year access problems.
tom,
is
..r
k;
'-a
i
I 	 I
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Table 8.	 FAA Total Investment Cost for A-G-A Communications,
NAVAIDS, and Radar Surveillance (Estimated as of
FY 1970) t°
Number of Approximate AverageFacilities	 Facility TypeInstalled Established Cost
1970 Each ( 1^1 ) Total ($M)	
f`
COMMUNICATIONS
378 RCAG (enroute) 98.0 37. 1
427 Remote Transmitter-Receiver 85.2 37.3(terminal area)
289 Flight Service Station 30. 1 8. 9
NAVAIDS
843 VOR 163.4 138. 0
561 TACAN at VOR 580. i 327. 0
7 DME at VOR Unknown - ^-
48 TVOR 138.2 6. 7
28 DVOR (VOR Conversion to Doppler) 2.43.4 7.8
28 Radio Ranges 52.8 1, 5
290 Non-Directional Radio Beacons 14.0 4. 1
46 Fan Markers 5.5 0.3
2 Cons olan 586.0
t
1. 2
RADAR SURVEILLANCE a
Enroute
r.
84 Long Range Radar
Primary 1600.0 134.4
	
.Secondary (Beacon) 240.0 20.16	 1
500 Microwave Link Repeaters 90.0 45.0
166 Microwave Link Terminals 91, 0 11.5
Terminal Area
120 Airport Surveillance Radar (ASR)
Primary 991..0 f ig.  0Secondary (Beacon)
TOTAL INVESTMENT - CNS $900.'0
Data Sources:(a)` Report No. RD-64-60, Cost of Major ATC and Navigation Facilities	 k
prepared for FAA/SR&DS by PRC, (June 1964). 4(b) Tc-chnical Manual Project No. 197-641-04R, Cost Estimates for
National Airspace Systems Facilities, DOT/FAA/SR&DS (August 1968)
(c) The National Aviation Systems Flan, DOT/FAA (March 1970)(d) Dept. of Transportation, ATC Advisory Committee Report, Vol. I	 {
(December 1969). 51
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Table 9. Comparison of Estimated 1971 and 1980 Annual Expenditures
for Radar Facilities and Equipment (F&E) and for
Operations and Maintenance (O&M)
Expenditures in $M
1971	 1980
Facility 'Type	 Averaged F&E
	 O&M Averaged F&E O&M
LRR
ARSR/SECRA	 8.o	 10.1	 20.8	 B. 6
Microwave Link
Relay & Terminals 	 0	 8.5	 16. 8	 15.0
ASR SECRA	 4. 1	 5.6	 36.5	 13. 1
	
t 2. 1	 24,,2	 73. 1	 41. 7
Total $36.3	 Total $114. 8.
Data Sources:(a) National Aviation System Plan/ Ten Year Plan, 1971 - 1980
DOT/FAA (March 1970)
(b) Technical Manual Project No. 197-641-04R Cost Estimates
for National Airspace SystemFacilities DOT/FAA/SRDS(August 1968)
Other ATCS Costs
i
a
4
Table 10 lists other major ATC facilities including control centers
	
t
and towers as well as landing aids. Also included is an estimate of related
average investment and O&M costs.
	
r
3. 2. 4. 2 The Effect of User E! ui ment Cost on System Acceptability
-	 -
The acceptability of any proposed air traffic control system concept
is a strong function of the cost of user equipment. While it is likely that
some system will be imposed on all segmerts of aviation, the concept
t
must not result in excessive economic burdens on the various elements of
the aviation community in order not to impede the growth of air transpor-
tation. Avionics costs are important factors in commercial aviation. A
financial return is available for the scheduled airline. For example, the
-cost of enroute and terminal delays in 1968 for all scheduled airlines
(Ref. 41) that were ATA members was in excess of 100 million dollars.
52	
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Number of Expenditures in $M
Investment Annual O&MFacilities Facility Type
Each Total Each TotalInstalled
26 ARTCC it. 3 294 4.4 114
(NAS Stage A) 13. 8 0.9
328 ATCT Av. 0.7 234 Av. 0.2 71.2
129 Full Time Approach Control
23 Part Time Approach Control
137 Non-Approach Control
191 Combined FSS
(ARTS II at 15 0 K ARTS`' III at
$1 M future)
92 ASDE	 ,' 0.6 55.2 0.08 7.3
12 PAR 0.76 9.1 0.02 0.24
92 Radar Bright Display Equipment o.6 54.2 0.08 5. 7
289 ILS 0.22 63.6 0.03 8.7
187 Flight Service, Stations 0.24 40 0.16 3.0
221 Miscellaneous L ighting 43 3
i^
_ T
Table 10. Major FAA.-`Facilities other than CNS
d
b; The problem of avionics costs for general aviation is somewhat
' more critical.	 These costs are more significant in relation to the air-
craft investment than air carriers experience, and since this equipment
.` may not provide a tangible benefit and may not be directly chargeable as
'	 s a business expense, it can be a major deterrant to general aviation grwoth.
To general aviation, costly new avionics may appear as only an entry fee
to the air traffic control system.	 The cost of general aviation user f
-` equipment would be a substantially larger percentage of the total airplane
cost and is critical to the health of general aviation.
	
Futhermore, the
a
1
return is not primarily a financial one.
	 Rather, it is the ability to fly t
into airports and airspace which would otherwise be denied him.
#r To consider the question of user equipment costs, it is necessary 1
:j to examine different categories of aircraft.
	
For this purpose, aircraft
r
{ are listed here according to their typical avionics costs.	 Included in the
first category, are almost all military aircraft and large commercial I°
jets.	 The second category includes second and third level carriers, for
_ the most part operating the short to medium haul and including V/STOL
types.	 General aviation is composed of approximately three types of
.w
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aircraft with a great deal of overlap.	 The most costly aircraft, such as
the high performance business twin engine and small jet aircraft, are one
category.	 From the standpoint of avionics equipment and pilot proficiency,
many company air fleets are competitive with the major air carriers.
The second and largest category is the moderate performance aircraft,
mostly single engine, and used for both pleasure and business flying.
These aircraft are frequently equipped with the minimum instrumentation
for instrument flight.	 Typical aircraft in this category are Cessna Skylanes
and Beach Bonanzas.	 The third group of general aviation aircraft is made
up of low performance aircraft used exclusively for training and/or pleasure
flights.	 Typical aircraft in this group are Cessna 120/140 and the older
Piper Cubs.	 These aircraft in same cases are not even equipped with
radios and have the most rudimentary instrumentation. 	 Thus, we can
-	 . divide aircraft into about six categories of different cost and sophistication
levels.	 In general, each category also exists for a different purpose.
The present cost of electronics for the various categories of aviation G
is indicative of what may be an acceptable cost for the user equipment in °.
an air traffic control system.
	 Typical avionics costs for several types of
aircraft are shown in Tables 11 and 12.	 The general aviation data in Table 13
shows both the installed equipment and the owner's intent as to the equip-
ment he would procure next.
	 In the two classes of military and commercial E
aviation, the addition of a device costing
	 2000 to $5000 is a very small
percentage of the total aircraft cost and commercial carriers could readily
- 1
absorb this cost.
	 Consideration of a satellite navigation set would clearly
be a matter of comparing. its performance and cost with the doppler and/or
inertial navigation system it would replace.
The niost numerous class of general aviation is the single-engine
four-place aircraft, which is used primarily for pleasure flying and occa-
•
sionally for business. 	 This aircraft category typically costs betweens, p
$13, 000 (Cessna 9.72, the most numerous single model produced) and T
$40,000 (Beach Bonanza) and is the most significant in terms of the effect
of user equipment cost, since it constitutes the largest number of aircraft. t
The third class of general aviation is the low-cost class.
	 It is less impor-
tant because there are fewer of these aircraft and over the years, 'they 1
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Table 11.	 Typical DOD CNS Avionics Costs (CNS Equipment
does not Include Mission Equipment)
Aircraft
Type CNS Equipment Function CNS Equipment Type Cost ($K)
It
F4E Communications
HF ARC-105 $ 13.5
UHF ASQ -19 (ARC 51) 9. 6=
Navigation
TACAN ASQ -19 (ARN 86) 6. 0
Loran ARN 92 115. 0j Inertial ASN 56 75.0
Surveillance
`i TRANSPONDER ASO 19 (KY532) 5. 7=
INTERROGATOR APX 76 (KIR-1A) 23.3
Total $248.1 ^y
.	 { C 141- Communications:
HF (2) 	 HF-102 $ 27.0
VHF (2)	 WCX 807/VHF 101 12.0
UHF ARC - 90 i
Navigation ?	 q
TACAN (2), ARN-21 12.0
VOR (2)	 WCX - 806 7.2 ;t	 ,
Loran APN - 157
s Doppler APN - 147
ADF (2) ARA - 50 4.0
Surveillance
Transponder APX 64 r;
' Total $179.2
A-6A Integrated Com-Nav-IFF AN/ASQ-57A f
Ii, V UHF $	 9.6
TACAN 6.o
Navigation F
Doppler AN'/APN-153 30.0
Radar Beacon AN/APN-154 13.-0
Surve illane
Control Box C-6280(P)AP-z'- 5.7
Total 59.3 
CNS Equipment doe st not include Mission Equipment.
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Table 12. Typical Airline CNS Avionics
Aircraft
	 Unit AcquisitionQuantity	 Cost
Boeing 707
2	 VOR/ILS Receiver	 61700
2 d
	Doppler Navigation	 25, 000
1 	 LORAN Receiver 	 5,000
2 	 HF Transceiver (Collins, AeroCom) 	 8,000
2	 VHF Transceiver (Bendix, Collins,
King)	 5,000
2	 Beacon Transponder	 3 204
Boeing 747
Delete Doppler Navigation
J 3	 Add Overwater including Platform
j for Altitude Inertial Navigation 110, 000
Concorde :4}
Delete Doppler Navigation
t
2	 Add Inertial Navigation
I Lockheed 101 i
.k Delete Doppler Navigation +}	 `
`./ 2	 Add Inertial Navigation
For oceanic operation
Table 13.	 Typical General Aviation Avionics Equipment Items
Percent	 Number Typical Price-
(Ref. 42)	 (Ref. 42) Spread (Ref. 43) f
Single VHF Com	 35.15	 28.857 395	 - 4,983
Single VHF ComNav	 34.03	 27,937 432	 - 6$250
ADF	 56.67
	 461524 495- 3,465
DME	 17.44	 14, 318 11645	 - 3$990
Weathe	 Radar	 132	 1r	 	 .	 f 084 6V693 .161% .292
HF Com	 2. 17	 1,781 695	 - 21795
Crash locator beacon	 1. 75	 1,437 140	 - 485 f
Dual VHF Com
	 60.93	 50,021 4, 790	 - 9,966 r
864	 - 12, 300
Dual VHF Nav	 60.07	 49,315
Radar altimeter	 L 22	 1, 002	 - 1,060
	 - 10,839
Glide slope
	
21. 94	 18,0121 595 1	 40 0'
t
Marker Beacon
	 48.50	 39,817 150
	 -
655
Transponder	 23.17	 t9,02?, -795. 51606
Autopilot
	
30.46
	 25,006 495	 - 30,000
Flight director
	 2. 13	 1, 749 37360	 - 24,000:
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have tended to be concentrated in rural, low density airports. 	 Only a
I
very small number of the aircraft manufactured today (e, g. , Champion
Citabria, and the American Aviation Yankee), fall in this category.
The cost of a two-way VI-IF radio (90 channels, digitally tuned,
5 -watt output) with an integral VOR-bearing indicator runs between $700
and $1, 600.	 This type of radio is the minimum equipment presently being
installed in new aircraft.	 A functioning two-way radio is required to
{ land at any controlled airport.
	
An aircraft in this category, which is
r? flown in IFR conditions, will likely include a second radio, probably with
360 channels and a marker beacon.
	 Also, an ILS localizer and a glide
f
slope receiver are often included.
	 An aircraft which flies in the vicinity
of controlled airports will therefore have an investment of from $700 to
F
$5, 000 in onboard eletronics,
These costs are indicative of the acceptable figure for surveillance'
transmitter cost.	 It would seem reasonable to expect that aircraft owners
would tolerate a cost of say 'one-half the present cost of electronics, but f
would object to doubling the total cost of their electronics. 	 Consequently
3 we assume that for this large segment of the aviation population, a cost
greater than $1, 200 for surveillance would be met with very serious'
1	 :^ objections.	 While it is difficult to predict with high confidence the reactions
of the flying public, it seems reasonable that a cost of less than $600
would be readily acceptable.
The lowest-cost segment of all aviation has been somewhat ignored
;R
in this discussion because it is assumed that aircraft of this type will
ultimately be relegated to uncontrolled airspace by choice of the owners
if not by fiat.
The most significant physical limitations on user equipment are on
the antenna because it must be situated on the outside of the aircraft where
'. there are aerodynamic and coverage considerations to be accommodated.
In order to perform as part of a satellite position determination system
z for navigation or surveillance, the antenna must be located on the upper
surface of the aircraft, preferably at the highest point with an unobstructed' 3
360--degree view, (such as on the top of the vertical stabilizer).
	 ^.
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Propeller-driven aircraft operate below 400 knots and, in fact, the
great majority of propeller-driven aircraft operate below 250 knots. Jet
4
aircraft operate in the lower transonic and supersonic region. In the cost
of jet aircraft, flush mounting therefore is desirable. For SST's the cost
for flush mounting is now considered money well spent in return for lower
drag. In the case of most general aviation aircraft some protrusion into
the air stream is certainly justified in return for lower equipment cost.
At the outset of the study, it appeared the weight, power, and
volume would also be significant if not important pares.°aeters. This does
not appear to be the case. With today's rapidly advancing state-of-the-art
F
in electronics, the weights and volumes are becoming quite small. Volume
	
is not even listed in the latest avionics directories. If a unit consumes 	 !
much power it also tends to be a high priced item as well. Typical weight j.
and power figures for avionics equipment is as follows:
ATC transponder
	 10 lb	 150-5OOW (peak)
Distance Measuring Equipment
	
11	 50-12OW (peak)	 t:
NANCOM	 i 0
	
I OW (peak)
Glide Slope Receiver	 5	 3. - 7 W (peak)
Airborne Weather Radar	 28	 1275W
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3.3 FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS
3, 3. 1 Surveillance, Navigation, and Separation Standards 	 i
This analysis investigates collision hazard protection in the
domestic ATC environment as it affects the feasibility and practicality
of a Satellite Communications Navigation Surveillance (C,NS) System, It 	 y
is beyond the scope of this analysis to establish rigorously the detailed
Satellite CNS system design criteria; but three specific cases are exam-	
F
ined herein. They are bounding, worst case analyses intended to resolve 	
j
the basic question of feasibility, and only in a fairly gross sense to pro-
vide some basis for preliminary design criteria. This analysis deals
with ground-based 'hazard evaluation and collision avoidance techniques
to be used by the air traffic control agency.
3. 3. 1. 1 Collision Hazard Evaluation Techniques
There have been a number of collision hazard evaluation concepts
k_
t
developed for either airborne collision avoidance or ground-based colli-
sion avoidance application.
	 The basic techniques involved can be divided 1
into four categories: l
s
1)	 Nodal check
2)	 Collision prediction l
3)	 Threat volume check.
4)	 Association check. {
k
These categories are not exclusive. 	 They overlap and contain some of
the same characteristics.	 Furthermore, most of the collision avoidance .r.
schemes under consideration today contain features of more than one of
4
these categories, t:
Nodal Che ck
In a nodal check technique, all aircraft .flight plans and flight paths .
are checked (i, e. , the three elements of position plus time) at periodic
four-dimensional nodes. 	 This was basically the technique used in the
domestic. United States prior to the introduction of enroute radar.	 A
flight plan was checked for conflicts before issuance, and then during; the
flight the pilot was required to report in at compulsory check `points.
His compulsory position report included his identity, the position, tip-le,
e^
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and altitude (which identifies the reporting point, or node) and his esti-
mated time of arrival at the next reporting point. 	 Because of large
delays, position inaccuracies, and the manner in which the data was made
available to the air traffic control system, much wasted air space resulted.
This is, in fact, the same technique which is used over the oceans today,
and results in large amounts of wasted air space around each aircraft
(e. g. ,	 6000 cu mi).
Collision Prediction
A collision prediction technique is the opposite extreme to nodal
checks and turns out to be impractical. 	 The system would continually
attempt to predict actual collisions based on the projected flight paths of
participating aircraft.
	
However, it is virtually impossible to predict
actual flight paths well enough to determine whether aircraft will collide
or have a near miss. 	 Thus, it inevitably follows that one takes out insur-
ance against the collision by avoiding the near miss. 	 That concept is
called the threat volume technique and is described below.
Threat Volume
The threat volume technique is the most general and potentially the
most powerful collision hazard evaluation tool.
	
The uncertainties asso-
ciated with the nodal check and collision prediction techniques both log-
ically lead to the adoption of some sort of "cocoon" around each aircraft.
In its basic form, this technique simply samples the available data on
`	 I all aircraft within a certain region and takes into account the nominal
flight path, all possible perturbations on that flight path, and uncertainties
in all of these items.
	 From this, the volume of air space that each air-
craft could occupy in the future is determined.
	
If it is determined that
two aircraft could occupy a portion of the same airspace at the same f..
time then a threat is considered to exist.
	
An intervention at that point t
- may be required.
	 If it is safe to postpone the intervention until a later
decision time, then it is postponed.
	 When it is finally determined that
it is no longer safe to postpone a decision, a warning or a collision
avoidance command is directed to one or both aircraft. Y
:6.0_ ;,
Association Check
The association check is also a very powerful tool, but is applicable
only when the airspace is well organized and all aircraft are attempting
to maintain assigned flight paths, such as under instrument flight rules
1	 11 d	 d 	 Th	 1-'1itn	 h	 b	 11or positive y contro	 a	 airspace con	 ios,	 e p i osop y, is	 asicCA,	 y
as follows:
1)	 Prevent flight plan conflicts by appropriate flight
`f
plan checks prior to issuance
' 2)	 Hold each aircraft to its assigned flight path by
periodically monitoring its position and issuing a
' { return-to-flight-path command" if it exceeds ?
certain tolerances relative to that path.
In the development of the association check technique, a philosophy sim-
1. ilar to the threat volume philosophy prevails.	 Allowances are made for 
uncertainties in assessment and prediction and the issuance of warnings
,
or commands is delayed until the last possible moment.
r,.
Two specific association check evaluations are considered in r ;;^µ
Sections 3. 3. 1. 2 and 3. 3. 1. 3.
3. 3. 1. 2 Enroute Collision Hazard Evaluation
- The analysis here is similar to that contained in the Navigation/ {
Traffic Control Satellite Mission Study (Ref. 5). 	 In that study, lateral
-^ separation standards, position determination accuracy, position deter- {;
mination frequency, the magnitude ofaircraft track errors, pilot and .
system reaction time, and aircraft turning performance were considered.
' The objective was to prevent air space violations by taking note at the r	
a
air traffic control center of an impending violation far enough in advance
ryt to allow the air traffic controller (or his computer) 	 p ilot inuter) to warn theP	 P .
time to prevent him from flying into an adjacent lane of traffic.
	
The
.,yr, model assumed reliable communications and both the willingness and , the ...
t ability of the aircraft to respond to the warning and/or the corrective` f
` heading instructions of air traffic control. -
x
This could be a commanded turn, clirrlb, descent, or even a change in
speed.
.
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Figure 9. Parallel Track Model Geometry
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The distance from centerline to the threshold line can be simply a 	 .
direct function of the uncertainty in surveillance position determination.
On the other hand, it could be set by the navigation/track-keeping capa-
bilities of the aircraft population. Finally, it might be made extremely
small, meaning that aircraft would continually be under observation in
1
	
	 the conflict search sense. In any case, some threshold distance from the
centerline (L i ) must be set within which no warnings or commands will
be issued.
Once the aircraft has passed the threshold line, that fact must be
established by the surveillance or data acquisition system (DAS). The
aircraft will travel some lateral distance ('L 2 ) during the interval in which	 k2
62
t
j,
the data acquisition takes place.'' ` Often overlooked in this type of analysis
is the fact that it may prove desirable to allow for a number of observa-
tions or fixes during this period of time. Multiple fixes in the DAS inter-
val are desirable for a number of reasons!
• Multiple observations are advantageous in the event of
an occasional garbled fix or drop-out. In this event,
there would still be ample data to permit the system to
work
• Multiple fixes allow establishruent of trend information
• Trend data allows the use of better, more sophisticated
criteria for warning (e, g. , the computation of time-to-go)
• Fewer false alarms will result, since aircraft whose
lateral deviations stop growing need not be issued a
"return to centerline" command.
This model does not require the multiple fixes be used. It simply allows
for the option. Finally, 4 can be seen in Figure 9 that a further allow-
ance (L3
 ) must be made for potential DAS errors in determining the air-
craft' s position.
i
i r;i'
i-
x,
3
The recovery zone is created to allow for two factors.	 First, a ;#
certain amount of reaction time (and lateral distance, L 4) is required;
for the air crews to receive, understand, acknowledge, and initiate com-
pliance with the command or warning from air traffic control. 	 Second, r
even after a turn toward the centerline of the airway is initiated, the
distance from the centerline wii.l continue to increase (L 5 ) until the air-
`.
craft has reached a_point in its turn vrhere its track is parallel to the r#
centerline.
The half Lane width, L/2, as indicated in Figure 9 equals:
j
- 2 NOZ + Vt2 sin g + L3 + Vt4 sinc + 57. 3' 8 _(1 - cos E )2 - o
f
1
The DAS interval is defined herein to mean that period of time which is
allowed for the acquisition of position data. 	 It may be long enough for
only a single fix or for multiple fixes,
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The various parameters in this equation are given below.
Normal Operating Zone (NOZ). 	 The NOZ is an area in which the
aircraft is free to essentially maneuver at will. 	 This zone is Fntended
to allow for navigation guidance and control errors which are typical of
user aircraft and air crew capabilities. 	 With today's equipment, this
would imply a NOZ of at least several miles. 	 In the future, it can be
assumed that for certain airways all aircraft would possess a closed-loop
' navigation, guidance, and control capability which would allow the NOZ
to get much smaller.	 In an analysis such as this, the width of the NOZ
can be set as a direct function of the aircraft navigation uncertainty, or
Xi
can be held at a constant figure, probably associated with the poorest
performing aircraft. 	 This analysis assumes the Latter, bounding case,
4r
since it involves only relatively high accuracy (60 to 500 ft) surveillance.
Aircraft Speed (V).	 Account must be taken of the fastest aircraft
using the airway.	 Therefore, V should take on the value of the cruise
x speed of the fastest aircraft expected to use that lane.	 (Note that it is
also possible to determine an appropriate speed limit for a given airway
by working this same analysis in reverse.) 	 _ {{
1 DAS Interval (t2).	 An appropriate DAS interval for radar would be
t.1 period of rotation of the radar antenna which might range from 4 to
'	 = 1Z seconds.	 For a satellite system, the DAS interval would be from 1 	 r
to 4 seconds.	 The DAS Interval might allow time for more than one fix, y.
since potential dropouts could be significant.
F Heading Error (E ).	 This deterministic	 worst-case analysis,
is basically a blunder check.	 Therefore, relatively large heading errorsit
should be handled by the system. 	 The heading errors need not exceed
that which can be built up by the aircraft flying in a constant rate turn 	 F
through the full width of the normal operating zone.
DAS Position Error Allowance (L3). L	 is the distance which judg-
ment indicates should be allowed to compensate for the position errors
generated by the data acquisition system. 	 L3 can be made equal to the
As opposed to probabalisT;ic.
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CEP, the 3T error, or any other relevant value depending on the nature
of the analysis and the degree of conservatism which is desired.
	 In
4	 x evaluating the Satellite CNS system., the 2a- uncertainty figure will be
`	 > used (i. e. , if the predicted 2cr uncertainty is smaller than the allowance
then the accuracy requirement will be considered to be satisfied).
Reaction Time 44).	 Since in this analysis, it is possible for the
last surveillance fix to take place just before the aircraft leaves the
surveillance zone and enters the recovery^z^rs..; ^the reaction time must
-- -^`include
•	 Air traffic control data processing
•	 Air traffic control decision making y
•	 The communication process (NOTE: It is implicitly
assumed that a reliable, short access time commu-
nications system will exist.
	
This is a very critical
t assumption.)
•	 Reception and verification of the command message {
s (verification may well include an independent aircrew
evaluation of the correctness, validity, and/or advis-
ability of the command)
•	 Initiation of the commanded maneuver (including{ rolling into bank angle required to generate the ^}
turning rates referred to below). I
L
Holt and Marner (Ref. 14, Appendix C4) and Blake and Smith (Ref. 14,
Appendix E4) assume 8 and 5 seconds respectively for the effective system
reaction time.	 These figures appear at this time to represent an opti-
mistic or best-case situation.
Aircraft Recovery Turning Rate (6).
	
Since a commanded recovery
j maneuver involves a serious, if not an emergency, condition, it may be
F`
assumed that the aircraft mak~ng the recovery maneuver will do so using
at least nominal turning performance for the conditions of flight. 	 It does
not seem prudent, however, to assume that the aircraft could or should
be put right up to its structural limitations in the recovery maneuver.
g	 '	 J ----` r_Thus standard rate turns 	 3 de /sec) would be assumed for^,.^W^^ speeds 4_
and altitude s, and half standard rate s (1-1 / 2 deg/sec )- would be assumed
for high speed situations. g
;k
65 ;
.	 A
^
'!I
1
Buffer Zone. Although Blake and Smith prudently allowed for a
buffer zone between independently operated lanes or runways, this analysis
since it is conservative and bounding at virtually every step, does not
include an additional buffer zone.
Illustrative Example: As an illustrative example, Equation 1 is
solved for a case which might be typical for STOL airways in the North-
east corridor and the results are shown in Figure 10. For the nominal
values used, which are shown on the figure, airway separations of be-
tween 2 1/2 and 3 miles seem feasible. An examination of the impact of
varying several of the input parameters offers some insight into this
problem:
1)	 DAS errors are not a major factor in determining
parallel track separation standards as long as they
are relatively small (i. e. , under 1000 ft).
	
If the
DAS errors become quite large, however, the normal
operating zone would have to be increased accordingly
to keep the false alarm rate down to some acceptable.
level.	 For example, if the DAS error allowance, L3,
increases by, say, 1 nautical mile, the NOZ might'
then be widened by twice the figure, and the track r
separation would then increase by roughly 4 nautical
miles.	 Reducing the DAS error allowance to zero, on
the other hand, produces in itself relatively small
differences in the results. 	 It might be noted here that
navigatio , guidance, and flight control errors will }
affect the system in a similar manner in that a large t
navigation, guidance, and flight control error allow-
ance will increase the NOZ and lane width accordingly. ?p
2)	 Reducing the allowed system reaction time from 10
seconds to 5 seconds would reduce the allowable lane
width approximately one-half mile.
	 However, it can
be seen from Figure 10 that the effects of longer x
_reaction times are quite dramatic.
	 It is not yet clear
what an appropriate reaction time allowance will be
for this problem, but it is significant that this factor
can have-a greater impact on the overall problem than `.
most of the design parameters put together.
3)	 The time interval allowed for data acquisition, though
_-not a major problem in terms of its impact on lateral
separation standards, nonetheless offers a very real
method of reducing track separation. 	 If the DAS
interval can be reduced from about 10 seconds (e, g.
radar) to esentially 0 by going to a very high data
rate system or by predicting the exact time an air-
craft leaves the NOZ., the track separation can be x
reduced. a full nautical mile.
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assumed that the errant aircraft begins a constant-rate turn in the direc-
tion of the other runway, and, in the event it completes a 90-degree turn
prior to reaching the other runway centerline, executes a roll-out with
its course then perpendicular to the right hand runway center-line. Both
aircraft speed (V) and turn rate (6) are treated as parameters in this
analysis. Figure 12 indicates that essentially the same time distance
relationships that were examined in the enroute case also are rel evaiit
in this -insta.nce,-except that in this case system configii ration is such as
to provide for warning to prevent a collision but not necessarily in tin-le
to prevent an airspace violation.
V AIRCRAFT SPEEC, FPS
(! AIRCRAFT TURNING RATE IN DI (3 'SIC
u - ANGLE FROM CENTERLINE = n't
r = RADIUS OF CURVATURE 57AV
fl
}
25L
INCREASING
SPEED 25R
INCREASING D : r (1 - COS 0) (1) {
TURN RATE
_i
.. o.- COS	 (l - D//r) (2) }	 '	 t.
D =r 0 - COS Of) (3) }
V D = 57.3 V (1 - C'OS (4)
°.
}
Cl
r
s	
`
;^
f)D r COS 8
r Figure 11. Parallel Runway Separation Standards Geometry
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Equation 4 as given in Figure 11 is solved for several cases invol-
ving speeds of 100, 150, and 200 knots and for turning rates of 1. 5 and 3
degrees per second.
	
The resulting relationships are plotted in Figure 13.
Also shown are lines of constant time remaining prior to reaching the
' 2500-foot line.	 The values shown. (5, 8, and 10 sec) are considered ?. to be
relevant for this analysis. 	 This represents only the minimum-to-nominal
jrange of values discussed in the enroute analysis, but is considered mar-;
ginally appropriate here, since:
1)	 Even with a narrow normal operating zone, several
seconds will have been used up by the time the air-
' craft leaves the NOZ.	 There will simply not be too
much time left for surveillance, command, and escape.
2)	 Air crews making instrument approaches are at a very [{ high alertness level, and consequently can be expected
to react to a command in a shorter period of time.
Given:	 (1) a particular errant aircraft flight path - represented by one
of the tracks on Figure 13, and (2) an appropriate escape (reaction-plus-
maneuver) time, one can then infer, from Figure 5, the lateral distance
which represents a maximum value for L + L + L	 Far example, if aP	 1	 2	 3,	
maximum threat were considered to be represented by track one, and if t
5 second escape time were acceptable, then about 1300 feet could be
allowed for L 1 + L2 + L3. {
Blake 'and Smith state that advanced instrument landing systems
should produce errors small enough to allow a normal operating zone of
f300 feet.
	 Consider a DAS which exhibits 3a- errors of about 500 feet.
These two distances are indicated in Figure 14.
	 The data acquisition
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interval line shown indicates that if the very conservative assumption
wexe made* that took it 3 seconds to provide a position fix after crossing
the 800 foot point, then for the 150-knot, 3 degrees per second case
(Track 2) the 5--second escape is still provided.
	 Since this long data
acquisition interval will seldom be required, a more realistic available
escape time for this situation would be about 8 or 9 seconds.	 The effects
of improving the DAS uncertainty to 200 feet also are shown in Figure 14.
The impact is essentially an increase of about 2 1/2 or 3 seconds in
escap
,e,time.	 Probably a better way to obtain the additional 3 second
escape time would be to effectively eliminate the data acquisition interval
by smoothing and prediction while the aircra-ft is still in the NOZ	 gen-
erating the warning or command at the instant that the aircraft is predicted
to cross the threshold line.
	 Clearly this is an important point for a pre-
liminary design phase of the data acquisition system.
I The entire subject of escape time and maneuvers needs to be ex-
plored much further.
	 Aircraft on instrument approach, especially as
they get closer to the landing point, are at less than 1. 5 times the stalling
speed and relatively close to the ground.
	 Therefore, violent escape
maneuvers are not realistic at this.
 point, but one-half g acceleration for
Iij
three seconds provides only a 150-foot change in flight path.
3. 3. 1. 4 Association Check Discussion
If it becomes advisable to squeeze parallel IFR runways, as close
together as 2500 feet, a position-only strategy appears to be marginal.
Even with perfect surveillance and -communications systems, a position
only strategy may not be adequate with regard to pilot and system reaction
time O airplane dynamics, and flight safety.	 Therefore, velocity data for
prediction of heading error buildup will be important.
For the enroute case
., separation standards of 2 or 3 nautical miles
and a 500-foot DAS error allowance
	 are more than adequate.
This association check analysis has been a bounding worst case
type analysis. A more detailed statistical analysis should be worked in
conjunction with (but not instead of) this type of analysis to obtain valid
preliminary design information, especially with regard to false alarm
rates, which do not
, readily fall out of the simple worst case studies.
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3. 3. 1. 5 Threat Volume Check
A measure of the uso.,fulness of a threat volume check surveillance.
system for separation ass-qrance may be obtained from a particular
scheme developed by Holt and Marner (Ref. 14, Appendix C4). The basic
idea of this scheme is that, at each decision time, all available inform-
ation concerning aircraft in a certain air sector is used to determine the
worst possible sequence of events which could occur if Air Traffic Control
did not intervene until the next decision time.	 If the safety of all aircraft t	 '
is assured, intervention is postponed for this interval of time.	 If, on
the other hand, safety is not assured, corrective maneuvers are ordered
immediately.	 The decision times are selected to ensure ample time to
f
safely perform the maneuvers.	 The escape  maneuvers prescribed by the
use of this model are vertical maneuvers only.
The basic problem in this model is the solution of the following f'
equation, based' on the data available up to some time, t = 0: ?`;
t
r (t) - r (0) + V (0) ti +J
	
a (t) dtf }	 .{ _	 _ o t
The range and velocity vectors Cr (0), V (0) J contain the theoretically ob-
servable, but not necessarily available, 	 of accelerations prior,results }	 .'`
=t{ to t = 0.	 a (t) represents all anticipated accelerations which should take
place after the last observation at t = 0 and up to some future time of r,`
interest tThe particular problem examined is the separation of two
closing aircraft, but the :results can be extended to other situations.
The following two assumptions were made:
1)	 All unknown variables which introduce uncertainty in
the predicted range, r(t1), of one aircraft relative to
another can be represented by constants over the
prediction interval (0, t i ).
2)	 These variables are always in the direction of the !:
predicted range vector r (t), to reduce separation(worst case).
z„
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If the assumptions are correct then the decision to intervene can be
1	 ,
deferred if the following scalar equation is satisfied:
tflr (0) + V (0) t +1 a (t) dt I ?(At2 + Bt +'C)_
0
a.. (t) is obtained from anticipated flight intent and r (0), V (0) are obtained
from surveillance. At2 + Bt + C is the radius of a cylindrical volume of
airspace which grows with t to reflect uncertainties in the predicted re-
lative range.
z
The coefficients (A, B, C) represent system parameters whose
values are determined by a number of factors. The constant A represents
an acceleration which is primarily determined by the maximum possible
relative acceleration of the aircraft but can also contain an acceleration
effect due to flight technical error.
	 The constant B represents a velocity 1
uncertainty	 hich is used
	 take into account the velocity measurementy
	Y
• error caused by the surveillance and filtering systems and the velocity
t error produced by flight technical error.
	 The position term C represents'
the minimum allowable miss distance, the position measurement error
1;r
and flight technical error.
	 These factors are summarized in Table i4.
' Table 14.	 Factors Contributing to Predicted Hazard Region
ContributingCoefficient j	 fFactors x,
i A	 it 5 $
B	 4 5 {
C	 2,	 3,_ 5 R
Legend
+ i.	 Maximum unanticipated relative acceleration
2.	 Minimum allowable miss distance
3.	 Surveillance position errors
4.	 Surveillance velocity errors
5.	 Flight technical errors (include acceleration,
velocity, and position errors)
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To determine the volume of airspace needed, a prediction interval
w
t (01 t i ) must be determined. 	 The interval must be selected so as to allow
` time for the aircraft to safely maneuver if intervention is needed.	 Hoit
and Anderson made a number of detailed error and time assumptions in
determining the prediction interval (Ref. 44, Table C4-4), and the re-
:. quired interval was:
f
(0, t i ) _	 27 + (surveillance sample time) 	 seconds
One way of looking at this scheme is to put all -relative motiony	 g	 P I,.^
(anticipated and unanticipated) on the "protected" aircraft.	 The "threat" k
aircraft remains fixed in space and the protected airspace defined by " the
j above equation sweeps out a volume. 	 ATC will defer intervention as long
as the threat plane lies outside the protected airspace.	 (At2 + Bt + C) is
I therefore a measure of system merit in the sense that the smaller this
y^ 'maintainedquantity can be	 the more efficient use is made of the..airspace. !
To implement the above scheme, both position (including altitude)
and velocity of all aircraft are required.
	
The satellite system, by its
surveillance function, can provide position data on all aircraft at a small
sampling interval. 	 The position data can be filtered to obtain an estimate 1
of veloci^,	 The errors in the velocity estimate`y	 y	 ate are a function of the ;.,
position errors, the unknown aircraft accelerations, the structure of the
filter used and the sampling rate.	 Therefore, to minifhize such errors,
- a study is needed to determine the optimum filter to be used (Appendix D).
_ Asteady-state Kalman filter (o - (3 filter) such as the one selected by
Holt and Marner for use in their hazard criterion study might be used.
This filter is governed by the following equations:
a
xk = xpk + a (xk -xpk) Y
r
Xk `- xk'- i + T (Xk -xpk)
i	 ^
r
xpk+ i - xk + T xk
i
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where
x  = raw position data at the kth time instant
xk = estimated position at the kth time instant
I  = estimated velocity at the kth time instant
xpk+i = predicted position at the k+i th time instant
T = sampling time
a, P = constants
,r
This filter is similar to a Kalman filter for a system with constant
velocities. The difference is that in the Kalman filter a and P are recal-
culated in a predetermined manner each time _instant and, therefore, are
not constant.
The Kalman filter calculation _
 requires an accurate knowledge of
the characteristics of each aircraft under surveillance, a requirement
which may not be practical for use in the air traffic control system. In
the stead state fil te r
 a and R are constants which are redetermined to
i
t
y	 p
minimize a steady ptate type of performance index.
	 ^	 z
A typical satellite system DAS error on raw position data, Cr inr
the contiguous United States is less than 150 feet for an X configuration
	 t
*	 satellite constellation with 16-degree inclination, and all satellites.
.	
^	 1
operating. With one satellite inoperative, the a- error is still less thanr
250 feet. The resulting output errors for a linear flight path using the
	
z'
steady state Kalman filter were determined for a number of values of r
and sample times, T. This was done for two values of maximum unantic-
ipated acceleration, 0. 5 g, representing a "-considerable freedom" case,
and 0. 1 g, representing the case of flight remaining within a well defined
corridor. For each case, filter constants were determined and used
fr
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to evaluate errors caused by the noise and lag on the filter. These errors
are tabulated in Table 15 and 16 and are denoted as:
JAR i = filtered position error
AV I = filtered velocity error
The errors were then used in determining the hazard regions.
The following cases illustrate the use of the scheme with a DAS
where o' = 150 feet and T = 1 second:r
Two aircraft are traveling under positive control along
well-defined linear flight corridors at a closing velocity
of 900 knots. For these well-defined flight path conditions,
the values for the factors which make up the coefficients
of A t B, and C; are chosen as follows:
Factor 1 (unanticipated relative acceleration
0.493 ft/ sec2
Factor 2 (Minimum allowable miss distance):
600 ft
Factor 3 (surveillance position errors, from
Table 16): 3 04 ft	 A
Factor 4 (surveillance velocity errors, from
Table 16) 67 ft/ sec
	
G ,
Factor 5 (flight technical errors)
"	 Acceleration: 0 ft/ sec
i	 Velocity: 50 ft/sec
Position: 200 ft	 PA.
'	 For this case, the radius of the resulting cylindrical volume of
airspace as a function of time is given by:,
At2 + Bt + C = `0. 493 t2 + 117t + i ?,04
The values selected for Factors 1 and 5 are representative of flight con-
..
ditions corresponding to average accelerations of approximately 0. 1 g
for each aircraft over a period of ii seconds out of the prediction interval r,
(0, te ) of 28 seconds.
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Table M Filtered Position and Velocity Errors
for the Considerable Freedom Case(Maximum Acceleration = i / 2 g)
Ltg Position 3a Noise Position Lag Position 3a Noise Velocity I AVIError, Error, Error, Error,T
see feet feet feet feet fps fps fps
I so 0.6 so Ito 160 60 44 103
ISO 0.5 97 289 385 80 89
250 0,4 193 426 619 113 95 208
1,000 0.S 425 1,460 1,890 166 224 390
2 so 0.8 48 127 175 64 46 111
150 0.7 102 350 453 87 96 183
250 O.b 200 533 733 118 110 228
1 ' 000 0.4 772 1,704 Z,476 225 191 416
4 so 0.9 70 137 207 93 34 1Z7
150 0.9 70 412 482 93 102 195
250 0.8 193 634 827 129 116 244
2 A32 7 034 236 221 4571,000 0.0 owl
to so 0.9 437	 137	 574	 232 14 246
01 ISO 0.9 437	 412	 849	 232 41 273
250 0.9 437	 687	 1,124	 232 68 300
1,000 0.9 437	 2,747	 3,184	 232 272 505
Table 16.	 Filtered Position and Velocity Errors for the
Well-Defined Corridor Case (Maximum
Acceleration	 t/to g)
Ig Position	 3a Noise Position ,	 lAg Velocity	 3a Noise VelocityError,	 JARI,	 Error,	 Error, JAVIT fiat
CL Error,
feet	 feet	 feet	 fps fps fps
I	 - 50 0.4 39	 85	 124	 23 Ig 42
150 0.3 85	 219	 304	 33 34 67
250 0.1 23Z	 296	 527	 55 28 83
to 000 0.2 1,18223Z	 1,414	 55 166
a so 0.6 40	 107	 147	 24 22 46
ISO 0.4 I54	 256	 410	 45 Z9 74
250 0.4 154	 426	 580	 45 48 93
1 8 000 0.2 927	 1,182	 2,1109	 log 56 165
4 so 0.8 39	 127	 165	 26 23 49
ISO 0.6 160	 UO	 480	 47 33 80
250 0.6 160	 533	 693	 47 55 102
1,000 0.4 618	 1,704	 2,322	 go 95 185
to so 0.9 87	 137	 225	 46 14 60
150 0.9 87	 412	 499	 46 41 87
250 0.8 Z41	 634	 875	 64 46 341
1,000 0.6 1.001,	 Z, 133	 3,134	 118 88 206
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A second case involves the situation of aircraft under less rigid
control (such as VFR traffic in a terminal control area) in which pilots
have considerable freedom to alter courses. For this case, the selected
factors are (see Tablc 2 for surveillance position and velocity errors): 	 ?'
Factor i (unanticipated relative acceleration):
2. 27 ft/sec
Factor 2 (minimum allowable separation distance):
600 ft
Factor 3 (surveillance position errors, from
Table 15): 385 ft
k
Velocity: 226 ft/ sec
Position: 0 ft
F	 and the corresponding radius of the resulting cylindrical volume of air
space i8	 I'. k
r3j	
At2 + Bt + C = 2.,27t 2 + 396t + 985	 !
The values selected for Factors i and 5 this time represent a relative 	 }
` t	 heading change of 30 degrees or a relative speed change of 360 ft/sec
over an i i -second period.	 t.
Figure 15 presents these two cases. The important dimension used
for horizontal hazard evaluation is the half-width of the hazard region,r
since this defines the minimum distance at which two planes can pass
without intervention. This dimension is sensitive to the measurement
errors incurred from the surveillance system and to the degree of freedom
k
f
' The position component of factor 5 was arbitrarily set to zero in view of	 f
the large values for coefficients A and B.
Factor 4 {surveillance velocity errors, from
'fable 15): 170 ft/ sec
Factor 5 (flight technical errors)
Acceleration: 0 ft/sec 2
E
fFi
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Figure 16 displays the half-width of the hazard region versus pos-
ition error, ^, at different sampling times for the well-defined corridor.. 	 f
Figure i7 is similar but for the considerable freedom case. These`'
figures can be used to determine the effect on tYse hazard region of
changing_ parameters of the navigation and surveillance systems.
3. 3. 1. 6' Navigation and Flight Control k
3.3.1. 6. 1 Definitions
Navigation is identified as the function of providing aircraft with
position, velocity, and bearing data so that the pilot (or automatic flight
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mands by appropriate adjustments of aircraft position (including altitude),
heading and speed. Steering commands are generated in various ways.
The most direct form of steering commands are the real time vectors
received from the controller over the communications link. Some types
of airborne navigation equipment present their output directly in the form
of steering commands, such as the "fly-right", "fly-up" commands, which
appear on the VOR and ILS course deviation indicators (CDI). Beyond
that, the commands are computed in the pilot's head or in an airborne
computer and displayed to the pilot based on present and desired position
inputs.
i
f•'
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The second function (generally called "control" ) may be manual
(i. e., rudder-stick-throttle) or automatic (i. e. , autopilot heading hold
f
or altitude hold). Discrepancy in the response of this control function to
the commands- is termed "flight technical error." This error is influenced.;
by many factors such as atmospheric turbulence, pilot experience, ade-
quacy of displays, and autopilot drift or instability.
Automatic flight control is a step further in which the navigation
.`	 equipment output is coupled directly into the aircraft control surfaces.
The commands then consist of simple implicit (autoland system), or explicit
(inertial system) desired future position inputs.
Not to be confused with air. traffic "control."
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In the analysis of ATC navigation relationships, however, it is
desirable to consider the navigation, guidance, and aircraft control func-
tions separately.
3. 3. 1. 6. 2 NavijZation Techniques
The basic techniques involved in the determination of position and
velocity are visual fix, magnetic compass, atmospheric measurement,
radio and inertial navigation. All these techniques, in various combinations
are utilized in aircraft navigation today and provide various degrees of
accuracy.
Visual fixes including landmark recognition and identification on
aeronautical charts and all the air navigation lighting aids and astronom-
ical fixes (celestial navigation) are usable techniques but they play prac-
tically no role in the domestic air traffic control process.
The magnetic compass/directional gyro needs little explanation.
Together with airspeed-time measurements they provide the basis for
..E
dead reckoning (which of course can serve as backup if all other naviga-
tion means fail), but in the present ATC environment the compass is used
primarily in executing ATC vectors (real time or procedural) and as an
adjunct in track-keeping. t
Air speed, altitude, and rate of climb, which are derived from
atmospheric measurements, are important inputs to the navigation function. [.
In flying VOR airways an aircraft is expected to provide ATC with an
estimate of time of arrival at designated locations or radio fixes.	 In z;
a many cases, the along-track position between fixes and predicted arrival
^a times can be determined only by airspeed-distance-time calculations,
Barometric altitude and rate of climb are today the primary means of
vertical navigation.
Radio aids are the primary means of horizontal navigation. 	 Various
systems, whether ground-radiating or self-contained aboard the aircraft,
provide basic determinations of either distance, angle or speed.
	
The
number of different types of radio aids in existence is extensive but only
a few, which are operated or commissioned by the FAA, form the basis
of the domestic ATC navigation system.
	 These are described in the next
section.
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Inertial navigators, having had their impetus first in ballistic
missile navigation and then in military aircraft, are now gaining wide-
spread use among the air carriers. This self-contained system derives
velocity and continuous position with respect to an initial point by inte-
grating the outputs of precision, inertially stabilized accelerometers.
Some discussion of inertial navigation is included below inasmuch as
certain installations in commercial jet aircraft have been certified as the
sole means of navigation.
FAA Navigation Services and Performance
The main navigation services provided by the FAA are implemented
through the following types of ground-radiating facilities and associated
airborne equipment:
•	 Low frequency non-directional radio beacons (NDB )
• VHF Omnirange (VOR)
a
j	 •	 Distance Measuring Equipment (DME)
z s
,:
e	 Instrument Landing System (ILS)
t
•	 Cons olan
t
;
Concerning the overall accuracy of these systems, one needs to
take into account not only the inherent accuracy of the ground station and
airborne equipment but also the errors introduced by propagation effects.
Overall accuracy figures have been compiled by the FAA and those using f
the equipment over the many years the systems have been in existence.
The accuracy figures associated with the following description of the
foregoing system types are compiled in Table 17, r
Low Frequency Non-Directional Radio Beacons
This technique generally bears the name associated with the air-
borne equipment (i. e., Automatic Direction Finder (ADF) ).. Special ..	 4
beacons are established by the FAA in,the 200-400-KHz band.	 The air-
borne receiver, with a directional antenna, establishes the relative bearing
of a station and displays it on the ADF indicator.
LTN-51 Inertial Navigation System, Litton Systems, Inc., July 1970.
82
h
t
f•
4
r	 .
F
Fable 17. FAA Navigation Aid ..Accuracy
Navigation Aid Accuracy Range Notes
ADF ±2 degrees (2v) 50 - 200 n mi 1, 2
VOR ±2 degrees (20-) line of sight it 3 9	4,	 5
DVOR ±1 degree (20) line of sight i, 3, 4
PVOR ±0.05 degree (2u-) line of sight 1, 319	 4
DME ±1200 feet (20-) line of sight 1, 6
TACAN R = ±0. 5 n mi (2T) line of sight i0 = ±0.75 deg.
ILS Localizer: It 7
0. 4 deg at 4.5 n mi 25 n mi min-
0. 08 deg at 0. 6 n mi imum at 2, 000
feet altitude.
Glide Slope:
0.15 deg at 4.5 n mi 10 - 15 nmi i, 70.1 deg at0.6nmi
Note s: G
1. Correlation function unknown, probably very low frequency-random.. 	
i
2. Accuracy primarily determined by airborne equipment and propa- 	 ^i
gation effects.
3. Expect 50 KHz spacing by 1973, 	
t° 
r
4. Ground station accuracy.
5. Permissible perturbation due to ground effect f3.5 deg (2(-).
6. Airborne equipment maybe range limited. 	 I
7. Category II requirements. 	 Y -
Propagation at these low frequencies can render signals useless 	 f
during heavy thunderstorms, or at far ranges at night when skywaves can 	 f.
cancel the direct wave at the aircraft. Thus the quoted accuracy is appli-
cable for signal strengths of approximately 30 m y/meter or more and
during quiet atmospheric conditions. For ATC navigation purposes, ADF
#	 is used mainly in terminal areas. Non-precision instrument approaches
are established using this technique.
i
r
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VHF Omirange (VOR)
This system measures magnetic bearing to the selected VOR facility.
Facilities are distributed along the VHF airways and at various terminals.
The bearing is displayed on a Radio Mangetic Indicator (RMI) or Course
Deviation Indicator (CDI).
The carrier frequency is in the i08-fi8 MHz VHF band and, as
such, is not affected by atmospheric or ionospheric conditions. Day-night,
all weather t static-free bearing measurements are possible. The follow-
ing different classes of VOR and frequency separation are intended to
provide interference -free service volumes for each class. Outside these
volumes, the service may be undependable.
Normally Anticipated
Normally Anticipated	 Interference Free
Class	 Altitude Serivce	 Distance Service
H	 Up to 45, 000 ft	 130 n mi
Above 45, 000ft
	 100 n mi
L	 Up to 18, 000 ft	 50 n mi
T	 Up to 12, 000 ft	 25 n mi
Servicing high altitude aircraft while retaining lower altitude VOR
stations constitutes a frequency management problem which may be im-
possible to resolve in the long run.
	 An already-crowded spectrum.for the
use of VHF omnirange has dictated the need to go to 50-KHz spacing.
As with all line-of-sight systems, the approximate maximum range
of usefulness of a VOR facility in nautical miles is limited to approxi-
mately
R	 1. 2 3 Vrh
where
h	 aircraft height in feet
R	 slant range to VOR station in nautical miles
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The accuracy of VOR bearing measurements is influenced by;
•	 Ground Station Calibration Error
•	 Receiver Indication Error
i •	 Polarization Error
•	 Vertical Pattern Effects
•	 Site Effects
j •	 Terrain Effects
Over the decades each error source has been reduced by the k
introduction of modifications to the system. 	 The accuracy of VOR is not
known precisely and varies from station to station.
	
Different references
quote different accuracies for the system. 	 These represent opinions of
experts in the field with many years experience. 	 Accuracy numbers in
2 Table 17 reflect best estimates of VOR accuracy based on the conflicting {
1 data available in the literature, drawing mainly from Reference 45.a ^.
Those accuracies do not hold under all siting conditions. 	 Low hills about
1, 000 feet from a station have been found to give 15-degree errors. in
--readings._ Thus, the FAA attempts to locate stations in the center of a
level 1, 500-foot circle.	 In addition, they try to prevent any object from i	 s
subtending vertical angles of more than 1. 5 degree at the station.
Distance Measuring Equipment (DME) ?
DME operates on the principle of measuring the time delay between
transmission and reception of a-pulse from the aircraft to a ground station
transponder. f
{ This system operates in the 960-1215 MHz band and is the distance
measuring portion of the military "TACAN" system. 	 A colocated VOR
TACAN station is referred to as a VORTAC facility.	 As in VOR, the
DME is line-of-sight system, although individual makes of airborne
equipment have built-in range limitations.	 These units can work in air-
- craft up to speeds of 2, 000 kn.	 The search time and setu p time fora
i channel can take as long as 18 sec on some models.
c
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Again, as with VOR, the accuracy of the DME is a function of which
c^	
author of supplier's catalog is used for reference. Factors which influence
the range measurement accuracy are:
• Pulse Rise. Time.
• Pulse Distortions
• System Calibration of Fixed Delays
• Frequency Stabilities
• Propagation Velocity Variation or Servo Repeater
Innacuracies
The sum total of the above effects yields an overall system accuracy i
depicted in Table 17.
As in VOR, the increased utilization of DME will require an expan-
sion of the capacity of existing facilities. Since DIME is a pulsed system,
new frequency assignments may not be as extensive as the C't1V'' VOR since
time sharing among aircraft is an additional degree of flexibility afforded
by the pulsed system.
Instrument Landing System (ILS)
The ILS contains three radio subsystems operating in different
frequency bands:
Localizer	 108 - 112 MHz	 ^ \
Glide Slope
	 328. 6 - 335. 4 MHz
t
Marker Beacons	 75 MHz
Both the localizer and glide slope work on the principle of power
till
matching two symmetrical radio beams whose axis of symmetry lies 	 s.
along the desired approach path. The localizes is capable of providing^	 . 	 g	 PP	 P	 p	 P	 g	 r
	
.;a	 on-course signals, at 2000 ft altitude, out to 25 miles. The course
	
.i	 width is normally 5 degrees.
The glide slope transmitter is located from 400 to 600 .feet from
the center line of the runway and a distance of about 15 .percent of runway
length from the runway threshold. The radiation pattern is adjusted to
Defined in Reference 24 as the incremental angle at any point along the
course between full "fly right" and "fly left" indication on the aircraft CDL
_	
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an elevation angle of 2. 5 - 3. 5 degrees, depending upon local terrain and
obstructions; the beam width (vertical) is normally 1 degree.
Y
	
	 The outer and middle marker beacons, located nominally 5 miles
and 3500 feet respectively from the runway threshold, are modulated at
different audio frequencies for identification. More specifically, the
middle markers intersect the glide slope at 200 feet altitude, the Cate-
gory I landing decision height. (Category II installations contain a third,
inner marker, which intersects the glide slope at 100 feet altitude, which
is the Category II decision height).
The accuracy of the ILS is quoted variously. One indication is the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) adopted practice as to
when the system is removed from service. It should be noted that the
accuracy values based on this practice are localizer angular error,
±f/3 degree (2Q); glide slope angular, error, f1.0 percent of nominal
angle, whereas the values given previously in Table 17 are taken from
information compiled by Kayton et al. (Ref. 46),
The principal uncertainties in ILS accuracy are associated with
siting problems and the vagaries of the local environment. Surface
movements of aircraft at ILS airports are known. to cause serious devia-
r
i
tions in the ILS beams, For this reason, it is not likely that the present
	 i
ILS technique will be applicable to Category III operations.
Consolan
The FAA presently operates two such long range navigation stations,
one in San Francisco and one in Nantucket. This system, operating in
the low frequency band, provides a bearing to the station. The day-night
range varies from 200 nmi to -1500 nmi and the 2, accuracies vary between
1/3- and 2 degrees, depending on day-night, land-sea and range conditions.
3.3 1. 6. 3 Landing Navigation	 f
For any level of navigational accuracy (including altitude) there is
-	
j.
some corresponding permissible "decision height" (DH) that is safe to
descend to without seeing the ground. The following discussion is
adapted from work by I. L. Ashkenas (Ref. 47). For an aircraft navi-
gating only with satellite data and an absolute (radar) altimeter, the
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decision height depends on its ability to correct for lateral dispersion
after breaking out of the overcast and before a flare is started.
	 The
influence of positional navigational accuracy on decision height for the
STOL aircraft used in the 1968 demonstration is shown in Figure 18.
For comparison, the same: parameters are shown in Figure 19 for the
DC- 8. 	The sidestep distances available starting at various heights
are calculated assuming a two second lag after the ground is seen at
the decision height. 	 The lag is required for the pilot to become fully
oriented and to decide on the direction and magnitude of any sidestep
required.	 Data are presented for smooth sidesteps of four levels.
`- In two cases, peak bank angles are limited to 15 and 30 degrees and in
two cases peak lateral control usage is limited to 1/3 and 2/3 of full
throw.	 The sidesteps are terminated at flare altitude.	 The analysis
produced an unexpected result.
	
Figure 19 shows that even at the STOL
approach airspeed of 80 knots, 2/3 full control sidesteps to correct
horizontal position errors of only 60 require a decision height of
1.50 feet, corresponding to Category IIA.	 Required lateral guidance
accuracy for Category 'IIB operation, at 100-foot decision heights,
is less than 10 feet, beyond the capability of pure satellite navigation. fr
The results are similar for the DC-8 at a typical jet transport approach
speeds of 144 knots.	 Thus, the approach guidance accuracy require-
_' ments for STOL transports appears to be as severe as for current
high-speed jets.	 This surprising result • is attributed to the steep
approach path (7-1/2 degrees) of the STOL, which requires even
larger flare heights -than for the jet, and provides no more time for
sidestep correction than is available to the jet transport.
	
A shallower
approach path would provide lower STOL minimums, but this could g
be unacceptable for some STOI_, terminals.
t
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n3. 3. 2 Control and Automation
Maximum pilot freedom is an important objective of an air traffic
control system. The ATC system should in principle allow the pilot to
do what he wants subject to the limitations imposed by safety requirements.
There are cerain factors which will tend to allow greater pilot
freedom in a future system even with greater traffic densities. 1) More 	 i
centralization of aircraft position data gives the control system an
overview of the whole situation, thereby eliminating some unneccessary
flow control: restrictions.- 2) Greater automation enables the system
to make more complex decisions. 3) Area navigation relieves en
route conjestion and eliminates the need for spacing aircraft in "trains"
flying between VORs. 4) Better metering and spacing techniques de-
crease the need for recise timin of a fl ; ht a th t1 • •p	g	 g	 ne r	 e ermma 	 i. e. ,
the "time to turn" concept- is used to deliver aircraft to the markers rx
on time instead of speed control, i
Maximizing pilot freedom is equivalent to minimizing false alarms. i
A "false alarm" is defined here in a broader sense than usual.
	
A
command is a false alarm if the separation standards between aircraft
would be preserved even if the command is not sent.
	 These are basically'
three reasons for such false alarms and they will be categorized as t	 ,
three types of false alarm commands:
Type I:
	 Because of errors in the data acquisition system, the
controller does not know exactly where the aircraft is.
	 For example,
i	 1
l'
to keep an aircraft inside an airway a controller may give a command
when the aircraft reaches a certain threshold distance away from thei
aircraft center-line.	 Because of 13A.S errors, the distance from the
center line is not exactly known and the command might be given unneces-
sarily; i. e. , when the aircraft has not reached the threshold distance.`'r
Type It:
	 The controller may not have sufficient information or
time to compute a better set of commands.
	 For example, a pilot in a_
busy terminal area requests a change in flight path in order to fly around
an area of thunderstorms. -Given enough time and information, the f'
controller, could grant the request.
	 However, because the controller
does not have time to calculate the effects on the other aircraft in the
F
90- i	 s
vicinity, some of which are outside his sector, he denies the request
and tells the pilot to continue on course.
Type III: An aircraft may be given one kind of command in order
to avoid the possibility of another more serious kind of command later.
Example 1:
	
Two aircraft are flying side by side in parallel tracks.
The aircraft are given negative commands (i. e., 	 such as "Don't turn
left" and "Don't turn right".
	 The aircraft are sufficiently far ap? rt
that even if they did turn towards each other, the control system would
have ample time to respond to the situation by giving positive commands
G. e. , such as "Turn right" and "Turn left").	 The negative commandsg	 g
are, therefore not necessary to maintain separation; they are given to
avoid the more serious positive commands later.	 Example 2: An
aircraft is due to arrive at an airport during a busy period.
	
If the
aircraft is permitted to fly at its natural speed it will p robably have
to be decayed.	 A command is sent to the pilot to delay his en route
time by a certain amount.. Because of random variation in winds,
airport capacity., etc. , it is possible that the delay is unnecessary.
However, since en route delays are preferred to holding near the termi=
I hnal area, the en route delay command may be sent.
r	
j
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The Type-I unnecessary command is a function of the DAS perfor-Y
rna.nce.
	 One can improve the situation with higher_ accuracy systems or
by increasing separation between airways (and consequently decreasing
r
capacity).
Unnecessary commands of Type II can be largely eliminated by
improved automation and by centralizing data. 	 In general, in an auto-
mated system not having time to compute will rarely be a reason for
giving unnecessary commands.
	
A number of studies of control with
A computers have suggested algorithms for calculation of commands to
G: ensure separation.	 For example, in this connection, an attempt has been t
made to develop an A.TC system by building the system around the com-
puter instead of (as in present systems) using the computer to perform k	 .
manual ATC functions faster (Ref. 48).
	
In this work a "near optimal"
control' algorithm is developed and described for a group of aircraft.
The algorithm has a number of limitations	 (for example, vertical
maneuvers are-riot considered) but there are a number of very interesting
^ •
..	 1.
f
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ideas suggested. 	 Another effort applies optimal control theory to the
problem of spacing a sequence of aircraft along an approach to the
runway (Ref. 49). 	 The proposed algorithm uses optimal speed control
to maintain spacing whenever possible and optimal turn control whenever
the speed commands violate the performance constraints of the aircraft.
There are limitations in the algorithm because of the highly specialized
nature of the problem considered and the particular meaning of "optimal"
.	 in the problem.	 The reference does demonstrate the feasibility of using
optimal control theory in a practical problem with a practical computer
program.	 An extensive study of the airborne collision avoidance problem
also has been conducted (Ref. 50). 	 There are many known analytic
techniques and computer simulation results for this problem. 	 While -
" the ground-based ATC problem is significantly different, airborne CAS
studies provide data on the important problem aspect of what to do when
only two aircraft are involved in a conflict situation. 	 A recently com-
pleted study of the problem of maintaining separation in a situation
involving a large group of aircraft considers aircraft motion in the large
to determine fre q uency of conflicts and does not consider the control
aspects of aircraft separation (Ref.	 51).
I'
For Type-III unnecessary commands the situation is also signifi-
cantly improved by additional automation. 	 Suppose one considers two; E°	 ,
kinds of command - Type A and Type B. 	 A command of Type A is pre-
ferred to a command of Type B.
	
(For example, a negative command
is preferred to a positive command and an en route hold is preferred'
to a terminal hold.)	 Now consider whether "one should give a -Type A
command.	 If the Type A command is not given, there is a probability -
P 1 that a Type B- command will have to be given in the future. 	 If the
Type A command is given, the probability is P 2 that a Type B command
will be given in the future. 	 The , purpose of the Type A command is to
"	 decrease the chances of a need for a Type B command-(i. e. , PZ < P1), t"
With an adequate automated control system, it is possible to compute r	 `
P 1 and P2 and decide, on the basis of a prior tradeoff decision, whether
r
to give the command.
	
The simplest decision is to compare the decrease
P 1 - P2 in probability with a preassigned threshold and give the command
if the decrease pis sufficiently large.	 The value of the threshold is deter-
mined by the degree to which a Type B command is more serious than a ^^k
Type A command. 92 w ^
The remainder of this section describes some of the problems
and methods of a maximum freedom flow control system. It is notI..	
•,0	 intended to be a complete flow control description. The complete problem
is beyond the scope of the present report, but the discussion which follows
should be sufficiently complete to illustrate the ideas.,
	
.	 :•..:.i The basic idea is to make flow control and en route control non-
rigid. To illustrate the idea, consider, for example, a group of aircraft
	
-	 leaving Los Angeles for the East Coast. One type of flow control approves
	
-,	 a train of aircraft leaving Los Angeles with, say, a 10-mile in-trail
	
'	 spacing. The flow control program has already checked to ensure that
the arriving traffic will merge with other Eastern traffic without exceeding
	
?	 airport arrival capacities. The en route command and control system
makes sure that the aircraft remain spaced properly throughout the trip.
They arrive spaced properly and, environmental conditions permitting,
F exactly on time, r'
If, on the other hand, the aircraft were left to their own devices,
then departure time would vary from that planned.	 The flight times would
also vary from that planned, especially if the aircraft fly at their optimal
speeds.	 There are also considerable variations in individual aircraft
t
which would result in passing within the train. 	 The result of all this is
,^+ that the sequence of aircraft arrives at irregularly spaced interva^s at
^
!.
times quite different from the scheduled times. 	 This disrupts the neat
plan of the flow control computer, and it requires more work in the
conflict detection function of the en route computers.; -.
P
A non-rigid flow control method might take the following form.
The basic data required includes the position of all the aircraft in the FLi
system and the approximate flight plan of each aircraft. 	 By "approximate"
F flight plan is meant the description of the aircraft type, ,origin,_ dcstina- f`
tion, and expected times of departure and arrival.
	
The details of depar-
ture patterns, etc. , are not needed.
Consider a particular airport.
	 The flight plan of the aircraft plus
the current aircraft positions due to arrive at that airport give a set of
expected time of arrivals at the airport. 	 "Arrival" means arrival at some
fixed radial distance from the terminal.
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Suppose that the arrival times of each aircraft could be predicted
with complete accuracy. Then it would be possible to calculate corrected
arrival times with the property that the aircraft would all arrive at the
r
	 terminal at equally spaced times, with the spacing determined by the air-
,.
	 port capacity. If any of the corrected arrival times is later than the
1
	 nominal arrival time of an aircraft, a delay command is sent to that
aircraft.	 1
Let the current estimates of the arrival times be t i , t 2 , t3,
Suppose that the airport can handle one aircraft every h seconds. Then
corrected arrival times are computed by separating the times into	
1
clusters and calculating corrections to the times within each cluster. 	 {
The procedure is as follows:
Start with 
,j i = i,
a) Let k = i . Let t = tj
i	 i
	
I
b)	 If tj
	+ k >_t.	 + k h , go to e).
	
Otherwise go to c).
i	 i
C)	 Let t^	 = tj 	+ k h . ;#+ k
i	 i
t
d)	 Let k + i — k, and return to step b) 	 - ?'
e)	 If all arrival times have been processed, stop. (	 {{ Otherw-ise, let j, + k –► j i , and return to a).
The delay for aircraft j is dj = t
The above process simply adjusts all the arrival times so that
no two aircraft will arrive closer than h seconds apart. - If there were
no errors, the .system would simply send delay commands of delay dj
for aircraft j.
In fact, the arrival times are subject to errors due to winds, pilot
decisions, etc. 	 If one were to let all the aircraft fly at their natural
speed, the actual arrival times would be 	 + E 	 E. is a random }
error.	 The variance of E will generally be smaller for aircraft closer
to the terminal.
	 This means that the delay time of each aircraft is a
random number with a` probability distribution which can be calculated
from the 'probability distribution of the errors E 1,
	 EZ,	 « .
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Let the probability distribution of the delay Dj in the jth aircraft
be P.(D.), i. e. , P.(D..) is the probability that the delay will be D. or
J	 J	 J	 J	 Jless. The details of the computation of P j (Dj ) will depend on the parti -
cular form of the ,distribution of the errors E 1 , E 23	 For example,	 .
suppose that the aircraft with nominal time of arrival F belongs to a
^..
cluster of aircraft with earliest time tk . Then aircraft j will be delayed
	
r
by an amount
Dj = t  + E K + (k-j)h - (t j + fj)
Dj +E K
 -
Ej
}	 where D. = tK + (k-j)h - t.. (This makes the assumption that the air-J	 J
craft will be ordered according to their nominal arrival times. Since 	 ;<i
they will eventually be ordered according to their actual arrival times,
this assumption is an approximation. ) If the errors EK, E. are normally
;^	 J	 Xdistributed with zero mean and standard deviations a-G.J , then D. will Jbe normally distributed with mean D. and standard deviation
J	 ,a
+ 02
K
	
	
,
J
1	 ,
Having the distribution function P.(D.), there are a number of
J	 J	 I
choices. If the aircraft is still on the ground and there is a large 	 1.z
(say greater than . 9) probability of a long (say greater than 15 minutes) 	 a
delay then a departure delay command would be sent to the aircraft. 4
ri
For an en route aircraft, at a large distance from the terminal, if there	 f
is a large probability of a .long delay, an en route delay command would
be sent; e, g. , a New York bound aircraft now over Nevada would be
told to cross the Cleveland area no sooner than 0945 instead of the }
nominal time 0930 of arrival over the Cleveland area, The pilot has
his choice of how to effect the 15 minute delay. For en route aircraft
at a closer distance from the terminal, an en route hold command would
be s ent.
i
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If an en route delay is sent to an aircraft, there is a chance that
the delay is a false alarm; i. e., the traffic might clear up sufficiently to
make the delay unnecessary. 	 If the commanded delay is P c and the delay
that will actually be required is D i , a false alarm will result if Dj^D
Since D. is unknown, it is impossible to say whether there will be a false
alarm, but it is possible to compute the probability of a false alarm.
This probability is Pj (D).	 When deciding whether to send an en routec
$' hold, it is necessary to trade off the advantage of early information being
sent to the pilot against the disadvantages of the possibility of a false
alarm and the necessity of using part of the communication capacity.
3.3.3	 Communications
4The expected increase in traffic volume during the next several
decades with the introduction of new aircraft types such as the super-
3 sonic transports, large capacity conventional jet aircraft, and V/STOLS,
4
will require additional communications capacity to handle, process,
and display more information more automatically and faster than the
present system, which relies heavily on human skills.
In the present air traffic control system, extensive communication
networks provide both direct air-ground and ground point-to-point
communications.	 These two networks are performing an essential
function in the management of air traffic.	 There are at the present
^ time, however, several areas where the communications-system is
working at or above normal capacity, or is marginal in terms of
^. reliability/ redundancy.
	 These problem areas will continue to increase
{ as the air traffic control load and coverage requirements increase.
Therefore, a logical step is to examine those ATC communication
	 _.
functions which might well be improved by satellites.
	 This section will
discuss present ATC communications links; investigate the nature of
the present ATC voice message traffic, treat in detail what is probably
4' a'.the single most important type of ATC message -, collision warning;
and finally, postulate a candidate set of satellite, communications
messages.
96
ai
3. 3. 3. 1
	 Present z'T'C Communications Links
The effectiveness of air traffic management depends to a large
degree on the reliable performance of the communications system. 	 In
;;- the present system, voice channels are provided for the purpose of air
traffic control, weather reporting, company business, and miscellaneous
other supporting services. 	 The current network for air-ground communi-
cations is configured to provide near continuous direct air-ground
communications capability between the ground controller and the air-
craft crew.
There are twenty-one Air Route Traffic Control Centers (ARTCC)
wherein each center is connected to from 7 to 18 Remote Control Airy
Ground Communications (RCAG) facilities usually by leased telephone
circuits.
	 The RCAG facilities are usually automated and unmanned. {
The network configuration in the continental United States is illustrated
in Figure 20.	 The RCAG 's provide communications with aircraft that
are beyond line of sight of the ARTCC's since the usable range of
. conventional 	 F _	 F communications is limited b	 the VH / UH	 n^  	 y {
radio horizon.	 When unencumbered by aircraft or terrain shading, the
radio range depends on the aircraft altitude and the refractive index of
the atmosphere.
	 A range of 200 "nautical miles is typical for 35, 000-foot
altitude.	 The system is now designed_ so that an aircraft's altitude b	 '
utsually-has to exceed approximately 50, 000 feet before it can ''see" two
or more stations simultaneously although this design goal is not always
met. `	 Therefore, very- high-altitude aircraft such as the SST (75, 000 feet
' altitude) could aggravate the current frequency confestion by requiring
greater distance separation between RCAG's using the same frequencies.
The 1971-80 NAS Plan (Ref, 16) indicates that the number of RCAG
channels will increase from 2141 to 2919 between FY 71 and FY 80.
The ARTCC's are usually interconnected by leased telephone
>	 f circuits which provide communications for control handover as air-
craft progress into different center areas of control ;responsibility.
In addition, teletype messages are used to transmit advance flight plan
_ information. r(
r
.	
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0CENTERS OF HUBS SHOWN ON MAPS ARE AIR ROUTE TRAFFIC CONTROL CENTERS
AND POINTS AT EXTREMITIES OF RADII ARE REMOTE CONTROL
AIR-GROUND COMMUNICATION FACILITIES
Figure 20. Configuration of ARTCC Communication Network
The control towers at controlled terminals are also connected
with their local ARTCC by telephone lines primarily for intercommuni-
cations involved in handing over control of arriving and departing air-
craft. F'or example, when an aircraft enters the controlled airport area,
the ARTCC passes responsibility for the aircraft to the control tower
	 r
and also involves the associated approach and departure control function
at IFR airports which is also usually located at the airport control
tower. This land-line telephone network tying the system together is
at the present time an ail-voice operation except for limited computer-
to-computer data transfer now being used in the Northeastern United
States.
In addition to the leased land-line telephone networks, the present
communications system includes a large number of Government-owned
microwave link repeaters and terminals which transmit radar signals
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from 84" Air Route Surveillance Radars (ARSR's) remotely located as
far as 250 miles away to the appropriate Air Route Traffic Control
Centers. In both terminal and en route systems, continuous availability
of radar displays is essential for effective and safe traffic control. How-
ever, a problem with this system is path fading on the microwave links
caused by variation of the radio refractive index. Shorter path lengths
might reduce path-fade outages but would require more equipment at
additional acquisition and maintenance cost.
3.3.3.2 Message Analysis
The purpose of this message analysis is to examine the present
air-to-ground message content, to postulate how it might change in the
forthcoming decades, to identify message types which are logical
SATCOM candidates, and to assess their impact on a satellite CNS system
design. The message analysis will involve both air traffic control and
air carrier company communications (although the latter might,be
considered 'beyond the scope of this study), but will not include emergency
communications. None of the known data available for this study covered
the subject in great enough detail to allow a message analysis; although
Boeing indicated that emergency messages represented about 6 percent
of the total communications load for over-ocean message traffic (Ref. 52).
J
i,
i
{
As part of a future air-ground-air communication subsystem
4	 investigation, Communication Systems Incorporated conducted a sample
survey of air-ground-air voice communications in the FAA Eastern 	 i
F^
Region (Ref. 53). Air route traffic control center message types as
summarized by CSI are listed in Table 18, which indicates the percent {
of the total communications time that is taken up by each type or cater
s	 gory. Although constant changes in the regulations, procedures, and
the nature of the traffic result in modifications to a message analysis
r,
such as this one, the results are recent and valid enough to.give a good
^°	 s
picture of an ARTC communications. This analysis develops a number
4	 of significant points relating to Table 18 as follows:
1) The three types of contacts of hand-off/frequency
changes (230),;, position reports (310), and altitude
By FY 1972, this number will increase to 112 (Ref. 16). r
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Table 18.	 ARTC Center Types and Major Categories
of Voice Messages'
Percentage Distribution of
Communications Time
v Type	 By Category
a
100 Air Traffic Control Instructions
	
25.5
110	 Aircraft Vectoring	 3
120	 Holding	 Small
130	 Altitude Control	 8
140	 Speed Control	 Small
150	 Clearance Control Without
	
12
Holding Information
.f 160	 Clearance Control With	 Small
Holding Information r
^^ r
200 Electronic Communication Support 	 20.8
t Messages
210	 Report-In	 4
'
220
	
Beacon Controi	 4
230
	
Hand-Off/Frequency Changes 	 12
a
300 Air Traffic Control Support	 28. 6
30
	
Position Reports	 12 !	 ,
320
	
Altitude Reports	 16
330	 Heading and Speed Reports 	 Small r
400 ,Advisory Messages	 14.0
410	 Aircraft Traffic Advisory	 3-5r4
420	 Aircraft Status	 SmaY,,^
430
	
Weather	 7- 9
440
	
Airport Status	 Small
500 Communication Incidents	 9: 3
.
t
. s 510	 No Contact	 Small
520	 Repeat/ Correction	 Small
530	 Standby	 Small
540'	 Communications Equipment 	 Small
Check
550	 Miscellaneous Communication	 Small F
Incidents
r
600
and r
700 Unclassifiable andUndeterminable 	 ,,,	 i-. 8
r
81-85 	 100.0 }	 ^.
.{
Information in this Table is taken from Ref. 16
Types 4 0 and 430 were each listed in Ref. 3 at 10 percent, but the
400 classification only totals 14 percent. 	 Estimated figures shown
are based on probability of occurrence ratios.
The remaining 15- 19 . percent is consumed by the various mes sage
types whose numerical time breakdown is not listed. }
100 {
ti
i
t_
i
r
reports (320) consumed 40 percent of the total ARTC
message time. The need for the use of voice for all
three can be virtually eliminated. Position and altitude
reporting are, of course, rendered obsolete by a reliable
surveillance system as long as the update interval is
adequate. Hand-offs might also be eliminated as a result
of a concept which has been developed for the FAA by the
Collins Radio Company (Ref. 54). This "single aircraft
frequency concept" differs from the present control fre-
quency system in that a single frequency would be assigned
to each aircraft for the duration of its flight. The con-
trollers would change to the aircraft's frequency as the
aircraft changed sectors. Collins claims that in addition
to reduction of aircrew workload, a significant channel
conservation would accrue. This would probably sub-
stantially reduce the Hand-off/Frequency Change, and
Report-in coma-.unications load. Furthermore, if
supersonic transports are ever allowed to fly supersoni-
cally on domestic flights, a single frequency/ single
controller flight using SATCOM appears to be worthy
of consideration. Furthermore, the increased use of
inland international gateways will result in a significant
number of aircraft operating within the CONUS which can
be expected to be equipped for SATCOM and could operate
independent of the conventional RCAG's.
2) From a flight safety point of view, the Aircraft Traffic
Advisory (410) and Aircraft Vectoring (110) are probably i
the most significant although they represent only about#
a twelfth of the total load.
	
These can become high priority
messages where short access time is -important; however,
the urgent messages of this type will be reclassified later- "y
in this section. ?}
3) Beacon Control (220) appears to be a more and more
^widely used device for identi£icatic-a and control of air
traffic.	 If the trend continues to use more and more codes I
and to have aircraft change codes on command as a method
of identification, then beacon control can easily become 17
the single largest type in terms of communication load.
It is not clear, however, that this trend is a necessary
or advisable one.	 In fact, it appears that all normal
Electronic Communications Support (Category 200) and ".
' Air Traffic Control Support (Category 300) messages
could be obsoleted by a properly designed data acquisition
system, with transmissions of this type taking place only
in the event of a malfunction or anomaly of some sort.
4) Weather Advisories (430) represent a substantial load.
Clearly nationwide weather broadcasts could be made via
SATCOM.
	
Unfortunately, although the broadcast mode is z
cheap from the ground station viewpoint and the SATCOM
could cover a very wide area, it would 'appear to be a
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somewhat inefficient approach from the aircraft viewpoint.
First, a pilot is interested only in the weather conditions
for his own route and destination, but not nationwide.
Second, SATCOM avionics are more expensive than con-
ventional communications equipment. On the other hand,
an aircraft which is flying over very long routes that would
already have a SATCOM capability (e, g., a 747) might
obtain better weather advisory service in this way.
5) High quality voice circuits or data link with a good multiple
access technique could materially reduce the number of
Communication Incidents. The Communication Incident
load will go down as the circuit efficiencies go up.
6) Automation - both airborne and on the ground - and data
link will reduce the total communications load substantially.
The limiting factor will probably be the man-machine inter-
face in the aircraft, specifically the analog-to-digital con-
version of the pilot's ideas into digital form for downlink
communications,
A functional examination of the message types, per -se, does not
completely determine the likely SATCOM candidates. It is simply not
the function or message type itself that determines whether or not a
satellite link should be used. Rather, it is the location of the aircraft
^	 R
Y
with respect to the ATC facilities and the budget constraints on the 7
aircraft and satellites which turn out to be the deciding factors here.
Satellite communications systems have two very significant characteris-
tics  regarding these two factors - one favorable and the other unfavorable.
The first is very good nationwide coverage, and the second is cost,	 i
The interplay between the various ATC functions become significant
here.	 If the satellite CNS system includes the primary surveillance
t
tool, then the fact that the surveillance data would probably be made
4
available to relatively few ground stations (i. e., the centralization of
.' that function) might lead to communications system centralization as
" well.	 In this case, more SATCOM would be desirable.	 Certainly the
Electronic Communications Support and Air Traffic Control Support
classifications (200 and 300) appear to be less likely candidates for
SATCOM than the Air Traffic Control. Instructions and Advisory Messages 	
3
(100 and 400), but primarily because, the former classifications are
r	 _-_ 7.. -1_.-7_ta._^.^__^.,
^I
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defining and evaluating the communications types, the identification
of the most important communications role for the Satellite CNS system
did not evolve directly from this analysis. Rather, it developed from
an input received from the operational agency itself, the Federal Aviation
Administration. That role is discussed in the next paragraph.
3. 3. 3.3 Short Access Time Communications
iir
^id
I
At the time of the Spring 1970 FAA Planning Review Conference,
TRW personnel and the NASA Technical Monitor visited FAA Headquarters
in order to obtain certain recommended inputs to this study (Ref. 55).
FAA pointed out several problem areas that could be alleviated by the
use of satellites. For example, many of the remotely located radars,
VOIR stations, and RCAG terminals are difficult to get to and require
high maintenance costs. There are towers at less than one-half the
airports served by airlines, and radar at less than one-fourth of these
s
i*
airports.	 As a result, service to the second and third level carriers trF
is less than satisfactory.	 There is a tremendous interaction between
the air carriers and general aviation at between 300 and 400 low density
airports (for example, Hendersonville, North Carolina where a 1967
mid-air collision tool place).
	
FAA pointed out that they need relatively }
inexpensive surveillance and communications for ground-based collision
avoidance services in these areas.
	
The average communications load
would not be great, but the need for traffic control to notify the aircraft'
x
involved is immediate when a collision situation develops.
	
This is a
very real problem to the FAA, one which they felt satellites must address.
Accordingly, TRW undertook to solve this short 'access time collision
warning problem.
	 Although it was not possible to complete all the
conceptual design work as part of this study, the technical details of
R
the system as presently conceived ,are _described in Section 4. 3. 1; and
a simplified communications load analysis- was performed and is des-
cribed in the next paragraph. w
Collision Warning x	 ;
Two methods were used to obtain a rough estimate of the number T
of short access time collision yarning messages that would be required.
The first is based on determining the number of potential collision
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situations which are likely tc exist in the time frame of interest by
extrapolation from 1968 near mid-air collision (NMAC) data (Ref. 56)
and to estimate the' number of warnings required to avert them.
	
The
projected number of NMAC's in 1995 was estimated as follows:
2230
	 x	 4	 x	 162.5 2	 = 161, 000 Projected Number
38. 6	 of Near Mid-air
Collisions in 1995
The	 'Factor	 "Population
number	 to account	 Squared Rule"
of NMAC's
	
for	 Applied to
reported
	
unreported	 Annual Flying
in 1968	 NMAC's
	
Hours Ratio
Since the short-termcommunications load is of interest,
x;
t NMAC' s	 3	 NMAC' s 
_	
5 x 10-161,000
	 Year	 Second
j
This, however, is an average figure which must be multiplied by the
{
busy day and busy hour factors from Ref. 14, Appendix Gi ).
	 Since the
busiest day has 2; 4 times the load of the average day and the busiest
hour has about it percent of the day's traffic:
t'
T
- 
3	 1/93	 NMAC s5xto	 x2.4x- =	 32x10-1/24
	 Seconds
,. Reference 5 indicates that the pilot's estimate of closest proximity
"i for the reported near mid-air collisions varied from 0 to 500 feet with
..'
a majority being less than 100 feet both horizontal ly and vertically.
	
IfJ	 Y	 g	 Y	 Y•
II
we assume an average figure of 100 feet and define a minimum acceptable
.
...
	 I .	 n! closest proximity figure as 2, 000 feet, the projected number of conflicts
' will exceed the number of NMA.C's.
	 Flanagan and Willis (Ref. 14,
Appendix Ct) indicate that the number of conflicts is proportional to E':,1
each dimension (i. e., horizontal and vertical).
	 Thus the projected
`Z
f;
number of conflicts is as follows:
32000
	
2	 Conflicts32 x-10
	
= 13x 100)	 Seconds
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Note that this does not indicate that the aircraft are allowed to get within
2, 000 feet of one another prior to any decision making or command. It
means that if their projected positions ge"- ;within 2, 000 feet of one another,
a message or command might have to be issued. Now since each aircraft
must be notified at least once per potential collision situation, the number
of messages or commands required of the satellite CNS system is 26 per
second. If one assumes that each aircraft must be given two or three
messages, then the system will obviously have to provide capability for
F
52 to 78 messages per second.
Now if we consider- horizontal and vertical separation separately, i
using a figure of 1 000 feet for vertical s eparation and 16, 000 feet forg	 g	 p ^
horizontal separation (which corresponds to a typical high speed "consi-
derable freedom" case of Section 3. 3. 1. 5), the number of conflicts
becomes: ##
f
-3
	
(1, 000
	 14, 000	 = 45	 Conflicts32 x 1.0 x	 100	 100	 Second
Y and the resulting short access time collision warning load would be
90 messages per second for a single message per aircraft or 180 messages-
yper second for two messages per aircraft. j
,r
{ Another estimate can be drawn directly from Flanagan and Willis.
.	 _ In their Los Angeles 'basin analysis they came to the conclusion that each
aircraft in the L. A. basin would receive a positive command about !
5 or 6 times per hour.	 Projected to a nationwide basis in, for example,
1995, this would mean: ' 4
Peak} Messages
	
Airborne 1
per Hour.	 54, 400	 Aircraft	 _	 Me s sage s5.1 to 6.5	 -77 to 98Aircraft	 3,600	 Seconds	 _	 Second
Hour
>^ The Flanagan and Willis model is not conservative in that it is based
on a gas-model assumption of aircraft flight paths in the L. A.. basin,
whereas the motion of the various aircraft around the many airports -
in'the L. A. basin is not random..
	
The application of this model in
this case, however, is conservative in that the Los Angeles basin on a'
Fridmy afternoon in the summer of 1 995 is going to have a,sub'stantially
higher aircraft density than the U. S. average. 	 Thus, for the purposes
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of this analysis it will be assumed that these two factors roughly com-
pensate for one another. It should be noted that the figure indicated
represents a single message to each aircraft. The comparable figures
for the two cases (24 to 90 versus 77 to 98) appear to provide a faily good
estimate of the SATCOM communication;:s load. Woodford and Dutcher
postulate a similar figure of 137 messages per second, which can be
derived from available data (Ref, 57, Table I). It should also be pointed
out tnat these analyses assume that all aircraft are equipped to receive
collision warning messages. Clearly, if they are not the load would be
correspondingly reduced.
These messages are not routine ATC vectoring commands. They
,a
are equivalent to the "positive" collision avoidance commands referred
to in Ref. 14.	 It is clear,	 however,	 that the "negative" or "prohibit"
commands of Flanagan and Willis serve a very useful purpose as well.
These "negative" commands might be "Don't turn left, " "Don't descend,
or some other instruction, which if followed would keep the aircraft
r
from turning towards one another.
	 It is especially desirable to send
such messages when you do not know the intent of one or both aircraft.
An automated service combining- negative and positive commands could
be made more efficient than today's voice link vectoring of aircraft
(message type 110 of Table 18) with positive commands only. 	 It seems
clear, then, that the satellite CNS system would provide a very significant
additional benefit if it could provide an improved "vectoring service.
Flanagan and Willis also indicate that the communicatio..s load for the r
positive-plus-negative" command approach would be from five to thirty
times that required for the simple "positive" command approach, with
ten being a typical ratio.
In summary, the satellite CNS system will be considered adequate
for the 1995 collision warning role if it can provide roughly 100 messages
per second and for the vectoring role if it can provide on the order of
1000 messages per second.
	 By the year 2010, these figures will have
roughly doubled.
106
I'
Entries From Remote Areas Into the ATC System
There is yet another type of short-access-time communications`
requirement which the FAA felt that the study should examine. 	 Control
for aircraft entering the ATC system from low density airports is now
procedural.	 The ATC system expects aircraft to enter the IFR system
at a particular point in time based on their filed flight plan which comes
in by telephone. 	 The ATC system today can handle the situation from,
the centers during off-peak hours, but on the weekends the load can
saturate the system. 	 The solving of the communications problem is a.
n
;i
must.	 Short access time communications are needed when, for example,
a pilot in the air files an IFR flight plan with the center by radio on short
notice (this is called a "pop-up"). 	 A typical case might consist of a pilot'
l under the clouds flying in VFR conditions desiring to climb up through a
Li thin deck of clouds under IFR control, reverting to VFR status as soon as
t.f he is on top.	 Thus, although his aircraft may actually be in instrument Ej conditions for a matter of just a few seconds, the IFR system must pick
E
s him up for that period of time.	 It is easy to see that areas which typically
^have a low bank of clouds (for example, along the west coast of the U. S.) t	 t
will have a lot of pop-up traffic.
	 -
i
a
iReflection on t l- ; s problem indicates that pop-ups will pose two types r
of requirements for tl--; satellite CNS system.
	 For the aircraft filing a i
flight plan from a remote airport without radio facilities, the FAA cannot
} accurately estimate the time at which he will call in at his first point of
y entry into the ATC system. 	 Uncertainties in take-off times greatly
exceed the uncertainties in enroute times.
	
Whereas a pilot might typically
c come within one to three minutes of his estimated times of arrival over ^
reporting points, he can very seldom predict his take-off time anywhere F
near that well.	 Minor mechanical anomalies, delays in loading passengers,
4 differences in taxi times to various runways, landing traffic, and the like,
3
all add up to much greater uncertainties.
	
Unfortunately, when the aircraft
is finally airborne at a non-FAA airport, the pilot can obviously no longer
"phone in".	 Therefore, the FAA sees a large• uncertainty in his arrival y
time into the system.	 The satellite CNS system' should provide the ATC
system with a more accurate indication of when the pilot. takes off from
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3. 3. 3.4 Air Carrier Communications
Although not strictly a part of air traffic control, a brief examination
of airline communications was made in order to scope the load and to see
if this type of service might be combined with the operational air traffic
control functions as is presently done over the Atlantic and Pacific routes. X:.
Aeronautical Radio Incorporated (ARINC) operates a large VHF air-ground t
communications service for the domestic airlines as indicated in Figure 21.
This involves some eight domestic centers and a large number of remote l_
transmitter/ receivers similar to the FAA's RCAG's.
	 ARINC (Ref. 58) !'
provided the data given in Table 19.	 It should be noted that position
reports head the list of message types handled, that some-ATC advisories LZ
are provided over the ARINC air-ground channels, and that no emergency i
or other urgent priority messages are so identified on this list.
	
Thus, a
certain amount of queueing of these messages should be acceptable.-
From Table 19 it can be seen that each air carrier aircraft spends
slightly over one minute per hour in contact with the ARINC ground stations.
For a 1995 peak air carrier load of 4600 aircraft, this would-be equivalent
to almost 80 voice channels at 100 percent duty cycle. 	 Using the voice-
-
to-data-link ratios determined in Ref. 5, this message load could be
handled by two or three 1200-bps data channels plus -a control channel.
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Figure 21. ARINC VHF Domestic Airlines Communications Service
Table 19.	 Summary ARINC Air/Ground Domestic VHF
Operational Data (R,:f. 58)
t_
Types of Messages Handled (Air/Ground/Air)
•	 Position Reports
•	 Terminal Forecasts
•	 Mechanical Messages
•	 Weather Messages
• Radio/Ramp Checks
•	 Selcal Checks
•	 ATC Advisories
e	 Miscellaneous, including messages pertaining to
passenger illness,	 special handling, wheel-chairs, etc.
Average Volume of Monthly A/G Traffic
•	
t
490,000
` Average Length of Contact (talk time) 28 seci •	 , Average Onward Handling Time 8 sec
Average Number of Contacts per Aircraft 2. 25
Revenue Hour
h^ •
It can be seen from the message 'ypes handled and the extensive``
"t VHF net provided by ARINC, that for this purpose the use of SATCOM
should be made on the basis that such communications would be less
expensive to operate and maintain than the ARINC net described.
	 This
' report takes no position on that question since it is beyond the scope of ,v
this 'study. ' It is simply pointed out that such a service could be provided.
The same rationale might also apply for a number of other special mission
s.SATCOM candidates such as Search and Rescue or control and mission
a support for aerial fire fighting units. -
3. 3.3. 5 Summary of Possible Satellite CNS Communication Services };^
:e A summary of candidate message
   types
  with recommendedpriori
  t
 Y
of application to the satellite CNS system is shown in Table 20.
	
Note that
two additional message categories have been added.
	 The 000 urgent
messages category is one which requires more study, but it is clear that
the satellite CNS system's major role is in this area.
	 Likewise, the other
r new category 800 special user mission support contains another important
potential satellite CNS application which is also closely related to emer-
gencies (i. e. , the Search and Rescue mission).
	 Althou- i more definitive
110 r-
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iTable 20 .	 Summary of Candidate Message Types by Priority
or Application to Satellite CNS System
,
f Priority'
Message Type	 I	 II III IV
000 Urgent Messages
j 010	 Collision Warning	 X
i 020	 In-Flight Emergency - An Immediate Flight 	 R Ii r
Plan Change Is Required (e. g. , Engine
Failure, Decompression)
A 030	 In-Flight Emergency - No Immediate Flight 	 R H
e Plan Change Is Required (e, g. , Engine Over- }
heat, Aerial Piracy)
040	 Emergency Advisories (e, g. , Severe 	 R H
Weather, National Emergency
4s	 '' 100 Air Traffic Control Instructions
1.10
	 Aircraft Vectoring	 X
120
	
Holding	 R 14
t	 .. 130	 Altitude Control 	 R 14
:. 140	 Speed Control	 R H
150
	 Clearance Control Without Holding incl.	 R H f?
~
' Info. "pop- ;
160
	
Clearance Control With Holding Info. I	 ups"	 R H
200 Electronic Communication Support Messages
210
	
Report-In X :.
220	 Beacon Control X
r230	 Hand-Off/Frequency Changes X t
300 Air Traffic Control Support i}
310	 Position Reports X
320
	 Altitude Reports X
330	 Heading and Speed Reports X
400 Advisory Messages
410	 Aircraft Traffic Advisory h I	 '
420	 Aircraft Status X
430	 Weather h
440	 Airport Status X
500 Communication Incidents	 Not Applicable
600 & 700 Unclassifiable and Undeterminable 	 Not Applicable
800 Special User Mission Support
` 810	 Search and Rescue	 X
820	 Air Carrier X
830	 Forestry X
840
	
Other X
j "Legend:	 Class I	 - Necessary Satellite Application
Class II	 - Important Satellite Application
Class III
	 -	 Possible Sattelite Application t
TM + Class IV	 -	 Unlikely Satellite Application K
x	 - Recommended Priority, All Areas
."- R	 - Recommended Priority, Remote Areas'
H	 - Recommended Priority, Hub Areas
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priorities could be established using more sophisticated mission and
operation analyses, the following observations can be made based on the
foregoing preliminary analysis:
1)	 The only message type on the list which is classified
Priority I is the 010 short access time collision warning{
message identified by the FAA.
j 2)	 The remainder of the urgent messages (000) class is a
required item for satellite applications to support aircraft
located. in remote areas (R), where line-of-sight ground
communication is not available (and where FAA still has
a responsibility), but not in hub areas.
3)	 A number of important message types (e. g. , aircraft
'. vectoring) are relevant for satellite application (II) if
the satellite system can be designed to fulfill this
requirement and remain cost effective in an operational
1
system.
4)	 The Class III items should be considered for satellite
appli^ation on a "pay as you go" basis (i, e. , each user
should pay charges for such services and unless it can
be shown that these services would be provided on this
sound, economical basis, they should not be assigned
to the satellite CNS system).
3.4 CONCEPTUAL DESIGN CRITERIA
This section draws together the results of Sections 3. 1, 3. 2, and 3.3.
The desired system characteristics discussed in Section 3. 4, i are quali-
tative rather than quantitative in nature, but they are nontheless important
{ design tools and have contributed significantly to the system conceptual
design.	 The specific quantitative requirements and criteria are summarized
	 i
f in Section 3. 4. 2.
	
.-
3.4. 1	 Desired System Characteristics
.	 f The following' desired system characteristics were first used as
` guidelines in the preliminary synthesis of the Satellite CNS System.
These characteristics were modified during the course of the study and
are used in try	 system effectiveness evaluation given in Section 5. 3.
•	 User Base and Costs.	 The projected number of fatalities	 i
associated with air carrier /general aviation mid-air
collisions, the high general aviation growth rate and the
difficulty in 'resolving the question of airspace organization
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make it virtually mandatory that the surveillance portion
of this concept be economically available to all aircraft.
Other cost elements must likewise be reasonable for the
service rendered.
•	 Adaptability.
	 This characteristics provides the ability
on the part of the ultimate operator or consumer to use a
system. in a number of ways, not all of which were evident
at the time the system was conceived.
	
As the needs of
the traveler and the modes of travel change, the require-
1 ment for the ability of such_a system as this to adapt to
those changes becomes extremely important.
	
If the sys-
tem has operational flexibility, the air traffic controllers
and pilots will find ways to adapt the system to its environ-
ment, thereby enhancing its overall usefulness and pro-
longing its life. t.
.1 • -Growth Potential.	 The system must be capable of beingphased into the domestic ATC environment such that it
need not displace present systems overnight.	 Further-
more, the system must be capable of providing growth s
- in the services provided just as the customer base itself
will certainly grow.
	 It is simply not economical nor
= feasible for commercial carriers, the military, or general
aviation to replace equipment which is operating adequately
before they have recovered their investment on that equip- f
merit.	 Further, they will not make such a change until it
is clearly demonstrated that it is both beneficial and safe 1
for them to do so.
	
The old low-frequency radio ranges s
' served the aviation community in the United States fora
long	 and
	 VHF	 expectedtime,	 present	 omniranges are	 to
do the same.
	 If correctly designed, this modern satellite=
based ATC system will likewise serve the country for ?	 ,
f decades.
•	 Availability.	 Full-time coverage over the entire United
States , must be available.
	
A total system breakdown
must be an extremely unlikely event.
	
Further, the ground
system should be made with enough redundancy and ease
a of maintainability that ground station reliability should
e
have an insignificant effect on overall system reliability.
x Finally, since the majority of the users of the systemwill
.r be in a competitive commercial situation, or on a limited
` budget in the case of general aviation, high reliability and F'
maintainability must be balanced against initial and oper-
ating costs, and the traffic control system must be able
to tolerate a few aircraft with in-flight equipme-it failures.
•	 RF Spectrum Utilization.	 Because the radio spectrum is
F a limited commodity, an important factor in evaluating
the Satellite CNS System will be the location and amount
of spectrum required for its operation.	 Since the radio
spectrum is regulated by international agreements and
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standards, and since many diverse users, industries,
k{'	 governments, etc. , often compete for the same spectrum
space, it is important that the system does not impose
unrealistic or unnecessary requirements on spectrum
-IJ	 utilization.
The present principal bands allocated for ATC functions are-
200-400 KHz
74-76 MHz
108-136 M-Iz
220-400 MHz
420-450 MHz
960-1215 MHz
1535-1660 MHz
1300-B50 MHz
2700-2900 MHz
4200-4400 MHz
5000-.5200 MHz
Low frequency beacons
Marker beacons
Civil air-ground communications, TOR, ILS
localizes signals
Military air-ground communications plus
ILS glide slope signals
DOT/FAA radar
DME/TACAN and ATCRBS
Satellite systems, radio altimeters, CAS
Air route surveillance radar (ARSR)
Airport surveillance radar (ASR.)
Radio altimeters
Satellite-based system
It is desired that the Satellite CNS system operate in one of the 	 .
y	 above bands to avoid allocation problems and that there be no interference 	 F
.^1
with existing systems- which would be retained. In cases where potential
interference may exist, the moving of one system to another band is 	 r
possible (such as the present plans to vacate radio altimeters from the
P	 1535-1660 MHz band) but undesirable.
	 {
3.4. 2 Specific Design Criteria
The air traffic control problem over the North Atlantic has been
analyzed extensively. The relationships between navigation accuracy,
surveillance accuracy and update interval, aircraft control accuracy and 	 -
k	 lateral separation standards have been well defined. In order to reduce
j	 separation standards to, say, 60 nmi, the quantitative requirements. on
the navigation and surveillance systems can be clearly stated. For the
domestic picture, many goals regarding separation standards have been
postulated, but few officially stated requirements exist. Thus the fore-
going sensitivity analyses shed some light on the problem, but they do
not establish firm system or subsystem performance requirements.J.;
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Specifically, the following general guideline criteria can be inferred
(each criterion is keyed to the relevant sections in the foregoing analysis):
Surveillance	 r
1) Position determination uncertainty (Section 3. 3. 1)
F
• Approach/ Departure: 200- 500-ft allowance
• Fnroute	 500- 1000-ft allowance
2) 1 - 3 -sec update interval (Section 3. 3. 1)
3) Full-time availability
• Very high reliability satellites and ground stations(Sections 3. 1. 3, 3. 4. 2)
•,, High reliability avionics (Sections 3. 1. 3, 3. 4. 2)
s Good antenna coverage for all headings of flight with
bank angles up to 30 degrees and normal pitch angles(Sections 3.2. 2, _3. 2. 3, 3.3. 1, and 3.4. 2), j
Navigation
1) Navigation, guidance, and control accuracies should be
on the order of: (Sections 3. i. 3. 1, 3.3. 1); :!
•	 enroute:	 no firm requirement established; probably
200 - 2000 ft (1 a) depending on route
,.. structure, flight rules, and type of aircraft.' a
•	 approach and departure'; ±300 ft allowance
' •	 landing: 60 ft (1 u)
2) Aircraft antenna coverage is important, although the s
requirement to tolerate dropouts during normal maneuvers
is not as critical as for surveillance or communications.
(Section 3. 2. 2)
Communication
.t
1) Short access time collision warning is a required com-
munication function.
	 The system should provide on the
order of 1OO messages per second nationwide. (Section 3.3.3) :.
2) It would be highly desirable if the sameshort access
time collision warning system could also provide on
the order of 1000 messages per second in order to
provide normal traffic vectoring service. (Section 3.3.3?
115
3) The system should also provide emergency communications
for aircraft in remote areas. (Section 3.3. 3)
4) Drop-outs associated with aircraft attitude are highly
undesirable, but a certain amount must be tolerated.(Section 3. 3. f)
In terms of hardware requirements, the satellite ground station and
aircraft hardware must simply meet the following criteria:
1) The hardware, when functioning normally within the
	
t
total system, must allow the system to achieve the
performance specifications just stated.
2) The hardware approach must be economically viable a
.	 in terms of initial investment, maintenance, and
reliability. Specific parameters which are specified
for pre-I a.rdware implementation, such as aircraft
clock stability, ground computer data handling capacity,
and satellite MTBF aregiven in Sections 4 and 5 of
this report.
Procedural
Only one procedural requirement appears critical at this paint. If
the concept of mixed airspace is to survive, then a concept such as the
short access time collision warning (or the so-called intermittent positive
	 .
control) must be implemented.
	 y
l
t
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4. SYSTEMS ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION
This section described the analysis and evaluation of the Satellite
CNS System.	 The rationale for selection of the LIT concept for detailed
y analysis is describes? in Section 4. 1.
	 The analyses performed in the
{ conceptual design of the surveillance and communications systems are
described in Sections 4. 2 and 4. 3 	 The navigation portion of the system is
not described herein since it had been well documented in a previous ` TRW .
study report for NASA (Ref. 6).	 Section 4.4 contains an ana.?.;r sis of the
satellite network design including reliability, availability, coverage, and
' capacity considerations. 	 Section 4. 5 treats the data processing load of
an air traffic control system using the LIT concept.	 Section 4. 6 is an
examination of the critical cost elements of the Satellite CNS System.
1 The purpose of this analysis is to establish whether or not the Satellite
CNS System can be justified on the basis of reduced costs.',
4.1 CONCEPT REVIEW AND SELECTION }
Satellite position determination techniques can be classified into
.i
three categories according to the functions required of the user. 	 The
user aircraft my transmit only, receive only, or both transmit and
,'. receive.	 TRW considered in this study a transmit-only system, called
the Location Identification Transmission (LIT) system; a receive only
.._	 i system, called NAVSTAR, .which had been studied previously, and a
transmit/ receive system using roundtrip ranging.
	
Table 21 is a simple
.` matrix showing the basic service provided by each of these systems. f
Earl	 in the stud	 Ty '	 y,
	selected the LLT system for continued }
concept synthesis, analysis, aii.d evaluation for the surveillance role.
The reasons are discussed briefly in the following paragraphs.
4. 1. 1	 Passive Ranging Plus Communications
In this system [which TRW has studied for NASA (Ref. 70 surveil-
lance information is obtained by the ATC ground center from users
equipped with NAVSTAR navigation receivers.
	 These users transmit
their. range data received from four satellites at either an assigned time
or at the command of the ATC center on a separate data charnel through
one of the satellites or directly air-to-ground.
	 The ground station
117
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Table 21. Navigation/ Surveillance Concepts
	 4
System Type
Transmit - only
(LIT system)
Receive-only (Passive
ranging - NAVSTAR
system)
Transmit/Receive(rcundtrip CW
ra:hging)
Service Category
Navigation	 Surveillance
Secondary Service''` Primary Service
Primary Service	 Secondary Service'''
Secondary Service
	 Primary Service''"''
r (:.an be provided by the addition of a c-ommunications lin;z.
0-0,
Requires one less satellite than other systems.
i
computers then compute the aircraft positions from the received range
data. This system has been named NAVSTAR/A-UTO_REP in the above
	 !
referenced study.
Approximately 110 bits of information must be transmitted for
each position computation by the ATC center.
	 This information includes
aircraft ID, range to 100 ft resolution from four satellites" , and the
time at which these measurements were made.
	 If we assume that every
aircraft position is updated each second, as the LIT system is-capable
of doing, then the data requirements for a peak load of 100, 000 airborne i.	 o
users will be 12 megabits per second.
	 Dividing the load equally between
four satellites requires each satellite to transmit 3 megabits per second .
to the ATC center.	 To account for synchronization bits and guard time -
between aircraft transmissions, the actual data rate will probably be
10 to 20 percent higher.	 Therefore, each satellite is likely to transmit
about 3. 5 megabits per second.
Range number one would always correspond to satellite one, range
number two to satellite two, etc. so
 that a satellite ID need not be sent
with each range number.
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the address or ID of an aircraft, then each interrogation must- coat:a.-.
at least 18 bits.	 Therefore, a command channel must have a data rate
of 450K bits per second. 	 Providing for error correction coding could
increase this rate considerably.
However, assuming a data rate of 450K bits per satellite for inter-
rogations, a satellite transmitter power on the order of 1.3 kilowatts is
i required.	 This is based on a 35 db satellite antenna gain (1 /3 CONUS
coverage) and a 3 db upper hemisphere coverage aircraft antenna gain.
The -satellite transmitter power for the NAVSTAR position data will be
on the order of a few watts despite the 3 megabit data rate since the
ATC center antenna gains can be much larger than the aircraft antenna
gain. 1'
µ Since the NAVSTAR/AUTOREP avionics will be expensive, it is
likely that only the higher cost users would be so equipped.	 Thus, use
of NAVSTAR/AUTOREP would probably be limited to air carriers and
the military.	 Of the expected 100, 000 peak airborne user population by
{ the year 2010, about 13, 000 aircraft fit this category.	 Therefore, the
data rates and satellite transmitter power requirements could be reduced
 However, the surveillanceproportionately.	 ance problem for the lame popu-
lation of general aviation users will not be solved.
1 For the above reasons (primarily the aircraft hardware costs),
NAVSTAR/AUTOREP is not recommended as a solution for surveillance
over the U. S. where the large and diverse population of users make a,
_..	 ..
common low cost system such as LIT a more practical solution.	 How- 4i
-.
ever, over a region such as the North Atlantic where mainly high cost
aircraft of limited numbers operate, NAVSTAR/AUTOREP appears to
be a good approach for the surveillance andnavigation functions.
419
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4. 1.2 Round-Trip Ranging
In this system (Ref. 14, Appendix F-2) the satellites have three
antenna beams each covering 1/3 of the United States. In addition, four
separate frequency channels are assigned to each beam in order that the
number of users transmitting; on a channel be reduced to a manageable
level Since adjacent beams will overlap, it is necessary that a differ-
ent set of frequencies be assigned to these beams, except the two outer
beams could conceivably have duplicate frequencies. 	 The required RIP
bandwidth on each channel will be 20 MHz (identical to LIT) since users
are transmitting at a 10 Mbps rate. 	 Therefore, the total bandwidth on
the link from users to the ground center will be at least 160 MHz. 	 With
guard bands between channels, in excess of 200 MHz is probably required.
The link from the ground center to the users requires another 40 - 50 Mhz
i. e. , two separate channels on the two overlapping beams.	 Therefore,
much more bandwidth is required for this system than for LIT.
.^ 1
The satellites are considerably bigger, more costly, and more
complex than the LIT satellite, although one less satellite is required
L
since ranging rather than range differencing is used.
	 The case against
this technique is most strongly made, however, based upon the cost of
the avionics hardware.	 It is sufficiently costly and complex as to be
completely non-competitive.
	 When we consider that there will be
j
upwards of a half million users involved in the 1995 era, the cost
differential is very_ significant.
4.1.3	 Transmit-Only Ranging
Because of the foregoing considerations, it was agreed early in
i
the study to concentrate most of the systems analysis and evaluation
effort on the most attractive candidate (i. e. , the transmit-only ranging
.: concept for surveillance and passive ranging for navigation).
{
t
a
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f4. 2 SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM (LIT) ANALYSES
4. 2. 1 Carrier Frequency Selection
Three frequency bands for the aircraft-to-satellite links were
examined for the LIT surveillance system 450, 900, and 1600 MHz.
•
The important technical factors in choosing a frequency band are the radio
propagation effects on system performance, the user costs, and the
impact on the satellite design. Each of these factors was examined for the
frequency tands of interest.
The important radio propagation effects to be considered are signal i,
{	 multipath, ionospheric scintillation and absorption, ionospheric refrac-
tion, and ionospheric dispersion.
a{ Multipath is discussed in detail in Section 4. 2. 5.	 In theory, multi-
path returns should be less at higher frequencies because surface reflec-
^j tions tend to become more diffuse as the frequency increases.
	 In
effect, a given surface !should look smoother to reflected waves as the
frequency decreases.	 However, the limited experimental data examined
has not conformed this theory.
	
Therefore, until further data is available, JI
the effect of frequency on multipath is not clear. `	 1
g Ionospheric scintillation and absorption should not be significant at
the three frequencies of interest.
	 While ionospheric absorption decreases
with the square of the frequency, it is normally insignificant even below
450 MHz.	 Below 200 MHz, certain auroral.. and polar cap events asso-
ciated with major solar flares and local geomagnetic storms can cause
Y severe absorption or signal fades for short periods.	 At higher frequencies,
however, even these events cause small signal fades.	 Ionospheric scin-
tillation is usually a more significant problem than absorption but should
still be small at the frequencies of interest particularly at the mid-
latitudes of most of CONUS.
	
Therefore, ionospheric signal fading is not
: a critical, factor in choosing the carrier frequency for surveillance.
The time varying electron density of the ionosphere causes varia-
tions in the refractive index for radio wave propagation and, consequently,
causes errors in the satellite-aircraft range _measurements. 	 The
magnitude of this error is inversely proportional to 'the square- of the
carrier frequency.
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fFigure 22 shows the ionospheric refraction error (translated to
horizontal CEP in feet) for a 90 percentile ionospheric electron density
at a frequency of 1600 MHz.	 The range error is translated to a CEP
error assuming a four satellite Y orbit constellatio3^ and accounting for
partial correlation of ionospheric errors between the different satellites.
If the errors were treated as being uncorrelated, i.e. , no spatial corre-
lation between satellites, the upper curve in Figure 22 results. In
addition, the errors are corrected to a residual of 25 percent of the
actual error by taking advantage of lnowledge of the ionospheric election
density as a function of time of day, season of the year, and the sunspot
cycle. Ionosphere electron density predictions are published monthly by
E55A. In practice, ratber khan correcting the ionospheric error using
electron density predictions, LIT ground beacons can be placed at various
locations (such as airports) to serve as real time calibration points. The
error in this case is illustrated by the relative navigation curve around
a calibration station. The ionosphere tends to become self-compensating
as aircraft approach one another so that the error tends to become
zero for collision avoidance.
i
	
Figure 23 shows the ionospheric errors as a function of frequency 	 " 4
and also shows the total errors (excluding satellite ephemeris errors) for
a system subject to random range errors of 15 feet (10. Typical total
errors for 16° and 30° inclined satellite constellations are shown. For
high frequencies where non-ionospheric errors dominate, the total rela-
	
tive error is N2 times the absolute error because of the rms sum of two
	
.^
measurements. If satellite ephemeris errors were included, the absolute
error would be larger.
For 16' orbits, the absolute error is essentially constant down to
about 400 MHz while the relative -error is constant down to about 250 MHz.
X
-
s
-'DefiE-^ed to mean that ninety percent of the time the ionospheric columnar
electi-bsn content will be less than 6. 5 • 10 17
 electrons per 'square meter.
This value- , is based on measured data taken with ionospheric soundings.
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For the higher accuracy 30° orbits, these frequencies increase
respectively to 900 and 400 MHz. Therefore, for the low inclination con-
stellations under consideration for LIT surveillance (Ref. Section 4. 4).
ionospheric refraction errors do not play an important role in choosing
one of the three carrier frequencies under consideration.
Because the ionosphere behaves like a time varying filter, it has a
finite transmission bandwidth to signals passing through it. The effect
ry
of this bandwidth limitation on the dispersion of the 20-MHz LIT signal
waveform (pulse shape distortion) has been analyzed. The pulse dis-
persionresults in a signal correlation loss in the ground station matched
filter which is reflected as a direct loss in 'signal--to-noise ratio. * This
correlation loss is a function of the pulse modulation code bit length,
carrier frequency, and the ionospheric electron density along the ray
path as shown by the following equation (Ref. 59)	 ;*
r.
I:
f 3
o	 ^t.
i
Lcorr F T K
where	
ty
`.	
4	
F,
T =pulse code bit length (0. 1 sec)
fo = carrier frequency	 }
K proportional to line integral of electron density along
y paths
Plots of the correlation loss as a function of fQ for a median and
worst case ionosphere are shown in Figure 24. These plots indicate 	 =
that the correlation  loss can be as much as 2. 5 db higher at 450 MHz than
r
at the other two frequencie•3. Therefore, the ionospheric correlation loss
tends to partially cancel the benefit of lower space loss on therequired
_	 i
aircraft transmitter output 'power at 450 MHz.
The other major consideration in choosing a frequency band is both
the user and the satellite costs. A key factor in user costs is the required
ipeak power output of the aircraft transmitter. Another less important	 4.
factor is the size and complexity of the aircraft antenna. Figure 25 shows 	 f
r
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plots of the required aircraft transmitter power and the noise seen by
the satellite receiver as functions of frequency. The minimum trans-
^t mitter power occurs at about 250 MHz. Above this frequency, increasing
space loss requires larger transmitter powers while below it man-made
noise P  begins to overcome the reduced space loss advantage. These
conclusions assume constant antenna gain on the satellite as well as the
aircraft at all frequencies. However, antenna dimensions scale approxi-
mately as f 1 for constant gain, so that lower frequencies require larger
antennas. For example, if the maximum permissible satellite antenna
dimension is 30 feet, then the minimum aircraft transmitter power occurs
at about 400 MHz.
s,	 .
Figure 26 is a scatter plot showing the maximum dimensions of
several upper hemisphere coverage aircraft antennas as-a function of
frequency. All other things being equal, dimensions should scale as f 1.
However, there is also a tendency, as dimensions become sniall in inches
as in the 5-inch NAVSTAR L-band curved arm turnstile), to exceed the
scaling law dimension both because of lack of incentive and difficulty of
manufacture. It does not appear that size will pose major limitations
on the antenna for subsonic aircraft at frequencies above 400 MHz. !^	 J
However, at the lower frequencies, good circular polarized designs
g	 may result in excessive size.
}	 1
}
J
Man-made noise levels looking'_ toward earth from a satellite are based 	 E
on a population density extrapolation of measured urban noise levels for
an antenna field of view encompassing the Continental United States.
The expected man-made equivalent noise temperature varies approxi-
mately as f- 2. 2 and equals 290 0 K at about 400 MHz.
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Coverage Aircraft Antennas
To summarize the above results, the 450-MHz band has the
r_
advantage of requiring the least transmitter peak output power with con- t:
sequent potential for lowest user costs. 	 The upper two bands have the
advantage of better propagation properties and smaller antenna dimen-
sions, particularly on the satellite. t.
Of course, the usual problems of spectrum availability and assign-_
ment play the major role in the choice of a frequency band. 	 At 1600 MHz,
'.	 the still largely unused, frequency allocation for aeronautical radio
services from 1535-.1660 MHz is available; at 900 MHz, the top end of
the UHF TV band or lower end of the TACAN band are possibilities; at
450 MHz, the DOD/FAA radar band may be a possibility. 	 It should be
noted here that LIT surveillance requires about 25 MHz of RF spectrum
per channel.	 Since a two channel system is required to handle the peak
traffic expected by the year 2010, a total of 50 MHz of RF spectrum will
be required for LIT by the end of the century.
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The satellite-to-ground links are located at 5 100 MHz, but can be
placed in any convenient band above 2000 MHz.
	 The main requirement
here is that the propagation errors on the downlink do not degrade the
' overall LIT accuracy and that the ground antennas have sufficient direc-
tivity so that the satellites can all transmit at the same frequency to
conserve bandwidth.
	 At too low frequencies, this requirement could result
in excessive antenna size for the ground station.
4. 2. 2 Pulse Modulation Technique
The basic goal in designing the LIT pulse modulation is to provide
the capacity to locate and identify up to 100, 000 aircraft/ see. using the
a
same signal space.
	 Therefore, the modulation should contain a potential
signal processing gain (PG) equivalent to
PG = 10 5 [
 (SIN) required] (.
I
which is on the order of 60 to 70 db.
	 Identification of all existing aircraft 1'
must be provided by some means of coding each aircraft transmission: to
give at least 100, 000 unique ID I s.
	 However, at least 106 ID t s are desired
so that most aircraft can be assigned permanent ID's in conjunction with
` their registration numbers.
The signal processing gain is provided by using a combination of
low duty cycle transmissions (pulses) and pulse coXnpression at the ground
receiver.
	 Identification codes are provided by using different combinations
of biphase pulse compression codes and pulse repetition periods (PRPIs)
for each aircraft in the system.
	 The PIRP 	 should be in the range of onei
to two seconds to provide the capability for position updating every one
- or two seconds.
The above considerations and analyses have led to the LIT modu-
lation parameters shown in Table 22.
	 The :,, mpressed pulse width of
- 0.1 µsec results not only from a processing gain requirement; but also
from an accuracy requirement on pulse arrival time measurements for
G
4
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Table 22. LIT Modulation Parameters
Parameter Parameter Value
Transmitted Pulse Width 51. 1 µsec
Pulse Repetition Period (PRP) Between 1. 0 and 1. 31 sec/pulse
Number of Discrete PRP ' s 31, 255 spaced 10 µsec apart
B ipha s e Code Length 511 Bits
Bit Length 0. 1 µsec (compressed pulse
width)
Ni, .iher of Biphase Codes 16
f
^j
position location. 	 Using the parameters in Table 22, the resulting
1 potential processing gain is '70 db, computed as follows;
;. •	 Duty cycle of 51. 1 x 10 - 6 give s 43 db.
•	 Pulse compression of 511 gives 27 db. 	 The sum of the
two then equals 70 db.
The number of identification codes available is equal to the product
of the number of biphase codes and discrete PRP I s or 500, 000.	 The
y coding studies (Ref. Section 4. 2.4) have, found 16 acceptable biphase
codes.	 Attempts to increase this numbe p in order to have more ID's or r
fewer PRP's have resulted in undesirable :..ross-correlation levels between
codes.	 Therefore, a maximum of 500, 000 unique ID I s will be available 4
for each LIT RF channel.'
}.,: Analysis of the ' r :blem	 f the interference	 crosstalk between	 p c	 o	 	 or	 o ^
p' pulses, given in Section 4. 2. 3, indicates that while an airborne peak
capacity of 100, 000 aircraft updated approximately once per :second is
possible, a more conservative design results in half this capacity. 	 There-
fore, ,LIT channel capacity will equal 50, 000 aircraft updated once per
second or 100, 000 once per two seconds or any combination resulting in
50, 000 updates per second..
12 9
aThe 10-µsec PRP spacing was chosen so that a combination of
doppler shift and transmitter oscillator error will not cause overlapping of
adjacent PRP assignments. For less than Mach-1 aircraft, doppler shift
(including satellite motion) will not exceed 1-1/2 parts per million. The
f-
aircraft transmitter oscillator long term stability will be one to two parts
per million (achievable at low cost) so that the maximum PRP jitter that
can occur is f2-1/2 to 3-1/2 µsec. For high performance aircraft, better
oscillator stability can be provided to offset the increased doppler.
f
	
	 The processing gain (G) of the pulse compression filter in the
grow 1d station can be shown to equal;
2
G = L (sin (1TLOfT)TrLOfT
1
where
L = biphase code length in bits
Of	 frequency error of pulse carrier due to doppler and
system oscillator errors
j T = code bit length or-compressed pulse width (0. 1 µsac)
i
-' The gain can be maximized for a particular frequency error by picking
r	
- an optimurn code length L. 	 This optimum length and the corresponding r
r
gain are equal to;
_ 0.372 ,.
L	 -opt	 Of r'i
0.23
GMax rs Of r
The same error sources resulting in PRP jitter also result in carrier
frequency error.
	
Therefore, Df will not exceed 3-1/2/  ppm.	 Using this
value, the frequency errors equal 5. 6 KHz at , 1600 MHz, 3. 2 KHz at
900 MHz, and 1. 6 KHz at 450 MHz.	 The corresponding optimum code
lengths L are 665 bits, 1160 bits, and `2320 bits.
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Two code lengths have been considered, 511 bits (close to optimum
for 1600 MHz) and 2044 bits (close to optimum for 450 MHz). 	 The
attractive feature of the longer code is the increased processing gain
available which permits reduction of the aircraft transmitter peak power
that in turn can reflect lower avionics costs.
A 2044-bit code cannot be used with the two highest carrier fre-
quencies, unless post-detection integration is employed, because the
frequency error causes a loss of matched filter coherency across the pulse
duration.	 For example, at 1600 MHz a 511 bit code results in 25. 9 db
processing gain, while a 2044 bit code results in 18. 2 db processing gain. 1.
Therefore, with the long code, the matched filter must be segmented into
four 511 bit sections and the output of each section summed incoherently
to provide post-detection integration of four 511 µsec pulses. 	 The process-
ing gain (taking into account 0. 6 db post-detection integration loss) in
this case is 31. 3 db.	 At 900 MHz only two post-detection integrations
I  b
	
b	 f the	 11	 f., w%J	 a necessary	 ecause o	 - sma er requency error.
4 However, this study concentrates on the use of a 511 bit code.
Investigation of longer codes is merited but was not planned for this study
^j effort.	 Therefore, the balance of the report assumes 511 bit coded TIT
pulses.	 However, for the aircraft transmitter design and corresponding
cost estimates study, both a 511 bit and a 2044 bit code were assumed to
determine the effect of the longer code on avionics costs.
4.2.3	 Pulse Detection and Interference
This section analyzes the effect of both thermal noise and pulse :Y ^
crosstalk on the pulse detection and false alarm rates at the ground station,
receiver.	 The crosstalk occurs because of the sidelobe structure of the
auto and crosscorrelation functions of the pulse codes.
,t Another detection problem occurs when two or more 0. 1-µsec com- R
pressed pulses arrive so near coincidence that it is not possible to obtain
tti
G a distinct and separate time of arrival measurement on each pulse and
so distinguish between the aircraft involved.
	
This interference problem
is also analyzed.
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4. 2. 3. 1 Pulse Detection and False Alarm Rates
t
This subsection contains an analysis of the effect of thermal noise
and pulse code crosstalk on missed pulse detection and false alarm rates
at the ATC ground station. The analysis assumes that the various pulse
code sequences are random, indpendent, and noise-like. A family of
such codes are readily obtainable and can be chosen from a table of
random numbers. Appendix E contains detailed analysis of the results
presented here.
The output pulse signal-to-thermal noa;se pulse crosstalk ratio can
be shown to equal
Signal1_
Noise + Crosstalk — IL +R R —S	 C
RS = N (Output signal-to-noise ratio after compression)
0
5i
Assuming that the distribution of the effective noise (thermal noise
plus crosstalk) is gaussian, the results of classical radar detection
analysis are applicable to the problem of missed and false alarm pulses.
In the ground station, each false alarm pulse enters the PRP sort mode
(,for aircraft identification) and missed pulses cause position fixes to be
t missed and tracked aircraft to be eventually dropped and re-enter the
sort mode for re-identification.
The number of pulses per second entering the sort mode (N s) because
^t
of false alarms and missed pulses, and the optimum threshold setting to
minimize Ns have been calculated.
	 Plots of Ns as a function of the output
signal-to-thermal noise ratio (R s) for various combinations of parameters
are given in Figures 27 and 28. 	 The plots all assume a nominal pulse
repetition period (PRP) of one second. 	 The number of coasts, N , is jt
i	 ? defined as the number of pulse periods (=I second each) the system
remains in the track mode before dropping track, if pulses do not occur
when predicted because of missed detection.
Since pulses received at the ground station will have a dynamic a
± range of 12. 8 db (Ref. Section 4. 2. 6 on RF link budgets), the crosstalk- k	
F
to-signal ratio will be highest for the weakest signals in the system.
	 In !
calculating the curves in Figures 27 and 28, all detected pulses were
t	 i
assumed to be at the weakest level, whereas the pulses for calculating
` crosstalk level were assumed to be 7 db above the weakest signals.:
These assumptions clearly result in worst case answer's since most
received pulses well be at higher levels where the crosstalk ratio is less.
F Some interesting results of the analysis are the following:
From Figure 27;
.. •	 The effect of the number of codes used is small.
•	 Increasing number of coasts from 2 to 3 is important.
•	 getter codes than noise-like are important.
} From Figure 28: r
•	 There is a sharp threshold in the number of users
.; the s y	 With 51/C i -stem can handle.	  -7 db andM = 1, it will be difficult to handle 100, 000 users
for N between 10 and 50.s
.e	 .
r
T
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•	 The effect of better codes improves this situation
dramatically.	 100, 000 users are easily handled
if M = 0. 5.
In the light of these results, the following conservative baseline
4 design, assuming noise-like codes, has been chosen:
`	 ! Nu = 50, 000 aircraft
T	 1 gecotid pulse period
N= 10 codesC
.'; M = 1 (noise-like random codes)
{ Nt = 3 coasts before dropping track r
N	 = 10 pulses/second
s.
R	 = E/N	 = 16 db for weakest pulse signal strength
s	 o
Therefore, the system is capable of handling 50, 000 pulses per second;
(i. e. , 50, 000 aircraft per second, or 100, 000 aircraft per two seconds,
or a: combination of fast and slow sampled aircraft segregated by code
assignments).	 At least ten noise-like codes (16 will actually be used);
and a minimum signal-to-thermal noise ratio of 16 db at the ground
station matched filter output are required.
''. 4.2.3.2	 Pulse Interference
tt
..
	 4
'. If two or more compressed pulses arrive in the same prediction
slot^^, it will not be possible to make an accurate measurement of the a,
affected aircraft- I s position.	 Therefore, while the aircraft can be
assumed to have been identified, position information would be lost for
f
one pulse repetition period.	 Since the PRP's are different for each
`aircraft- and vary between 1. 0 and 1_. 3 seconds, interference between any
two aircraft using the same code can at most every 4 seconds (assuming-
the interferring aircraft are using 1.0 and 1. 25 sec PRP's respectively).
z
ter,
The tracking computer will be able to predict the arrival of pulses from
aircraft in the system. to within one microsecond or lens based on prior rtracking data on each aircraft. r
s
t
9
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However, since the aircraft are moving with respect to each other, this
interference situation will be short lived.
F,
` The probability of losing position information because of interference
can be estimated as follows. 	 Assuming pulses from all aircraft are
k uniformly distributed over the pulse period, the probability of inter-
ference on a particular pulse in a particular period is;
6 N ;<
I
P . -	
ui	
T N
f
c i.
°a where
N	 = number of aircraft in system (50, 000) iU 
Nnumber of biphase codes (16)C
S = prediction slot (one ,u.sec) f1
T = pulse period
	 one second) }
^.	 1
or about 0.003. 1
Therefore, an average of three measurements in 1000 would be lost
from a satellite due to interference of this type.
	 The probability of obtain- a:,.
ing at least four measurements from four satellites for a three dimen-
4sional position fix during any period would be (0. 997)
	 or 0. 988.	 Thus, ?.	 ,
x
only 12 position fixes out of 1000 would be lost and they will be randomly
distributed.	 Considering the fix rate capability of once per second, this
is quite acceptable.
	 With five or six satellites available, the data loss k
will be even less.
4. 20 4	 Bipha se Coding
, The objective is to find a set of biphase codes `which minimize the r
crosstalk between LIT pulses.
	 A large number of codes with minimum
interference are desired to obtain a large number of aircraft ID's as
discussed perviously.
	 Codes must be found which have aperiodic
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autocorrelation functions with low sidelobes and minimum valued aperiodic
cross-correlation functions between all possible code pairs.
The problem of assynchronously multiplexing many signals in the
same frequency band does not appear to be treated in the literature
although several related areas have been studied.
	 Radar and sonar studies
have produced a number of codes with low sidelobe aperiodic autocorrela-
tion functions (Refs. 60 through 62) 	 however, there is no obvious way to
formulate a set of codes with mutually low aperiodic crosscorrelation
sidelobes from knowledge of single codes with good autocorrelation char-
acteristics.	 In synchronized communications systems there are a
number of code sets known to have good periodic crosscorrelation proper-
ties (Refs. 63 and 64).	 Unfortunately, for the asynchronous case, the f
aperiodic crosscorrelation characteristics are either unsatisfactory or
v unknown. ;.
The problem of synthesizing sets of codes with low aperiodic cross-
correlation is related to problems, encountered in the study of comma-
r
free codes (Refs. 65 and 66).
	 Comma-free codes are defined as follows;
if al a G ......	 an and b1 b2
 ......	 bn ar .^ code words,
	
then a. a.+l...__._... an
;	
v
b i b^ ...... b.	 1 is not a code word for any 1 < j <_ n, where n J is an
integer equal to the number of symbols. in a word.
	 In other words, given 1.'.
a set of 2n symbols one can always tell where one word ends and the
next begins just by observing the sequence of symbols; therefore, the
f
{ sequence allows the receiver to place commas between code words
without the code words actually containing a prefix or suffix for that
purpose.	 Comma-free codes are often desired in communication systems
where rapid automatic synchronization is required.
	 Comparison of any -	 ^*
misaligned set of n consecutive symbols with any of the code words will
r always show that a mismatch exists between one	 r more	 airs	 fY	 o	 o	 p	 o
symbols..	 The minimum number of mismatches for any pair of words
a and any -n consecutive symbols is called the	 index of comma-freedom^M.
In most communication systems a high 	 iformation rate is desired; con-
sequently,- the investigations have been concerned with a large set of
short code words -(e. g., n :5 32) and low indices of comma-freedom
s(e. g. , n s 8).	 For the LIT codes, the same type of assynchronous
behavior exists but the interest is in long code words with low information
t
,
v	
f': y{
y
rate. A high index of comma-freedom is desired, for this assures a
low aperiodic crosscorrelation between code words.
A method of constructing comma-free codes is to select one word
from each nonperiodic cyclic equivalence class (Ref. 66). 	 A cyclic
equivalence class is defined as all cyclic shifts of the same consecutive
sequence of symbols.
	 Unfortunately, no theory is known which indicates
what the index of comma-freedom is between words taken from different
equivalence classes.	 Some new algebraic concepts have been published
recently (Ref. 66), but they have, to the writeris knowledge, not been
applied to the synthesis of sets of long assynchronous codes.
	 Further
work in this area would bear directly on the, fundamental problems of a
assynchronous code division multiplexing.
	 Even if only bounds on the
number of code words and the minimum hamming distance were obtained,
computer searching would be greatly facilitated.
	 However, the scope of
t
the present study did not permit investigation, in this area. 	 The work
done on coding for this study is described in the following paragraphs. rL
To obtain a set of codes for the LIT system, several codes known
to have certain favorable qualities were examined.
	 Basically, the three
types of binary codes that were investigated were m-sequence codes,
subsequences of long m-sequences, and codes formed by concatenating a {
number of short code words.
	 Only binary codes were considered because
of the magnitude of the problem and desire for the lowest-cost transmitter
design.	 The length of the code was fixed at approximately 511 bits, ` as k
discussed in Section 4.2. 2.
Although the Gold codes ( Ref. 64) possess favorable periodic auto
and crosscorrelation characteri's 'tics, it was conjectured that the aperiodic
performance would be degraded for three reasons.
	 First, the aperiodic
crosscorrelation; of selected pairs of m-sequences were found to be con-
siderably worse than the _good periodic cxosscorrelation computed by
Geld.	 Second, the mod-two addition of two m-sequences (required for
synthesis of Gold codes) can lead to a substantial weight imbalance (i.e.
the difference between the number of ''V's and the number of "0" 's can
be large).	 It is believed that code words of approximately equal weight
are a necessary but not sufficient condition for low aperiodic crosscorre-
lation.	 Third, the information conveyed by a -sequence composed of the
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mod-two sum of two equal length sequences exceeds the amount of
information conveyed by a single sequence; this suggests there is less
' redundancy and, hence, higher crosscorrelation with Gold codes. 	 For
these three reasons the Gold codes. 	 For these three reasons the Gold
' codes were assigned a low priority and time did not permit their examina-
tion for this study. i
Appendix F reports the results of the coding study for the 511-bit
M-sequences, the 511-bit disjoint subsequences of longer m-sequences,
and the 512-bit sequences based on concatenating short codes.	 In addition,
f
the Appendix gives calculations of the sidelobe distributions and the
Doppler performance of the subsequence codes.
The results are summarized below.
•	 The 511 bit m-sequences do not appear to provide a set
of aperiodic codes suitable for the LIT application.
The peak crosscorrelation values found were high and
there appears to be no systematic way to select
sequences and their initial conditions to provide
mutually low aperiodic crosscorrelation:
•	 A set of codes exhibiting reasonably low aperiodic cross- 1
correlation and satisfactory autocorrelation can be .	 =
constructed from short (e.g. , 32 bits) Walsh functions(Ref. 63) concatenated according to the Reed-Solomon
procedure (Ref. 67). 	 The peak crosscorrelation for
time shifts which are not integer multiples of the r's
number of bits in the Walsh function, is highly
dependent upon the way the phase value s for the Walsh
functions are chosen.
	
Although a full set of codes was j
not evaluated, it is expected that sixteen .512 bit codes
can be obtained with unnormalized aperiodic cross-
correlation peaks of between 50 and 60.
I
•	 The best codes found for the 'LIT application consist of
1 sixteen disjoint 511 bit subsequences of the 8191 bit
m-sequence using generator polynomial 27537 (Ref. 68)._ 4	 '.
:- The peak unnormalized aperiodic auto and crosscorre-
lation sidelobes are 47 which corresponds to a peak
..; correlation of p -	 g 47 /511 = 0. 092.	 Histo rams for
the auto and crosscorrelation were obtained which
indicate that 98 percent of the unnormalized correlation
values lie betweer_--135 and -35 And that 80 percent lie
between +23 and` , -23
a
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f•	 It appears that the number of subsequence codes can be
increased from 16 to 19 by choosing subsequences which,
instead of being disjoint, overlap by 40 bits.
	 It is
believed that there will be no penalty in increased peak
cross correlation although the average will increase
slightly.	 Time did not permit computations to verify the
performance of these non-disjoint codes.
•	 The total number of subsequence codes cannot be increased
by using subsequences from the reciprocal polynomial(i. e. , the original m-sequence run backward) without
increasing the cross correlation.
•	 Based on partial results it appears that the crosscorre-
°'; lation performance of the subsequence codes is not
j adversely affected by Doppler -shifts of the magnitude F
expected in the LIT system.
:a
In conclusion, the coding study has found a set of 16 binary codes which
provide acceptable performance. 	 These codes are the 16 disjoint sub-
i sequences of a 2 13 - 1 bit long- m- sequence generated by the octal {^
polynomial 27537.
4. 2. 5	 Ground Multipath
In the LIT system, ground multipath will induce delayed echoes
similar , in appearance to the direct signals from which they ari -e.
	 If
the ground receiver response to 'these echoes exceeds the preset detection
threshold, false alarms will be generated.	 In principle, it is possible
to reject each such echo by predicting its time of occurrence; however, t
this prediction is an undesirable complication and in addition may increase ( l
the pulse interference probabilities to undesirable levels.
	
Consequently,
'	 . we wish to look in detail at the echo characteristics in order to estimate
the magnitude of the multipath problem at the receiver.
	
Three factors
enter this determination:
1)	 Ground specular reflection coefficient
	
-
r;
• 4 2),	 Aircraft antenna directivity
j 3)	 Time and frequency :spread due_tu diffuse return.
The effect of these three factors on the magnitude of^ the maltipath n
echo has been calculated and is reported in Appendix G.
	
In addition, the
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appendix details available data on backscatter measurements using pulse
j
radar altimeters (Ref. 69) and on errors in ILS installations due to multi-
' path relfections (R.efs. 70 and 71). 	 This data was investigated in order to
help infer the expected multipath for the LIT system.
The following points summarize the results obtained:
F 1)	 Over ground of a particular degree of roughness , and
specific constituent parameters (conductivity and
dielectric constant), the multipath ratio may be
estimated as the product of the following two factors:
•	 The specular return from smooth ground of the same
constituent characteristics as that in question for the
particular frequency, elevation angle, satellite €
polarization, and aircraft antenna under evaluation.
The specular return can be estimated from Table 23
and Figures 29 through 32. 	 The figures are the
result of measurements made on a curved-arm turn-
stile antenna, mounted on a scale-model F-100
aircraft and cover a range of elevation angles and i.
satellite polarizations as well as a variety of
surface characteristics.
i
•	 Diffuse time-spread attenuation, which is a fLinction,
of the surface roughness.
	
The diffuse attenuation
may be estimated from Table 23 and Figure 33. 4.	 4
:i.
2)	 Under worst-case conditions, using a RHC polarized
satellite antenna and a, curved arm turnstile , aircraft
°antenna over sea water (Figure 10) at E = 10 	 theg ^ 	 I{
,. specular return maybe as little as 5. 5 db down and
}
;' 	 I the diffusion factor may be negligible at low altitdes.Yu
,-
„'r
3)	 Use of vertical polarization in the satellite reduces 4
Li the specular return to at least -12.. db at low elevation
angles. t
.' 4)	 It appears probable that tail-cap mounting of an air-
r craft antenna, designed for vertical polarization at
low elevation angles, would considerably reduce
multipath-but such measurements have not been
mae .
	
-d t'x
5)	 The time-spread diffusion factor for rough ground
will usually result in 5 to 15 db- of additional multipath
relief but there will be occasions, particularly
involving low altitude flight over smooth sea or lakes
where this factor will be negligible.
i
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Table 23.	 Measured and Extrapolated Scatter Coefficients for
j.
r 4200-MHz 0. 1-µse;; Pulse (Ref.	 69)
Estimated
'- Estimated Diffuse
`t SP ecular Time
Scatter, Reflection Spread
Direct Coefficient Attenuation
Type of Surface (db) (db) (db)
Water, 7-kt Wind -8 -1.7 6. 3
ry Water, l 1-kt Wind -11 -1.7 9. 3
Water, 3-kt Wind =6 -1. 7 4. 3
Water, 6.-kt Wind -9 -1.7 7. 3
Water, 25-kt Wind -15 -1.7 13.3
' City - 8 -5. 6 2.4 .
Residential Area -10 -5.6 4.4 +;
Countryside -11 -5.6 5.4
Cultivated Land -14 -5.6 8. `4
Flat Field', Dry Grass -17 -5.6 11.4 x
High Grass, Cornfield -17 -5.6
.r Wooded Land -15 -5.6. 9:4
Dry Woods, Leaves -1.6 .-5.6 10.4 ;..	 `.Is
Heavy Woods, Dry Leaves -18 - 5. '6 12.4
Woods, No Leaves -19 5.6 13.4
Desert -20 -56 14.4 b:
Frozen Snow Covered Forest- -25 -2. 5 22. 5 ' :.
ry
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..	 1 From the above results, it is estimated that the worst case
multipath ratio (multipath/direct signal'ratio) is about -5. 5 db and the l
average multipath ratio is about -17. 5 db for aircraft antennas similar to
Ij4 the curved arm turnstile. 	 Multipath could be decreased by 6 db or more
if vertical polarization is used at the satellite antenna at low 'satellite -
aircraft elevation angles. 	 However, signal fading due to Faraday rotation
in the:ionosphere presents a problem.
	
At 1600 MHz, maximum rotations iII
,1
of 20 or 25° can be expected which would not cause significant signal
^.
r
fading but at 900 and 450 MHz, rotations•: greater than 50° can be expected
_	 _ k
which are prohibitive.	 Therefore, with the possible exception of 1600 MHz
..'f operation, decreasing- the multipath by using satellite antenna vertical
polarization is impractical.
The exact distribution of umultipath ratios for all received pulses is
difficult to estimate due to the parameter variations involved such as
elevation angle, aircraft antenna pattern, and ground reflection char-
acteristics.	 Nevertheless, it is apparent that the multipath can be
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significant and it is necessary to consider two possible effects of such
multipath.
1) Interference with legitimate pulses.
;i 2) False pulses saturating the pulse deinterleaving computer.
With regard to interference, it is clear that the interference level
. i. ` due to multipath is less than the interference between direct signals since
the multipath is usually well below the direct signal levels.
	 However,
depending on the distribution of multipath levels that will occur with LITP	 g	 P
the peak capacity of a LIT channel may have to be reduced slightly from
50, 000 pulses/sec.
	 The magnitude of this reduction (if any) in capacityr
was not computed during the study.
The principal concern for multipath is false pulse saturation of the
pulse deinterleave (sort) computer.
	 If all of the multipath returns coming
into the computer were at the worst case level (which they clearly are not) ..,
they would constitute an intolerable load for the deinterleaver.
	 This
load of false multipath signals is easily wiped out completely however by
the simple expedient of inhibiting sort i1nitiation. for any unidentified
pulses from a particular satellite and code occurring within a time Ti {
i following	 pulse from that satellite and code.	 This inhibit an Y tracked P
time period, Ti is chosen to be adequate to cover any significant multipath x
1
y return.
	
Exact inhibit period is not critical, but a value in the neighbor-
hood of 40 µsec appears reasonable.
°j What will be the effect of such inhibits on the sorting df desired -'n
signals?	 First note that with say 3000 pulses per code", and Tb = 40 'sec,
about 1/8 of the time will be blanked on the average.	 Thus, a random
a	 ringw	 arriving unidentified 	 ulse has	 8	 robabi it	 of	 rr vin	 dune ly 1	 1PY	 probability	 g
an inhibit period and having the initiation of his sort delayed by 1 sec.
Similarly, 1/64 probability of a 2 sec delay, etc.	 Notice that the
j unidentified pulses are not prohibited from entering the sort store during
A inhibit periods so that they are available for correlation with already
initiated tracks; only sort initiation is inhibited during this period.
ii
=t-50 000 pulses /sec divided between 16 codes. -
n146
t {
.y
Y
t
Y
r
is
i
i
4. 2. 6 RF Link Power Budgets
Uplink and downlink power budgets for the LIT system are shown
in Tables 24 and 25. The uplink is shown for a 1600 MHz carrier fre-
quency. At this frequency, the aircraft identification location transmitter
(LIT) requires a peak output power of 2000 watts minimum which allows
for one db degradation from the nominal 2500 watt design level.
At 900 Mfiz space loss is about 5 db less so that for the same air-
craft and satellite antenna gains and after accounting for an 0. 5-db loss
due to ionospheric dispersion, the transmitter peak power requirement
a is reduced to 700 watts minimum, 900 watts nominal.
	 However, the
satellite antenna dimensions increase from 4. 2 x 6. 1 feet to 7. 5 x a;
10. 9 feet.
	 At 450 MHz, the transmitter peak power requirement is
reduced. lto 300 watts minimum, 350 watts nominal because of 11-db less
space loss and 2. 5-db ionospheric dispersion loss.
	 In this case, the i
satellite: antenna dimensions increase to 15 x 21. 8 feet.
Table 24 shows the uplink power budget for two cases — the weakest ?
and strongest signals received at the satellite from aircraft.
	 Aircraft
. _.
*	 ^^ will have varying.
 ERP's because of antenna gain pattern variations. }'t
(Ref., Section 5. 2. 1. 4) and to a lesser extent transmitter power and
cable loss differences.
	 In addition,- there will be variations in satellite
x
antenna gain as seen by -aircraft over different points in CONUS. 	 Since
the satellites are moving in elliptical orbits the range plus the angular
displacement from bo.resight are changing with time at any point. For
..:M 160 inclined orbits, the net satellite antenna gain, normalized to a. slant
a range of 19750 nmi, will vary from 22. 1 to 26. 1 db over all points in
s CONUS (Ref. ,Appendix H).{
A 12. 8,dB difference in signal strength will consequently exist between
the weakest and strongest pulses received- at the satellite from aircraft.
Thus, the ground station must be capable of reliably detecting this range-
of pulse strengths.	 Pulses received which are weaker than the weakest
F signal shown in Table 24 may still be detectable but with reduced
probability.
i
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`	 Parameter	 Weakest Signal 	 Strongest Signal
LIT Output Power	 + 33. 0 dBw	 + 34. 0 dBw
`.	 (2000 - 2500 W)
Circuit Losses
	
1. 0 dB	 0. 2 dB
Aircraft Antenna Gain(Turnstile)'
Space Loss (19750 nmi)
Satellite Antenna Gain
( 4' x 6' reflector)
Circuit Losses
Carrier Power Rcvd
Noise Spectral Density
-	 3. 0 dB +	 4.04B
187. 7 dB 187. 7 dB
22. 1 dB 26. 1 dB
0. 5 dB 0. 5 dB
-137. 1 dBw -124.3 dBw
-201. 0 dBw/Hz -201. 0 dBw/Hz
(N. F, = J. 0 dB)
Noise Bandwidth	 73. 0 dB 73. 0 dB j
(20 IMz)
j Carrier-to-Noise	 -	 9. 1 d -	 3. 7 dB
Ratio
Available E/No (After 	 21. 0 dB 33. 8 dB It
{J
"
Pulse Compression) x ^. 
s =Polarization loss is included in the antenna gain as these numbers
reflect actual gain measurements made on breadboard models of the
turnstile antenna (Ref. Section 5. Z. 1.4).
a	 ,
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Table 25. Satellite-to-Ground Link: f = 5100 MHz
Parameter	 Nominal Value
Satellite Transmitter Power	 + 3. 0 dBw
( 2 W) ,,
Circuit Losses 0. 5 dB
Satellite Antenna Gain 28. 0 dB
J (3' Dish, beam edge)
Space Loss (19, 750 n mi) 197. 8 dB
ATC Center Gnd Antenna (25' Dish) 49. 5 dB
Circuit Losses 1. 0 dB 4
Power Received -118.8 dBw
Carrier Power Received (pet LIT pulse) -130. 0 dBw
Uplink Noise Power Received -120. 9'd Bw
1
1
Gnd Station Noise Spectral Density -201. 0 dBw/Hz(3. 0 dB noise Fig.)
Total Noise Spectral Density - 193. 1.dBw/Hz(incl. uplink noise)
Carrier-to-Noise Spectral Density Ratio 63. 1 dB
' Pulse Compression Integration 42. 9 dB
(T =	 51. 1 µsec)
Pulse Output Signal-to-Noise 'Ratio (E/No ) 20,. 2 dB
• L:.
Required E/N 16. 0 dB
0
v
Margin
	
- +	 4.2 dB ^:..
-'For five weakest overlapping	 ulses received at the Satellite.	 Since	 --
pulses have a dynamic range of 12 8 dB and number of overlaps vary, the
5 output power will vary for a linear transmitter.	 For 50, 000 pulses per
second, average -output power will be about 5 watts and peaks will goj to 40 watts before saturation.
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The downlink power budget is shown in Table 25 for a carrier
frequency of 5100 MHz (in the 5000-5250 MHz radio-navigation band).
The power budget illustrates the case where five overlapping pulses of the
weakest level are received by the satellite. This case requires 2 watts
of Satellite RF output power in order to achieve a 16 db output signal-to-
noise ratio for each pulse at the ground station with 4. 2 db signal margin.
However, pulses have a dynamic range of 12. 8 db and the number of
overlaps vary with time in some statistical fashion. Therefore, the
required output power for the downlink transmitter will vary with time.
Instead of operating in a saturation mode, the transmitter should
be linear over the range of expected signal plus noise levels at the
satellite. Linear operation is desirable in order to: 1) prevent signal
correlation 1o5-s and IM interference due to limiting, and 2) to prevent
suppression of weak signals by strong ones.
The transmitter linear range requirements havo been calculated in
Appendix I. For 50, 000 aircraft and a nominal PRP of one second
(50, 000 pulses/sec), the transmitter will exceed 21 watts output power
only two percent of the time and 54 watts only 0. 1 percent of the time.
The average output power will be only 5 watts. Therefore, a transmitter
linear range of one watt (noise input only) to 30 or 40 watts should pro-
vide satisfactory performance. Saturation will occur less than one
-	 t
I
percent of the time for this linear range, 	 k,,
The three-foot C-band dish will cover close to two-thirds of CONUS 	 i
so that ground stations would have to be located within a selected two-
thirds region of the country. The 28-db gain is a minimum value nor-
malized to 19750-nmi slant range. Though the antenna gain varies with 	 F
satellite motion, there will be only a minimal affect on the downlink since
the uplink is the dominating factor in downlink performance.	 f
*This is the margin for the weakest signals. The margin increases for
stronger signals.
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s4.2.7 Jamming Threats
The possibility of intentional jamming by a determined saboteur or
enemy exists in any ATC surveillance system. Strong arguments can be
made that the probability of any such jamming effort occurring is
extremely small. Nonetheless, since such a possibility exists, careful
consideration must be given to the consequences and backup procedures.
This is not unique to satellite systems since the very real possibility of
sabotage (or simple failure) exists throughout the present ATC system.
Explicitly or implicitly, this possibility is countered by backup systems
and/or procedures. Qualitatively, the problem is no different with
satellites and it is solved by the same approach except that backup pro-
cedures will be quite explicit. A balanced study and evaluation of these
vulnerabilities for all ATC systems should be undertaken.
Three types of strategies are examined here which can jam the
LIT uplink to a satellite and thereby disable the downlink to the ATC ground •
centers.	 In the first strategy, a jammer degrades the uplink by trans-
mitting broadband noise in the LIT frequency band so that the pulse signal-
to-noise ratio at the ground center is degraded to the point where the
surveillance function is seriously impaired.
	
In a second strategy, the x
jammer saturates the satellite transponder with a CW signal so that LIT E
pulses are suppressed by limiting action in the transponder and robbed i
of downlink power.	 In the third strategy, a jammer transmits LIT type }
pulses at a high enough rate to saturate the computers- in the ground
centers. k
}
The noise jammer transmits thermal noise across the 20 MHz LIT
RF pulse bandwidth at a sufficient power level to reduce the pulse
signal-to-noise ratio at the ground station below the 16 db threshold value i
established for system operation. 	 This threshold occurs when the signal-
to-noise ratio in the transponder IF drops below about -13. 5 db. 	 LIT f
pulses arrive at the satellite at levels between -137 and -124 dbw (Ref.
Table 25).	 Therefore, the jammer must add sufficient :noise power to the
inherent transponder receiver noise (-128 dbw) to reduce the signal-to-
noise ratio below -13.5 db. 	 This will occur for jammer .noise powers of
F_
r
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-125. 5 dbw for the weakest received pulses and -111 dbw for the strongest
received pulses.	 These noise powers require jammer ERP's of +40 to
+55 dbw at 1600 Mhz and +35 to +50 dbw at 900 Mhz.
The CW jammer will just saturate the satellite transponder at an
.; input level of -113 dbw, assuming a 40-watt saturation level in the trans-
mitter.	 A jammer at this level will capture most of the available trans-
mitter power" and will also suppress the weaker LIT pulse signals another
4-6 db (Ref. 72).	 In this case, most LIT pulses will not be detectable
at the ground station.	 Increasing the jammer power another 10 db to
-103 dbw will prevent even the strongest LIT pulses from being detected.
f
The jammer ERP's required to accomplish saturation are +54 to +64 dbw
at 1600 MHz and +49 to +64 dbw at 900 MHz. 	 These ERP's are higher
than the noise jammer ERP's so that this type of jamming strategy is
probably less likely to be used.
The code jammer requires the same ERP as an aircraft transmitter. i
i However, the transmissions are CW so that the average power require- rjz
lk
31I_f
ments are considerably higher. 	 Therefore, a jammer ERP equal to an
I aircraft's pulsed ERP will insure that the jamming pulses will be detected
in the ground station with the same probability as the LIT pulses. 	 Air-
,a craft ERP's vary from about +29 to +38 dbw at 1600 MHz and +24.5 to y
'z +33. 5 dbw at 900 MHz.	 These differences in ERP are due primarily to e "
the effective aircraft antenna gains at different aircraft attitudes and
satellite elevation angles. 	 While the code jammer requires the smallest
ERP, he is also likely to be the easiest to guard against by u::e of
appropriate software techniques in the ATC computers.
	
Further effort
is needed in this area to fully explore all possible jammer strategies
and appropriate software countermeasures.
	 However, preliminary r
estimates indicate- that because of such countermeasures and the consider-
.. ation that any such code jamming would only effect one of the 16 . ,)r so r
available codes, this would not be a preferred jammer strategy. r
'The composite LIT signal at the transponder seldom reaches 40 watts
output.	 The average signal level is approximately 10 db below this level.(Ref. Section 4. 2. 6 and Appendix I. j
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iIn order to achieve a given required ERP, the jammer is faced with
a design compromise between costly high transmitter power on the one
hand or narrow antenna directivity on the other. If he chooses narrow
antenna directivity he encounters a significant problem in pointing his
antenna at the satellite constellation. A jammer also will require more
than one transmitter and antenna in order to jam enough satellites to
reduce the number available to the system to less than four. If the con-
stellation is "widened', using higher inclination orbits, it could require
tha jammer to point a separate antenna and transmitter at each satellite.
The constellation inclinations may be increased anyway in order to
improve system accuracy.
1 It should be noted that radar, VOR, ILS, and VHF air-ground
communications are very vulnerable to jamming.
	
INTELSATS are like-
x` wise vulnerable, and yet these systems have not been subjected.to
 this r,
i
tactic.	 It should also be pointed out that:
	
1)	 LIT jamming does not
j
interfere with passive navigation; 2) LIT jamming does not prevent traffic =r.
control; and 3) jammers may be located and stopped.
	 It is clear that
any threat evaluation tends to be subjective, and there is certainly no
consensus today on the importance of the jamming vulnerability of an
'
ATC system.
	
-
r
^. 4.3 COMMUNICATION SYSTEM DESIGN ANALYSES
a In this section two types of satellite communications are discussed. -
The first is a short access time collision warning data link which works
in conjunction with the LIT surveillance system. 	 The second is a pos-
sible two-way 1200-bps data link for large aircraft...
4. 3. 1	 LIT Backlink
^' E
The LIT surveillance system can provide the basis for a low date r.
rate communication link from the ATC center to ali aircraft equipped
with a Location Identification Transmitter.. 	 Aircraft would add a simple,
r; love cost receiver which can receive messages from the ATC center for
collision warning.	 The ATC center addresses messages to each air-
{ craft by utilizing knowledge of each aircraft's position and LIT 'pulse
transmit time (to better than one microsecond).
F
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To address a particular aircraft, the center transmits three RF
pulses through three of the CNS satellites. The pulses are timed to
arrive at the aircraft at times unique to that aircraft's position and LIT
transmit time. Receptxt)n of all three pulses in a window alerts the
aircraft that it is being addressed by the ATC center„ The window is
then extended and the presence or absence of pulses in subsequent time
slots establishes the message being sent to the aircraft.
An aircraft acknowledges the reception of a message by-delaying
its next LIT pulse transmission from the normal time (as determined by
its assigned PRP) by a fixed time of say 10 µsec. After the ATC center
transmits a message to a particular aircraft, it looks for the presence
of a pulse 10 µsec. after the normal predicted time of the next pulse
arrival, based on the known PRP for that aircraft. If a pulse is received
at this time, the center assumes the message was received by : the air-
craft. If no pulse is detected, the center repeats the message.
4.3. 1 1 Message Structure
The structure of messages received by aircraft is illustrated in
Figure 34. Each of the pulses in the message is the same length as the
LIT pulses transmitted by aircraft, or 51. 1 µsec. This minimizes the
	
a
receives design since_ it permits utilization of the timing signals -gener-
ated in the LIT transmitter.
The first portion of each message consists of the three address n
pulses. At a predetermined time after every LIT pulse transmission by
an aircraft, the receiver opens a window and looks for three pulses in 5	 e
x
END Of LITEMPT"
TRANSMISSION
	
I	 ADDRESS SLOT----	 SLOT 
	
MESSAGE SLOT
ADDRESS PULSES 	 DATA PULSES
NO.I	 NO.2 I N0,3
	 I NO.I I NO.2 `I NO.3 I NO.4 I NO,5
	 NO.b I NO.7	 N0.8
	
IJ -	 a Z a
---1 51.1 Is
	
-	 --1 51,1 ps fi
^__50 ms	 153.3 ps	 ^^^
	 459.9Ns
	
_—
Figure 34. Message Structure Received at anAircraft(Message No. 1 illustrated, see Table 26)
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iA single-error correcting double-error detecting (4) Hamming	 f
code (Ref. 73) is used for the .messages. This code provides a total of
16 messages as shown in Table 26. However, the first and last codes
shown in the table are not used so that a total of 14 messages are possible.
If the presence of a pulse indicates binary "one" and absence of a pulse
binary "zero, " then a message is simply the presence of just four pulses
in four of the eight message time slots. Since the code is single error
correcting, the message will be received correctly if one of the pulses
is not detected or an extra pulse is detected in one of the empty time
slots due to noise. If two of these errors (missed or false detection of
a pulse) occur, the message will not be received successfully, but also 	
li
will not be confused for another message. Thus, the coding provides a 	 X
measure of protection against receiving false messages due to noise in
the receiver.
Since all messages contain three address pulses plus four data
	 t
pulses, the duty cycle of the message transmissions is constant and does
not depend on the distribution of 'messages in the ATC system. The
transmission .of message pulses is distributed equally between four
i
	
	 satellites in the manner shown in Table 27. That is, each satellite trans-
mits one of the four data pulses. However, the address pulses are
Aircraft not being addressed will receive these pulses at the wrong
times because of the difference LIT transmit 'times and different loca-
tions in three dimensional space from the aircraft being addressed.
	 s
m	 Consequently, non-addressed receivers will not detect all three address
pulses in their windows.
*Also, when less than three pulses are detected any message decoded
will be rejected, for reasons discussed in Subsection 4. 3. 1. 2.
.#
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1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0
2 0 1 0 1 0 l 0 1
3 1 0 0 0 0 1° 1 1
4 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1
5 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1
6 1 1 p p 1 1 p p.
7 0 p p 1 1 l 1 0
8 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 _	 l
9 0 0 1 1 ''0 0 1 1
10 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
11 p 1 1 0 p 1 1.,• p
x	
_ 12 p 1 1 1 1 p p p
'. 13' 1 0 1 0 1 :0 1 0'
14 0 0 1. 0` 1	 r 1 0 1
Not Used-► 15: 1 1 T` 1_ 1 1: 1 1
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Table 27. Distribution of Message Pulses
Between Four Satellites
Messages in	 Satellite Number
Sequence	 Address Pulses	 Data Pulses
1	 1,2,3 1,2,3,4
2	 1,2,4 1,2,3,4
3	 1, 3, 4 1,2,3,4
4	 2,3,4	 1,2,3,4
'd 5	
1'2'3	 12'3'4
i
transmitted by allpossible combinations of three out , of four satellites
f P
with each combination repeating every fourth message. 	 This results in
equal and minimum power requirements for each of the four satellites.
t.
For example; if 100 me'ssage 's per second are transmitted by the ATC
center, than 175 pulses per , second.per satellite or a total of 700 pulses
per second are .required. i
4.3. 1.2	 Message Errors
' There are three types of message errors to be considered:,
1)	 The message is not successfully received by the addressed'
aircraft:
2)	 A different message is received by the addressed aircraft
, from the one that was sent.r
3)	 An • aircraft not being addressed receives a message
The., probability of the first two types of errors can be computed
from the proba.bilitie,s of missed pulse aetection (failing to detect the
presence. of .a pulse) and false pulse detection (detecting: a pulse due to
°	 r noise along).	 The detection probability of a signal in Gaussian noise
is given by Marcum ' s Q function (Ref. 74).
a4
CO	 2
Pd = Q (R, (3) _	 x exp -(R +^Io ( 2R x) dx
.
w1
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i ^
where
R = pulse signal-to-noise power ratio
R = threshold setting normalized to rms noise level
The probability of false pulse detection (P f) is given by the above
equation with no signal present, i. e. , R
	
0. False pulse detection
occurs when noise alone exceeds the threshold setting P. Therefore,
P
	 Q (0, P) = OD x2x exp C- 2 dx = e
- X2/2
By adjusting the threshold level (3 so that P  equals 1 - P d, the
probabilities of false and missed pulse detection will be equal. Therefore,
the probability of mistaking "ones" for "zeros" and vice versa in the
messages will be equal. Figure 35 shows a plot of the false and missed
pulse detection probability (Pe) versus the pulse signal-to-noise ratio.
Pe can be considered as the probability of a message bit error.
Since a single error correcting code is used, the probability of
r10-'
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the probability of receiving the wrong message from the one transmitted
(Pw) equals
P  = P3 [1 - 128 Pe( 1-Pe ) 6 + 8 Pe (1-Pe ) 7
 + (1-Pe)81]
Table 28 shows a tabulation of 1-P c (the probability of not receiv-
ing the message transmitted) and Pw as functions -of Pe , the pulse
signal-to-noise ratio as taken from Figure 35 and the required threshold
setting, (i , above the rms noise level. For example, if the ATC center
transmits 100 messages/sec. and P = 1075, on the average there will
_	 e
be 3. 1' 10 4 wrong messages received in a day or the mean time to a
false received message will be 3200 days. In addition., there will be on
the average 260 messages unsuccessfully received per day that have to
be retransmitted.
}
., The third type of error can only occur if an address is received by tf
.a
another aircraft than the intended aircraft, or if noise causes three
successive pulses to be detected -when the receiver opens its window to
' Table 28.
	 Message Error Rates
Signal-to- Threshold
±	 - P Noise RatioP
Setting1I	 : e 1_ Pc w	 (db) (db)
11	
Y
.
10 3 3.10	 3 .: 3.6.10	 5	 13.5 11._4
d 10 4 3. 10 .4 3.. 6 • 10 -7	 14.9 1:2.7
10	 '. 3. 10;- 5 3. , 6 •_ 10 - 9	 -	 16. 1 13:6 .
_1e 3.10-6 3.6-10-11	 16.9 14.3
k	 ,
This is since Pw includes cases where less than threepessimistic
pulses are detected. These cases are not accepted by the receiver as
proper messages.; ,
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Ilook for an address. However the latter event is highly unlikely, For
is	 5 ,example, if P e	10	 the probability' of a particular aircraft detecting
three false pulses is 10 15 .	 For 50, 000 aircraft in the system, the r
probability of any aircraft detecting three false pulses is increased to
5' 10 ]' 1	 The mean time to a false address detection (analogous to the
rr
pulse false alarm time in radar systems) is:
Tfa -	 (T)B P
i
fa P'
where
Pfa	 Probability of false address (5.10-11 4
B	 = pulse IF bandwidth (200 KHz for 5 µsec rise time)
T	 = address window (153 µsec)
.	 j
T	 time between LIT transmission (1 sec approx.)
The mean false address time equals 6. 6 . 10 8 seconds or approximately
20 years.	 The actual mean time is much longer since most of the time
there will be considerably less than 50, 000 aircraft in the system. a
A more likely way of receiving an address by mistake would be the
following: An aircraft which occupied the volume of space adjacent to the
addressed aircraft could detect three pulses if its address window coin-
'	 k cided with the addressed aircraft's windoNxi. 	 For example, if two air-
craft were less than '5000 feet apart, pulses would arrive at both aircraft_
within 5 µsec of each other.
	
If the address windows of the two aircraft
.
coincided to within f 30 µsec then the non-addressed aircraft would
receive two complete 51-µsec pulses and at least one-quarter of the ^nz	 ,
energy of the third pulse.	 While the probability of detection would be
reduce-d for this third pulse, it would still be high enough to be -of con-
cern	 The probability of .
 the two windows coinciding within f 30 µsec is
about 6 . 107 5 since each window occurs about'once per second.
	
However,
t
y If a false address occurs, the aircraft must still detect at least three
pulses in the data window which follows the address window in order to
accept a message.
	 Therefore; false addresses will not cause a problem i
unless Lhree data pulses are also detected.
1 61
l -'^
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the ATC center would be aware - of.this aituation - and could elect not to
transmit a message when this condition existed. Since the aircraft are
likely to be using different PRP's, the next LIT pulse transmission
(about one second later) would separate the windows so that a message
could be safely transmitted to the intended aircraft during this time.
As the separation between aircraft increases, the probability of receiving
the three address pulses at the non-addressed aircraft decreases. For
51-µsec pulses, a separation of 10 miles or more reduces the probability
to zero.
Finally, another way for an aircraft to receive an unintended
address is in fhe following manner. Assuming messages are transmitted
far enough apart.so that their pulses will not interleave at any aircraft's
receiver, a non-addressed aircraft can receive in its address window
certain combinations of three out of the seven pulses in a message. As
an example, the aircraft's location and address window time could be so
situated as to ailowAddress Pulses 1 and 2 from Satellites 1 and 2 plus
Data Pulse 3 from Satellite 3 to be received in the address window. An
t
I-
{f
L
examination of Table 27 shows that there are six possible combinations
where three out- of seven pulses in -a message could be received in the
address window of a non-addressed aircraft. ;*
Assuming uniform distributions -of aircraft locations and address
s window times, the probability of an aircraft receiving a particular
51-µsec pulse in one of three overlapping 76-µsec slots of the 153-psec
address window i`' e
p l	 3	 (76 - 51)	 10 6 = 7.5-10-5
g	 4 .
This limits the maximum message rate to about 80 per second since
i
-
a pulse transmitted from anyone of the satellites will reach all points in
3
-CONUS in a maximum time interval of 12 mi.11is:econds.
	 Therefore,
messages would have to be transmitted about 12 milliseconds apart to
insure pulses between adjacent messages will not interleave at any r
aircraft location.
This permits two pulses to overlap by 50 percent of their width.
	
While
the probability of detecting both pulses is reduced from the no-overlap
case, it will be conservatively assumed that the pulses are detected
with certainty.
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The probability of receiving three particular pulses in the three 76 µsec
slots spread out over a time interval of 12 msec (as messages will be
. over CONUS) is:
=
2 (76-51) • 10 -6 10	 6	 =	 6. 6. 10-10'[ (76-5l)-P3	 p1	 12-10- 	 12. 10
Since there are six possible ways for the three pulses to be received,
the probability of an aircraft receiving three pulses from the seven in
y. any given message increases to 4 • 10 -9.
For 50, 000 aircraft, the probability of any aircraft receiving a
false address in the riannex described equals 2 • 10 4 .	 if 100 messages j.
per second are transmitted, then on the average there will be 1700 false
addresses per day. 	 This number is on the high side, however, since
for most of the day there will be considerably less than 50, 000 aircraft j
in the system.	 Even if an aircraft receives a false address, it must
also receive at least three data pulses in the 408 µsec window which
follows the address window in order to decode a valid message.	 This
fact reduces the incidence of false addresses causing false messages
to a small fraction, since at least some of these data pulses would
have to result from false detection due to receiver noise. t
The above analysis has attempted to show that the LIT backlink
conccnt can provide a means of selectively addressing aircraft and
_
transmi.ttin	 messages reliably.	 However, the messageg	 g	 Y	 ,	 a rate has a limitg
' beyond which false addresses may become a serious problem.
	 This limit
is probably in the range of 80 - 100 ordered messages per second. TM	 ;
Since the backlink occupies only about 200 KHz of bandwidth, higher
message capacity can be achieved by going to more channels.
	 In fact,
z
to handle 100, 000 aircraft peak traffic, two backlink channels would be
used.	 Spacing between channels would be 250 KHz providing 50 KHz
guard band. r
Based on a 5 µs rise time for the 51 µs transmitted pulses.'
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4.3. 1. 3
	 RF Link Budget:
	 Satellite-to-Aircraft
R The LIT backlink operates in the same frequency band as the LIT
surveillance link.	 That is, the ground station to satellite links will be
C-band and the satellite-to-aircraft links will be at one of the three
bands - 450, 900, 1600 MHz under consideration for LIT surveillance.
Therefore, the same satellite, aircraft and ground antennas can be used
for both functions.
The ground station C-band transmitter will have sufficient output
.1 power so that the uplink will not degrade the downlink.
	 Therefore, the,b
1 critical link is the downlink from satellites - to--aircraft.
	 Table 29 shows
' the downlink budget for a 1560 MHz carrier frequency. r
The satellite transmitter peak power will be three kilowatts.
	 At
.lj this power output, the aircraft receiver will have a minimum pulse '
signal-to-noise ratio of 16 db (for Pe
	 10 5 ) based on minimum satel-
4	 ,
i
lite and aircraft antenna gains.
	 Since the satellite is moving in an ellipti-
cal orbit, the range and distance from boresight is changing with time at s.
Table 29.	 RF Link Budget Satellites-to-Aircraft (fc
 = 1560 MHz) t, }
Parameter	 Value
.A
1Satellite Transmitter Power (3 kw, peak)
	 + 34.8 dbm
Circuit Losses	 _	 0. 5 db
Satellite Antenna Gain	 22. l db-
Space Lo =ss (19, 750 n mi)	 187. 5 db
Aircraft Antenna Gain 	
_	 7. 0 db
Aircraft Circuit Losses
	 -	 1.0 db
Carrier Power Received
	 -139. 1 db
Receiver Noise Spectral Density (N. F. = 6 db)
	 -199. 0 dbm/Hz
Carrier-to-Noise Spectral. Density Ratio
	 59. 9 db-Hz i
Pulse Integration BW (integration time = 46 µsec)"
	 43. 4 db
.
Pulse Signal-to-Noise Ratio
	 16.5 db t
,
n Since pulses are 51 µsec long, 5 µ,sec is provided for dumping ,tae
I&D filter in the receiver.
1.64
"i
.	 any point.	 For a 16' inclined orbit, the minimum net satellite antenna
gain in CONUS will be 22. 1 db.
The aircraft antenna has a normal gain variation of +4 to -3 db
(at 10 ° elevation angles). 	 However, if the aircraft is in a banked posi-
tion away from the satellite at the time a message is received, the
antenna gain could be less than -3 db and the message has a reduced
probability of being successfully received. 	 Therefore, a minimum air-
craft antenna gain of -7 db has been assumed to provide a degree of pro-
tection against larger than normal aircraft pitch and bank angles.
If the satellite network is handling 100 messages per second,', each
of the four satellites in the network will transmit 175 pulses per second
and the transmitter duty cycle will be 9 - 10 3.	 Therefore, with three
kilowatts peak transmitter power, the average RF power will be 27 watts.
For a multi-channel higher message capacity system, the power require-
ments would, of course, go up linearly with the message capacity.
	 At
the lower RF frequencies of 900 MHz and 450 MHz, the transmitter peak
power requirements are reduced to 1100 watts and 300 watts, respec-
tivel , because of reduced space loss,y	 p ^,	 s
4. 3. 2 Data Transmission
y
Larger aircraft can use the additional capacity of the satellites i
for the transmission and reception of digital data with the ATC ground
centers.	 Each data channel will transmit at a rate of 1200 bps.
	 This
transmission speed has been selected by the Radio Technical C(-
 ,nmission }
for Aeronautics (RTCA) as the standard for aeronautical air-ground t
communication
The modulation technique can be selected from coherent phase
shift ke;,ring . ( '.CPSK), differentially coherent phase shift keying (DPSK),
and noncoherent frequency shift keying (FSK).
	 Table 30 shows examples }
of the RF link budgets (at 1600 MHz) between aircraft and satellites.
1.
 The net gain is normalized to a range of 19, 750 n mi so shat the effect
T
1
of range changes are included in the net gain (Ref. Section 4. 2. 6).
The RF links between the ground centers and satellites wouldbe
located at C-band.
3, 65  _.
s
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Table 30. RF Data Links Satellites-Aircraft
Satellite-To-Aircraft
	 Aircraft-To-Satellite
Parameter	 (1550 MHz)	 (1650 MHz)
Transmitter Power 13.0 dbw (20 w) 24. 8 dbw (300 w)
Circuit Losses 1. 0 db 1. 5 db
Transmit Antenna Gain 22. 1 db 3. 0 db
I
Space Loss (19750 n mi)
Receive Antenna Gain
Circuit Losses
Received Carrier Power
Receiver Noise Density
Received C/No
Required C/No
Satellite Transponder
Noise BW
187. 5 db
3. 0 db
1. 5 db
-151. 9 dbw
-202. 5 dbw/Hz (4100K)
50.6 db-Hz
42.3 db - Hz
188. 1 db
22. 1 db
1. 0 db
-140. 7 dbw
-199 .0 dbw/Hz (920°K)
47. 0 db (50 kHz)
G
r
i
r
r
Transponder S IN	 —	 11.3 db
Required S IN	 —	 6. 0 db
Signal Margin	 8.3 db
	 5. 3 db
1The budgets are based on DPSK modulation and a bit error probability i
of 10 4.	 Under these conditions, the carrier signal power-to-noise
z
spectral density ri 	 'o required at the receiver is 42.3 db-Hz. 	 A signal- t
.	 to-noise ratio of 6 db in the satellite transponder is desirable to prevent
serious degradation of the downlink to the ATC ground centers.
	
The ^E	 ^
downlink will require less than one watt of RF power.
The satellite RF power for the downlink to aircraft will be 20 watts
per 1200-bps data channel.	 At 900 MHz, the output power can be
reduced to 7 watts.	 The aircraft transmitter power for a 1200-bps data
rate will be 300 watts at 1650 MHz and only 100 watts in the 900 MHz
band.
Some method of access by users to a data channel is required. x	 4
Since an aircraft will not be able to hear other aircraft transmissions,
the monitored approach where aircraft use the channel when it is clear
is not possible.	 A solution might beto have the satellite transmit a low
power busy tone when it is receive-ng transmissions.
	
Scheduled access
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where aircraft transmit only at preassigned times or controlled access
where aircraft transmit only upon receiving permission from the ATC
centers are other possibilities. Further work in this area is required
to define the best access solution.
4.4 SATELLITE NETWORK DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
The design tradeoffs involving the satellite network configuration
are the availability, quality of service, and cost in providing the
three principal services of communication, navigation, and surveil-
lance. As indicated in a number of other studies (Refs. 7, 75, 76,
77, and 78) there are a number of useful satellite constellations to
choose from. Although the requirements need to be further quantified
in the preliminary design phase, enough has been done to discuss some
of the trades between coverage, availability, accuracy, and cost; and to
identify an attractive candidate system. Preliminary reliability and
replenishment analyses have been performed to determine the require-
ments on satellite reliability and lifetime, the number of spares, launch
rate requirements, and launch strategies which are needed to provide
various levels of overall system availability,
4.4.1	 Reliability/Availability,
A total system breakdown must be an extremely rare event. 	 Thus,
since it could be inferred intuitively that at least one orbiting spare
would be required, an. analysis was performed for six satellite constel-
lations, i. e. , two orbiting spares. 	 This analysis treated the effects of
satellite MTBF,	 satellite design, 'life, and booster reliability on satel-
lite system availability and replenishment rates.
	
Exponential distribu-
tion assumptions were used throughout the analysis because, in thi s
case, there are insufficient data available to describe any non-
exponential satellite failure distribution, and because previous efforts
had shown that a system of nor-exponential segments yielded similar
results.	 Furthermore, it was assumed that some dedicated launch
facility was available which would be capable of launching a satellite
six weeks after the heed for it had been identified, but that two launches
could not take place within a six week period.
A conservative estimate was first made using MTBF's and design
lives typical of satellites being flown toda 'Ar (e. g. , Intelsat	 II).	 Then a
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reasonable projection was made, using figures typical, of today's satel-
lite designs (e. g. , Intelsat IV). The results are gratifying in either
case.
A satellite with a 5-year MTBF and a 7-year design life and
launched from a booster with a 0. 95 launch reliability, designated as
"Type 1" in Table 31, produces a system availability of 0. 99967 in the
six satellite configuration tentatively selected. (Intelsat III is actually
designed with a 7-year MTBF and 5-year design life, but results would
i
iiii
7	 ^
Two Type 2
and
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Four Type 3
Parameters Satellites Satellites Satellite Satellites
Satellite. Date
MTBF - 5 12.5 9.8 See Second
Design Life 7 7 7 and Third
Payload 1 Nay. I Nay. I Nay. Columns
1 Surv. 1 Surv. 1 Surv.
1 Backlink 1 Backlink 1 Backlink
3 Data 3 Data
Reliability 
30 Yr. Probaility
of	 <6/6 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
<5/6 0.988 0.506 0.681 0.625
<4/6 0.203 0.0173 0.0345 0.0337
Availability (2:4 of 6)
Average Availability 0. 99967 0.9474 0.942? 0.9447
Average Downtime,
Wks /Yr. 0.017Z- 0. 00135 0.00405 0.00277
Average Outage
Duration,_ Wks. 2-1/2-3` 2-_1'/2-3 2-1/2-3 2-1/2-3
M. T. B. Outage,
Years 150 1850 600 900
Life Cycle
Start up 6.3 6. 3 6. 3 6. 3
Launches per Year 1.7 1. 1$ 1. 26 1. 21-
Table 31. Satellite Reliability/Availability/Life Cycle Data
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e similar. ) The probability of a system outage occurring during a
0-year projected system life span would be 0. 203. The probability of
ystem outage would not reach 0. 5 until the system had been operational
50 years. The expected outage time for such an even would be about
o or three weeks. For such a system, and on average maintenance
unch rate of approximately 1. 7 per year would be required. This would
mount to about 40 launches over a 20-year span including the initial
tart-up.
A (Type 2) satellite with a 12. 5-yeas MTBF and a 7-year design life
(Intelsat IV is projected to have 14 years MTBF and a 7-year design life),
launched from a booster with a 0. 9 launch reliability, produces an extr
extremely high system availability for a six satellite configuration.
	 If six Inr.
such satellites were used, each providing navigation, surveillance, and
.' collision warning communication capability, the probability of a system
outage occurring during a 30-year, proj ected system life span would be
less than two percent.	 The probability of system outage for a system
operational life of 99 years would still be less than fire percent.
	 The
expected outage time would again be about two or three weeks.
	 For such
a system, a maintenance launch rate of approximately 1. 2 launches per 1. t
year would be required.
	 This would amount to 30 launches over a 20-year
N ;.pan including the initial start-up.
In order to provide a data link service, each satellite could accept
-,n additional payload of three or four ,
 
1.200 bit per second data trans- I
ponders.	 If three transponders were added to each satellite and six
such satellites were used, the resulting_ reliability/availability data
would be as indicated for the Type 3 satellite in Table 31. 	 For the
"'
recommended Satellite CNS system, the four satellites in inclined orbits
.	 ; will be postulated to have two 1200 bit per second data channels	 and
the two geostationary satellites will not have any data transponders.
e a ^Outage here is defined as having less than four operational satellites
available.	 As pointed out in Section 5, 3. 2 it is actually possible'to deter-
mine aircraft position when only two or three satellites are available.
Since the system is normally configured to operate with four ox igore
r^atellites, the probabilityof outage is conservatively deflined herein on
that basis.
Thus rendering these reliability figures somewhat conservative.
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The reasons for this is that the payload capability into a synchronous
equitorial orbit is reduced over the inclined orbits because of the
increased plane change required to attain equatorial orbit. The result-
ing satellite system will be assumed to be composed of six satellites
identical except that if a particular satellite is to be launched into geo-
stationary orbit, the data link transponders are off-loaded (or not
on-loaded) during the satellite/booster integration at the launch facility.
The appropriate reliability/availability life cycle data for this over-all
R' t	 system are shown in the last column of Table 31.
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4.4.2 Coverage
While a satellite constellation of synchronous equatorial satellites 	 i
would have fixed geometry at any specified paint on the earth, thereby
simplifying user search and acquisition, the geometry to users in the
United States would not yield acceptable accuracy.
Placing some satellites in inclined orbits enhances accuracy
since those satellites, when in the northern hemisphere, are at hig'-flr
elevation angles. On the other hand, the satellites may now drop com-
pletely out of sight when they move to the southern hemisphere. Placing 	 a
perigee at the most southern latitude reached (by setting the argument of t
perigee at 270 degrees), gives the circular ground track and also
increases the percentage of time the satellite spends above the equator, L
7 The reduced perigee altitude, however, tends to cause the satellite to
disappear below the horizon near perigee, for which the increased. speed
at perigee may only partially compensate.
	
Thus, with more highly
inclined, elliptical,
	 satellite orbits, the advantages of better accuracy
may be paid for with requirements for more satellites in orbit to cope
with loss of visibility during part of the orbit.
	 These satellites would
be in addition to whatever on-orbit spares may be required to protect J
' . A against satellite failure.
	 Examples of these-coverage/accuracy tradeoffs l`
*. are given in the following paragraphs.
A constellation which has been studied extensively places two
satellites in equatorial synchronous orbit ("central satellites") and four
others within inclined elliptical orbits with their ground tracks circling
a central point.	 It is termed a "Rotating X11
 configuration.	 Figure 36'
G: shows approximate ground tracks and coverage contours for these'
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different ''Rotating X'' configurations. It can be seen from Figure 36
that 30 0 inclinations are not suitable for full view coverage of the U. S.
In fact, something less than 20 0 is required. A 12 0 orbit on the other
hand takes in much of southern Canada.
Very high inclinations and eccentricities, on the other hand, pro-
vide orbits yielding full coverage of the North American Continent as
long as enough satellites are in view. Furthermore, the elevation angles
tend to be substantially higher, which generally improves the user antenna
coverage pattern picture. Ground traces for a system with satellite
inclinations of 63 0 and eccentri --ities of 0. 52 are shown in Figure 37.
Placing four satellites in the ''ring'' and two as shown on the equator
yields a very attractive system. The coverage in the U. S. is 100 percent,
and the accuracies, as will be pointed out in a later paragraph, are
excellent. In the event of the failure of two satellites in the ring, how-
ever, the system will bf inoperative (i. e. less than four satellites will 4
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Figure 36. Orbit Ground Tracks
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To obtain these tracks, set e = tan (i/2; e. g. , for i = 20 degrees
inclination, e - 0. 176.
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N different "Rotating X 11 configurations. It can be seen from Figure 36
that 30 ° inclinations are not suitable for full view coverage of the U. S.
In fact, something less than 20 0 is required. A 12 0 orbit on the _other
hand takes in much of southern Canada.
Very high inclinations and eccentricities, on the other hand, pro-
vide orbits yielding full coverage of the North American Continent as
long as enough satellites are in view. Furthermore, the elevation angles
tend to be substantially higher, which generally improves the user antenna
coverage pattern picture. Ground traces for a system with satellite
inclinations of 63' and eccentricities of 0. 52 are shown in Figure 37.
'	 Placing four satellites in the "ring" and two as shown on the equator
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yields a very attractive system. The coverage in the U.S. is 100 percent,
and the accuracies, as will be pointed out in a later paragraph, are
excellent. In the event of the failure of two satellites in the ring, how-
ever, the system will be inoperative (i. e. less than four satellites will
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be in view) ten hours of every day. Going to even higher inclinations
and eccentricities will reduce this outage time, but the availability of
this system can only approach that of the low inclination system as a
limit. In the event that the two geostationary satellites were to fail,
there would be only approximately four hours in the day when the
remaining four inclined satellites would all be visible from the United
States.
4.4.3 Accuracy
The full accuracy analysis of a. satellite surveillance or navigation
system is complicated by two considerations involving error correlations:
1) With respect to satelliteephemeris errors: the correlation
between various elements of the ephemeris for an individual
satellite and between satellites for absolute or relative
navigation,
2) With respect to ionospheric errors: correlations between
the ranging errors on the various rays to the various,
satellites for absolute or relative navigation.
All these correlations have been solved for and included correctly in the
error analysis in prier TRW navigation satellite studies (Ref. 79). The
full repetition of these correlated error analyses is believed to be	 t
'	 unnecessary. Certain generalizations can be made as a result of the
prior referenced studies, namely:
1) When the satellite ephemerides are determined by inverse
measurements of the same type as used for the navigation
or surveillance function at known fixed locations, and with
the inherent advantage of orbit smoothing, and including
the effect of the full multi-satellite ephemeris error
covariance matrix, then the effect of ephemeris error on
user position location is negligible relative to the errors
of his particular measurements. This may be viewed as
a natural consequence of the fact that, with respect to
ephemeris errors, and provided that satellite tracking is
based on the same type of measurement as user tracking,
then navigation is always in the relative sense, the
reference stations being the ground tracking stations.
In a typical case from Ref. 79, ephemeris errors were less
than 1/6 the random error over an area the size of CONUS.
2) The effect of ionospheric error correlations between the
various rays to the various satellites is* such as to reduce
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the navigation error by a factor of about 1/4 relative to
that corresponding to independent ranging errors of the
same size.
3) The relative navigation effect on residual ionospheric
errors is negligible until the distance between user and
reference is less than that between various rays where they
pierce the ionosphere, or typically about 100 miles. Thus,
this calibration effect can be ignored on en route surveil-
lance and assumed essentially perfect in an approach and
landing area.
Under these generalizations, the analysis is much simplified. The
following assumptions were used in error analyses of a 16 0
 rotating "X"
constellation shown in the following paragraphs.
• A random ranging error (1a) of 15 feet.
• An effective uncorrelated, ionospheric error of less than 	 t10 feet for 1600 MHz and less than 30 feet for 900 MHz.	 i.
This is based on a 90 percentile ionosphere, corrected
to an assumed 1/4 residual (Ref. 79) based on ESSA,
monthly published ionospheric predictions, and a further
reduction by-1/4'to account for the effective uncorrelated
equivalent as discussed above. 	 j,
• Satellite ephemeris errors assumed negligible per the
	 i
above discussion,	 t
• Range differencing or pseudo-ranging techniques (recur-
sive estimation of clock bias) are assumed, requiring a
minimum of four satellites in view unless a priori
altitude information is available.
Single-point-in-time accuracy over CONUS was computed using the 	 ^.
01
above ground rules. The ,horizontal CEP and la- altitude in feet are
shown in the contour maps for the six-satellite constellations at an
arbitrary "zero" time in Figure 38. The accuracy varies only slightly
with time in this configuration. Figure 39 shows the accuracycontours 	 ".
associated with a failure of one of the central satellites: the degradation
from the six-satellite case is only about 35 percent. However, if two
satellites fail, the accuracy obtainable from the remaining four satel-
lites can be very strongly geometry- and time-dependent. Although the
system should not get down to four satellites as often as once per
decade, additional effort in designing coragtellations to minimize system
sensitivity to a double-satellite outage must be expended.
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4. 5 SYSTEM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION — DATA HANDLING
This section concerns the total data processing load of an air traffic
control system which uses the LIT system.
4. 5. 1 Data Handling Load
The total load for a post 1980's ATC system without LIT has been
estimated by the ATCAC committee (Ref. 14). The functions of the sys-
tem were "collision avoidance", data acquisition, command and control,
flow control, and "additional" functions. 	 Results are summarized in y
Table 32.	 The total instruction rate for one en route -enter was estimated
to be 7. 4 MIPS" (million instructions per second). 	 The final figure was
a
then multiplied by a factor of approximately 12 to account for the facts
that:	 a) some instructions are faster than others; b) there are "executive
h overhead" operations; and c) the program will be written in a higher order
language.
	 The resulting en route center estimate was 84. 4 MIPS.	 The
estimate for a terminal control center was 107. 1 MIPS.
". The LIT system will not have any direct effect on the collision
avoidance, command and control, flow control, and "other" functions.
{ These functions require aircraft position inputs from the data acquisition
function.	 It doesn't matter a great deal whether the position data comes
from beacon., radar, ground multilate ration, or LIT.	 Since the data from
h LIT will be very accurate in all three dimensions and updated quite fre-
quently, the commanding rate may be slightly different and the collision {
avoidance function might have less to do, but the functions themselves
	 ` <
certainly need not be complicated.
t
The main impact of the LIT system is on the data acquisition func-
tion.	 This function occupies a large part of the instruction load (37 per-.
`- cent for the en route problem and 55 percent for the terminal problem).
In the system considered here, the position determination function
is removed from the en route and terminal computers and moved to a set
of "LIT data processing centers. " 	 The reason for doing this is that it
would be very expensive to put a LIT receiver and data processor at every
L
r
mTo relate this to current machines, note that performanc6 of most of the
third generation machines is about 1- MIPS."
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terminal and en route control center. This would also result in consider-
able duplication of computation, since each data processor would have to
sort out and ignore data for aircraft under other centers' jurisdiction.
Clearly one LIT Data Processing Center (LDPC) could perform the LIT
computations for the entire CONUS. Considering the possibility and the
consequences of the loss of the LDPC due to some catastrophe such as a
fire, severe storm, major power failure or sabotage led to the conclusion
that some redundancy is in order. Furthermore, the cost of point-to-
point communications between LDPC's and ARTCC's could likewise be
reduced by some decentralization. Since the optimization of this design
question was beyond the scope of this study the arbitrary decision was
made to configure the ground system with four LDPC's. 	 i
r.
Table 32. ATCAC Committee Results
Function	 Enroute (IPS) J"
 Terminal (IPS) National (IPS)
Conflict Prediction 2. 56 x 10 5 15. 1 x 105
and  Resolution
(mixed) a:
t
i
Conflict Prediction 9. 2 x 10 5 (in command	 — `ifand Resolution and control)
-(High density)(Collision 4
avoidanc e) ^fz.
Data acquisition 27. 3 x 10 5 - 48. 9 x 105
	 —
Command and 5. 6
 x 10 5 14. 6 x 105
control
Additional Enroute 29. 2 x 10 5 —	 — i(Displays, etc)
Additional — 10. 0 x 105
	
—'
Terminal
Central Flow 0. 03 x 10 5 0. 4 x 10 5 	0. 4 x 106
Control
6
7.39x 10 8.92x106	 0.4x 106
k
IPS ='Instructions per second.
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The communications load for the data sent to the ATC centers can
be estimated as follows. For every airborne aircraft, a position message
is sent every second from one of the LIT data processing centers to an
ATC center every second. The message would consist of identification,
time, and position. If LIT identification is used, 18 bits will identify the
aircraft — four bits for code and 14 bits for PR P. The time requires
16 bits, assuming that millisecond accuracy is required and that the time
measurement is recycled every minute. The two horizontal position com-
ponents, in rectangular coordinates relative to some point in the addressed
ATC center require 19 bits to provide accuracy to ten feet in a 500-mile'
square center jurisdiction. The altitude component require 13 bits for 	 1
10-foot accuracy. The total message is 85 bits. With 10 5
 airborne air-	 1
craft the total communication load is 8. 5 x 10 6
 bits per second.
E
lion pre icte track positions (0. 4 !,iIIPS)
4) Conversion to system coordinates (0. 4 MIPS)
-Miscellaneous calculations account for 0. 4 MIPS to give a total of 4. 9 MIPS
ti
for the data acquisition function for the terminal processor.
,l
The LIT system would replace the beacon multilateration system
assumed by the ATCAC report. This relieves the ATC computer system
of the need to perform function 1). The position determination part of
function 2) is also removed. This leaves about 3. 2 MIPS as the remain-
ing computing load of the data 'acquisition system.
To summarize, the LIT data processing center will relieve each
ATC center of about -20 percent of its total computing load.
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The computing load for the data processing centers is described in
Appendix M. The next question there is to determine is how much of the
computing load is thereby removed from the en route and terminal centers.
The ATCAC report considered the following major functions for the
data acquisition system. The numbers are given for the terminal data
processor.
1) Scheduling of multilateration interrogations (1. 4 MIPS)
2) Multilateration tracking including position calculations(0. 3 MIPS), and smoothing/pr e diction (2 MIPS).
3) Correlation of search radar reports and multilatera-
d'	 d
r	 .
l
4
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4. 5. 2 General Description of a LIT Data Processing Center
Each LIT data processing center is responsible for receiving LIT
data, decoding and unscrambling the data, and computing the position o f
all aircraft within its assigned region at some given rate, say once pnr
aircraft per second. In order to insure that mid-air collisions can be
prevented, the computer programs must obviously deal with aircraft in
the assigned region. Thus it is necessary to add a buffer zone to the
boundaries of the region and compute the position of aircraft within the
buffer zone also at the same rate as in the assigned zone. To do less
would not provide the same required level of protection for aircraft which
chance to meet at the boundary. Outside of the buffer zone, i. e. , for the
rest of the country, aircraft positions canbe calculated at a less frequent
rate. When the country is divided into four LIT data processing regions,
each data processing center which might be calculating position data every
second for aircraft within its region (and also within the small buffer
region), should calculate aircraft position about every two minutes for
aircraft outside this region.
4. 5. 3 System Design
This section describes a rough system design for a LIT data process-
1,
{
^t
ing center which can handle a peak of 25, 000 aircraft (lf 4 of the country).
The programs referred to in the following discussion are defined and
described in Appendix M.
The computation for the LIT data processing center can be divided
into parallel tasks in a natural way. The position determination calcula-
tions are independent and can be carried. out simultaneously for many air-
craft at the same time. The deinterleaving problem also involves many t
calculations which can be done simultaneously. This kind of problem — a G
large computing load in which most of the computations can be done in
parallel suggests the use of minicomputers (Ref. 80). Minicomputers
are small, fast, and relatively cheap computers which are becoming
increasingly popular for this type of problem. Typically, a minicomputer
with a one MIPS speed and 4, 000 words of core storage costs around
$10,000.
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JA large computer would be used to perform executive and scheduling
functions, to maintain satellite positions and to send the satellite positions
to the minicomputer storage.
The raw pulse data for one code would be sent to a minicomputer
which will compare the predicted and observed pulses for that code only
(Program P1). With 100, 000 pulses per second arriving, each of the
16 minicomputers assigned; to do program P IL will be required to handle
an average of about 6, 000 pulses per second. With 50 instructions per
pulse, a -minicomputer would be required to perform 300, 000 instructions
per second to perform P 1 ., which is easily within the capacity of existing
computers. If two seconds of data (measured and predicted pulses) are
stored by the minicomputer, an average of 24, 000 words of storage would
be required by each of the PI minicomputers.
A minicomputer is assigned the task of deinterleaving the pulses for
a single code. The computing load for each 'code is about 9 >V 2/C, where
N is the number of unidentified pulses for this code. In the steady state
this load is very light. If the number of unidentified pulses for a single
code gets as high as 2, 000 per second, five seconds of data are collected
before being processed, then the computing load is about 1 HIPS. This is
still within the capacity of a minicomputer. If the number of unidentified
pulses gets even larger, then the system would enter a special mode of
operation to concentrate on the deinterleaving task.
The o--ition determination 1-n ram for a sin le code ould be
a
4
1P^	 P g	 g	 c
assigned to a set of 2 minicomputers. A single minicomputer is then
required to handle an average of about 1, 000 aircraft per second. With
1, 000 instructions per aircraft, each Minicomputer is required to per-
form 1 MIPS. With a more efficient algorithm, the number of minicom-
puters can be reduced.
t 
	 rWhen the number of unidentified aircraft gets too large for the
deinterleaver program to handle, the minicomputer assigned to position
determination would be reassigned to the deinterleaver task. i
The executive operations (Program P4 of Appendix M) fora
particular code would also be ass 'ned to a minicomputer. With
200 instructions per aircraft, the computing load on each of these mini-
computers is about 1 MIPS.
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The above system is only a rough system description of the .LIT
data processing center based on the computer sizing described in Appen-
dix M. A complete design is beyond the scope of the present study. The.
rough design, hov ever, suggests a computer center with one large scale
computer and a bank of less than 100 minicomputers to handle the data
processing load. This is well within the current computing state of the
a rt.
,r	
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5. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 
5.1 PRIORITY OF SATELLITE APPLICATIONS
The priority of satellite applications stated in this section will be
implemented in the satellite system configuration described in Section 5. 2.
This priority determination is made in the light of the requirements
analysis previously described in Section 3, and the systems analysis and
evaluation given in Section 4.
	 The determination is based on:
' •	 The needs of the air traffic control system .
`.
a	 The capabilities of the satellite concepts investigated..
•	 The economics of the aviation community including both the
.'^ operational agency and the flying public. a	 '
`, 5. 1. 1	 The Needs of the Air Traffic Control System
The following quotation is taken from the Report of the Department
of Transportation Air Traffic Control Advisory Committee (Ref. 1).
"The demand for all categories of aviation will main-`
tain its high growth rate unless further constrained by an
inadequate air traffic system.
	 The various national indicies
of aviation activity are predicted to at least double by 1980
(with respect to 1968) and to double again by 1995. 	 Five
airports now operate at saturation during peak hours. 'This
number will rise to twenty by 1980 unless present expansion
plans are accelerated.	 The demand for ATC service will
rise even faster than aviation activity in general.
	 Overall,
the demand for ATC service is estimated to almost treble
;.a by 1980 and to treble again by 1995.11
-' In light of this projected demand, the Committee sees three critical
problems which urgently require solutions if aviation growth is to be
accommodated:
x_
a)	 The shortage_ of terminal capacity
b)	 The need for new means of assuring separation
_
c)	 The limited capacity and increasing cost of ATC FE
5
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The needs of the air traffic control system addressed herein are
specifically associated with items b) and c) of the foregoing list.
5. 1. 2 Capabilities of Satellite Systems
-:: The most obvious attribute of a satellite system, especially one
involving synchronous satellites, is coverage.
	 It is precisely that fact
4 which leads to a paradox concerning the logical application of satellite
'x
f
concepts to air traffic control.
	 Since everyone in the United States can
see a set of synchronous satellites, the temptation exists to force every-
one to use them for all functions.
	 Thus, it is possible to start out by
expecting and therefore demanding too muclh of the satellite system.
	 The -
results are bound to be disappointing.
	 It appears that many satellite
detractors have fallen into precisely this trap.
	
NASA, in the backgroundP	 Y	 P	 g !`
objective and statement of work to this contract, made it clear that the
+
?`
functions of communication, navigation, and surveillance should be
examined to determine if it made sense to use satellites for communica-
tions, navigations, and/or surveillance.
	 As a result of performing this
study-, TRW feels quite strongly that it is unnecessary and inadvisable to
attempt to accomplish the entire domestic air traffic: control task with
satellites.	 It simply does not make sense to do so. 	 Thus, the CNS
functions have been examined from the standpoint of how they function
together in air traffic control, but the assessment of priorities and
implementation have allowed a substantial measure of independence. 	 In
other words, from the outset, an acceptable solution to this problem
.° could have been a satellite system which performed all surveillance/ IM
limited navigation/no communications, or even all surveillance/no navi-
gation/no communication or any similar combination- of functions. 	 Asa j
result of our studies and some important contacts (Refs. 55 and 81) the
:.. very important combination of surveillance and communication, which is
required for ground-based col',dsion avoidance, was established as `a task
-. of ` primary importance.P	 Y 
:.
In summary, TRW feels that the capabilities of Satellite CNS sys-
tems which male- them unique are
•	 Coverage x
•	 Performance
Cost
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5.1.3 Economics of the Aviation Community
s	., It is clear that in an era of "pay-as-you-go" aviation a concept such
as this one must be economically viable from the standpoint of the opera-
ting air traffic control agency (Federal Aviation Administration) in the
'. entire aviation community comprised of air carriers, general aviation,
business aviation, and the military.
	 The resulting air traffic control
system must be capable of doing a bigger and better job in a more cost
effective manner, and the flying customers must find it economically
sound if not beneficial.
	 The operational life of the system concept mustz
` be measured in decades and its introduction must be evolutionary rather
than revolutionary.
5.1.4 Recommended Priority
' Based on the foregoing criteria, the recommended priority Satellite F
°. CNS application is as follows
Priority 1:	 Surveillance/Short-access-time Collision:
Warning, (i. e., the LIT/LIT 'backlink concepts,,,described
t "	 in Sections 4. 2 and 4. 3 respectively). j.
is
Priority 2: Navigation.	 It is hard to imagine placing a
satellite constellation such as the one recommended in this
study into orbit without providing at very little additional
cost the capability represented by the passive navigation
concept described in Section 2.2, Ref. 6.
	
This extremely
high quality area navigation capability, if made available
to those who can afford the service, would undoubtedly be
a cost-effective and therefore useful system.
d Priority 3:	 Data Link.	 The role of satellite communica-
tions will essentially consist of supplementing the present
direct air-ground system as indicated in Section 3. 3. 3.
r Those aircraft that can 'afford SATCOM equipment that are }
in remote locations would consider this service a top
priority requirement.
	 However, it does not appear that
this load would be very large.
	 The air carrier aircraft
that could afford SATCOM fly almost exclusively on well-
A, traveled positively controlled airways or area navigation
routes in fairly densely populated portions of the country
where direct air/ground coverage is already quite good.
Thus, the potential customers for remote urgen communi-
cations would be for the most part limited to the military-
and special mission (e.g, , forest-fire fighting and/or
search and rescue aircraft] ;
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The impact of the, recommended priority on implementation is as
follows:
a) The LIT and LIT backlink are "must" items for the
satellite payload.
b) The NAVSTAR transmitter is also designed into the
satellite since it appears very cost effective to do so.
c) Two 1200 bit per second data channels are also
designed into the satellite. However, if it we r neces-
sary to use one or both of these channels as a satel-
lite weight and /or power contingency (i. e. , to convert
that allowance to some other portion of the satellite,
for example to obtain adequate MTBF or design life)
this could be done. Even more likely, however,
would be the conversion of this capability to an
increased LIT backlink capacity which can be used
to provide a greater collision warning capability.
5. 2 SATELLITE CNS SYSTEM CONFIGURATION
The Satellite CNS System Configuration that is described in this t
section represents an attractive but by no means optimum system design. wi T.
i It is important to note that when future air traffic control system require-
.
' ments become definitized, there are many design degrees of freedom ^ "y
(e.g. , number of satellites; orbital constellation; aircraft and satellite
antenna gains and transmitter powers; LIT design parameters such as
carrier frequency, pulse width, coding schemes, and pulse repetition
period; and many ground station data handling, communications and traffic
control approaches) with which to further enhance this already attractive
system design.
5. 2. 1	 Aircraft Avionics'
Descriptions of the Location Identification Transmitter (LIT), the
backlink message receiver, and the antennas required onboard the air-
craft to operate with the ATC satellites are given in the following sections. rr
' The avionics  equipment to operate with the NAVSTAR navigation system
is also described briefly. = Further details are available (Ref. 6).	 Design
of the avionics equipment to provide data communications via the satellite
also has been covered in other reports (Refs. 7 and 82).
,z
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Six different designs were investigated for LIT. These designs
were for three different carrier frequencies and two different pulse widths
at each frequency. Table 33 lists the six designs and the nominal peak
output power for each.
The two pulse lengths require codes which are 511 bits and 2044 bits
long, respectively. The coding effort concentrated on finding 511 bit
codes and no effort was spent on finding suitable 2044 bit codes. The
evaluation of the 204 µ.sec pulse length requires further analysis on
coding, pulse interference and crosstalk, effects of post-detection inte-
gration (necessary at 900 and 1600 MHz because of the coherency requre-
ments of the ground station matched filter), and transponder linearity
requirements. The advantage of the longer code is the reduced peak
power required in the transmitter which could have an important influence
on the transmitter cost. If a significant cost savings can be demonstrated,
then the longer code merits further study in evolving a LIT type, system
for ATC.
The transmitter requires a reference oscillator of at least 2 ppm
long term accuracy. For high performance aircraft, the oscillator sta-
bility must be several times better than 2 ppm. The oscillator is the
timing source for the digital logic which derives the pulse biphase code
i
j-
i
4
and pulse repetition period. The oscillator also feeds a multiplier-
amplifier-modulator chain which drives the final power amplifier stage.
Table 33. Transmitter resigns 	 ti
18 6 	
^"j
ra;
Therefore, the pulse repetition period, pulse code rate, and carrier
frequency accuracy are established by the oscillator accuracy or stability.
The oscillator will probably have to be recalibrated once a year in order
to stay within the 2 ppm accuracy. This could be accomplished as part of
the annual relicensing requirement for aircraft.
A block diagram of the A design is shown in Figure 40. The B, C,
and D designs are basic modifications of this block diagram. For
example, in the B design, pulse amplifier #4 is removed because of the
lower power output. Design C is identical to B except that the X5 multi-
plier is replaced by a X3 multiplier because of the lower frequency out-
put. Design D is identical to C except that pulse amplifier #3 is removed
because of the lower power output. For designs E and F, the last X3
multiplier would be removed and solid-state amplifiers would be used for
the final output power stage.
A detailed description of the transmitter design is given in the
following paragraphs. In reading the description, reference should be
made to Figure 40. In Appendix J alternative design approaches are
discussed some of which may prove 'CO be more cost effective in the
t
future.	 However, if the transmitter were to be built today, the design
_approach given here appears to be best choice.
y.
10 MHz Oscillator.	 The primary requirement on the oscillator is a 1
stability requirement of 2 ppm accuracy over one year.	 To achieve this, l
a simple ' thermal blanket will be wrapped about either the crystal or the
entire oscillator depending upon the physical configuration selected for
the final design.	 This thermal blanket will be controlled by a small
i silicon controlled rectifier which is fired by a thermistor sensing a lower
temperature extreme.	 Thus, the temperature excursion of the oscillator
Y
;. will be limited to a range much less than the ambient excursions antici-
pated for an aircraft environment.
	
By so doing, the basic stability of the
oscillator will thus be limited to less than the requisite two parts per
- million frequency deviation. 	 When the transmitter is switched-on, in
preparation for a flight, a 5-10 minute warm-up time is required to allow
the temperature of the oscillator to reach the proper operating point and
the crystal to stabilize to the 2 ppm requirement.
Y
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GENERATOR	 OUTPUT	 SUPPLY	 TO TRANSISTOR
CIRCUITS
Figure 40. LIT Transmitter Model A Block Diagram
I
lLinear IC Amplifier. A linear integrated circuit follows the 10 MHz
oscillator and is designed to acct both as a buffer between the oscillator
and the balance of the tranF-mitter circuitry, and also to provide approxi-
mately 30 db gain for the low powered oscillator. Of course, it is possible
to increase oscillator power and delete the integrated circuit, but in
general the crystal oscillator configuration precludes large output power
if the required stability is to be maintained.
X10 Multiplier. A times ten multiplier, consisting of a snap recovery
diode and a few passive components, follows the linear integrated circuit.
This simple circuit allows the frequency to be translated upward by an
order of magnitude, and although the loss incurred in this circuit is on
the order of 10 db, obtaining a decade increase in the basic oscillator
frequency more than compensates for the loss.
A-1 Amplifier, X5 Multiplier, and A-2 Amplifier. Following the
times ten multiplier is an amplifier designated A-1 which more than
recovers the power lost through the multiplication process. Immediately
following	 amplifier is a times five multi	 l identical to the^l	  this ampPl r nearly
times ten multiplier.
   Following the X 5 multiplier  i s an amplifier  des ig-
nated A-2 which amplifies the carrier to the level required to drive a
;f biphase modulator. circuit.
:a
q
,
Biphase Modulator, Amplifiers A-3 and A-4, and X3 Multiplier.
	 The
biphase modulator consists of a simple diode quadrature ring of relatively
conventional design.	 This design can provide 180° phase shifts with an
i
accuracy of +I* .	 After the biphase modulator two amplifiers designated ti
A-3 and A-4 provide high level drive to the final X3 multiplier.
	
The out- rf
put from the X3 multiplier will be on the order of 3-1/2  watts at the final
output frequency (1. 6 GHz).	 This level is sufficient to drive the pulsed
t._
amplifier chain to a final output at the antenna conne ctor of 2500 watts.
j
Pulse Power Amplifiers.
	
The power amplifiers which are gated on
only during the desired pulse transmission duration consist of tuned
cavities using ceramic triode tubes. , These amplifiers are extremely
rugged and capable of producing more than the indicated output power
levels.	 The electron tube generic type tentatively selected for this appli-
cation is the type Y1537, for the lower level stages and the type Y1536
for the final output stage.
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tPower Supply. It should be noted that due to the extremely low duty
cycle imposed upon the pulsed amplifiers the power supply need only
deliver its maximum current during a very small portion of the operating
time. Consequently, the power supply may be very inexpensively con-
structed utilizing a capacitive discharge output to maintain the necessary
current level during the very short burst of coded pulse sequences. The
proposed power supply is designed to convert a nominal 12 volt DC level
to several isolated DC outputs required by the transmitter. These out-
puts are:
Vout	 Iout	 Ipulse	 Pave
jV)
	
(ma)	 (A)	 (w)
-x-1200
	
0. 1 	 1.5	 0.48
+600	 0.1	 0.3	 0.096
w -50	 1	 0.8	 0,058
r,
-5	 1	 0.05	 0.001
+28	 20	 1.12	 0.594
+5	 500	 0	 4.000 (Including Regulator Loss)
"
5.253 = Ptotal
The power supply will utilize a standard DC-DC converter configu-
ration (magnetic inverter -rectifier -filter).	 The +5V output (for the digital
circuitry) is regulated and an additional 24 volt regulated output is derived
from the +28V output for the crystal oscillator.
	 These regulators will use
integrated circuit techniques.	 The power supply _for .all designs are.
similar except for the different power requirements for the output ^o
amplifiers
The high pulse current requirements are handled through capacitor
Y
energy storage techniques.	 The expected voltage drop during the pulse
Y duration is less than 10 percent.
:x Code Generator.	 The transmiter code generator produces sequence
bursts of 511 bits at a rate of 10 MB/s. 	 The bursts are repeated every
one to 1.31255 seconds. 	 The repetition rate is _selected with a resolution
of 10 µs, thus providing 31, 255 distinguishable rates.
	
The Timing Dia-
gram of Figure 41 illustrates the process.
	 Generation of the code burst
is implemented by the micro-programmer and code generator illustrated
by Figure 42.
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Figure- 42. LIT Code Generator Block Diagram
s	 ..
J
t
I
f	 Tx ENABLE	
r
	
PERIOD
  
SELECT
i
The run rates of the micro-programmer are derived from a divider
chair, which is driven by the 10 MHz oscillator. Resettable decimal divi-
ders are used to produce the desired frequencies of 100 kHz and 1 kHz.
At Reset Time all counters are reset to zero. The mode counter, now in
the 00 mode, selects the 10 MHz clock and produces a Transmit Enable
pulse which lasts for the duration of the code burst (51. 1 4s). This pulse
also opens the clock gare for the PN generator which produces the 511 bit
sequence starting with a vector which was loaded previously. During the
00 mode, the program counter counts to 512. This count is decoded and
steps the mode counter to 01. S' multaneously, the PN generator is reset.
In the 01 mode, the 1-kHz clock is selected by the clock commutator. The
programmer counts to 1512 the 01 mode lasts one second then steps
the mode counter to 10 via the 1512 decoder. Simultaneously, the desired
start vector is loaded into the PN generator. In the 10 mode the program
counter is clocked at 100 kHz until the Reset Decoder detects coincidence.
with a selected number between 1512 and 32, 767. Fifteen binary lines
are neces , ary for this selection (PRP Selection).
4
The code is generated by a 13-stage linear code generator.	 One of
sixteen (16) non-overlapping segments of the 2 13	 1 bit sequence is
selected by loading the appropriate start vector.	 Thirteen binary lines
are needed for this selection. +:
It is expected that the code generator will use LS! technology.	 Its
implementation is facilitated by using many identical elements, thereby
:i considerably reducing the mask generation effort.
5.2.1.2	 Backlink Receiver i
R
Figure 43 shows a block diagram of a 1560 MHz receiver, which
when added to the Location Identification Transmitter(LIT)I  provides the
LIT backlink communications function. 	 The diagram would be identical
for the other two LIT carrier frequencies (receiver at 940 or 410 MHz') -	 f
except for the LO and possibly the IF frequency. 	 The LO source is t
' obtained from the transmitter as are the basic timing pulses for genera-
ting the I&D filter timing and sampling signals._ The LIT surveillance
and backlink carriers are separated by 40 MHz so that the IF is centered
at 40 MHz.
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Figure 43. Backlink Receiver Block Diagram
A.
After each LIT pulse transmission, a control signal places a TR
switch in the receive position.	 Fifty milliseconds are allowed for the
switching to take place.	 Thus, the address window is opened by the mes-
sage decoder for the next three 51 µsec time intervals following a 50 ms -
interval after the LIT pulse transmission.	 The window is extended r,.
another nine time intervals if an address is received. 	 At the end of this
period, the TR switch is returned, to the transmit position ready for the
next LIT pulse transmission. 	 The TR switch avoids the use of a diplexer
and yet allows the same antenna to be used for both surveillance and the
communications backlink.
The display indicates which one of 14 messages is received or that
i an invalid message was received. 	 A confirmation signal on successful i
receipt of the message is sent to the transmitter telling it to delay its
normal transmission time on the next LIT pulse by 10 µsec so as to
convey "message received" to the ATC center.
5.2. 1. 3	 Navigation Equipment
The user hardware for receiving the ranging signals from the
satellites and computing position involves a wide range of costs and capa-
bilities.	 The elements of a typical system are illustrated in Figure 44. a`
The equipment is designed to operate at L-Band, the band selected for
,
+the NAVSTAR. navigation system.
1
•	 '` The satellite signals are received by a simple, lightweight curved-?
arm turnstile antenna (described in the next section); they are processed
by a receiver that decodes the satellite ephemeris data and forms a
digital number representing the time of arrival of the signal.
	 Since the
signals are received in time sequence, the receiver requires only one
channel.
The output of the receiver interfaces with a small digital computer
for automatic computation of position.
	 The display indicated in Figure 44
is similar to one in a con_v_entional inertial or doppler navigation system;
however, the NAVSTAR equipment is capable of driving any conventional t
or planned navigation display (e. ' g., moving map).
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Figure 44. Navigation System Avionics Hardware
5.2. 1.4 Antennas
Aircraft antennas suitable for general aviation use were
experimentally studied to determine their coverage and gain capabilities
assuming a Cessna 172 type of aircraft as representative of general
aviation. The antenna configurations selected for experimental evalua-
tion were the curved turnstile and curved dipole antennas. These antennas
were tested on ground planes whose dimensions were sized to represent
the wing of the Cessna 172 aircraft. The pattern test frequencies were
1500 MHz for the curved turnstile and 2200 MHz for the curved dipole.
The antennas and ground plane were scaled for an operating frequency of
900 MHz. The results can be readily extrapolated to a frequency of
450 MHz. These scale model tests were designed to verify the LIT user
antenna requirements of near hemispherical coverage with a gain varia-
tion of -3 to +4 dbi for 900 and 450 MHz. Previous test results on
antennas for the NAVSTAR system (Fief. 6) have already verified the
requirements for a 1600-MHz operating frequency.
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Frequency (MHz) a b c
450 5.01' 11.2" 8.6"
900 2.511 5.6" 4.3"
1600 1.711
	
_ 4,811 2.511
Experimental model pattern tests indicated the desired coverage at
all three bands can be provided by the turnstile antenna. The antenna
would be installed on the top of the wing or tail assembly. The antenna
pattern coverage is near hemispherical with gains ranging from -3 to
+4 dbi over a coverage cone of 160 degrees or better. Over the same
coverage, the gain of the curved dipole antenna is approximately 3 db
less than the curved turnstile antenna. The gain degradation is primarily
due to losses resulting from the linear polarization of the curved dipole
antenna. The turnstile antenna provides circular polarization which is
better matched to the circularly polarized satellite antennas. Detailed
gain patterns measured for both antennas are given in Appendix K.
The curved turnstile design can operate without an aerodynamically
shaped protective radome for low speed general aviation aircraft. Also,
the antenna elements can be formed from metal rod.s whose ends are
mounted directly to the aircraft surface through a fiberglass insulator.
The design and mounting technique are illustrated in Figure 44.
T
The dimensions of the 450 MHz, 900 MHz, and 1600 MHz turnstile
antennas are given in Table 34, where the dimensions a, b, and c are as
illustrated in Figure 45. The antenna patterns in Appendix K are given n
in terms of the angles 6 and 0.
Table 34. LIT User Antenna Dimensions
Another design which provides hemispherical coverage is the conical
4
'.	 to spiral; however, due to its large physical profile (approximately
..	 g!	 aP^	 g P y	 P	 (PP	 Y 40
inches and 20 inches in height at the respective frequencies of 450 MHz
	 i
and 900- MHz) the design approach was not selected.
The curved dipole design which results in linear polarization is
shown in Figure 46. The major advantage of the linear polarized design
4
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Figure 45. Curved Turnstile Installation
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Figure 46. Curved Dipole Antenna
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is that it can be packaged into a blade shape making the antenna more
suitable for application to a wider variety of users (e.g., high perform-
ance aircraft). However, the peak gain of the antenna with respect to a
circularly polarized isotropic source is only +1 dbi.
5.2.2 Spacecraft Configuration
A conceptual design was conducted to determine a spacecraft con-
figuration to accomplish the Domestic ATC Satellite mission. The space-
craft was sized to carry sufficient electrical power to accommodate two
LIT channels, two backlink channels, two 1200 bps data channels and a
NAVSTAR navigation channel.,
Several configurations were investigated to select the most promis-
ing candidate, among them a spin-stabilized configuration, a momentum
wheel three-axis stabilized configuration with rotating solar array
paddles, and a momentum wheel three-axis stabilized configuration with
a despun antenna with the rest of the vehicle oriented towards the sun
with fixed arrays. The spacec aft design selected was the one with
rotating solar paddles and momentum wheel stabilized since it offered
good performance with low rleve opti3ent risk
Y'
A layout of the satellite is shown in Figure 47, and the orbital
configuration is illustrated in Fiau.: e 48.
f	 The estimated weight of the satellite is 1228 pounds, including the
apogee injection motor, which is within the booster capabilities of the
improved Thor Delta. The spacecraft will be launched on - a Thor Delta	 }
904 which includes nine solid strap-on rockets on the first stage, an«
	 inertially guided second stage, the TE 364-4 third stage, and a bulbous
fairing. This combination can place 1250 pounds (Ref. 83) into a transfer
orbit up to synchronous altitude at an inclination of 23 degrees. The
'	 23-degree inclined transfer orbit was selected because of range safety 	 4
f	 restrictions on the impact location of the second stage.
,t
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5. 2.2. 1 Payload Pl
The payload for the CNS satellite consists of the following
subsystems:.
• LIT surveillance transponder
• LIT backlink transponder rf
• NAVSTAR navigation signal generation
• Data transponder
A brief description of each is given in the following paragraphs. The
carrier frequencies shown are meant to only be examples and do not
imply that the choices are correct for IM and filter requirements.
LIT Surveillance Transponder. The surveillance transponder will
be a two channel single conversion repeater for relay of LIT pulses from
aircraft to the ATC ground centers. The major. requirements on the
transponder are listed in Table 35.
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fTable 35. Surveillance Transponder Requirements
Receiver
i
Input frequencies:
Noise figure:
Bandwidth:
Input power:
Output frequency:
Translation accuracy:
900 MHz (Ch. 1), 925 MHz (Ch. 2)
3 db
Nominal 20 MHz each channel
< -113 dbw in linear region
5075 MHz (Ch. 1), 5100 MHz(Ch. 2)
0. 1 ppirn
Transmitter
Center frequency:	 5075 MHz (Ch. 1), 5100 MHz(Ch. 2)
Output power:	 40 W peak, 5 W average each
channel
Linearity:	 <1 db small signal suppression at
peak power
The critical element in the transponder is the linear power
amplifier. At 5100 MHz and with output power requirements of 40 watts
peak, 5 watts average, a traveling wave tube amplifier is the most
apparent device. In fact, at the present time (until 1975) it probably
represents the best solution. However, there is one serious drawback
to the T W T . The DC input power is constant and 'a function of the peak
RF output power requirement. Thus, for a eery large portion of the time,
the amplifier is inefficient in the use of DC power.
A more satisfactory solution is a power amplifier whose DC power
input varies with the signal input level (i. e. , a Clans B, linear ampli- x.
fier). Therefore, the DC input power would be proportional to the
average output power rather than the peak output power. Possible ampli
fie r candidates are 	 k
• Triode
• Transistor
• Electron-beam Semiconductor
204
. The electron-beam semiconductor (EBIRD) consists of two back-biased
diodes excited by a dynamical focused electron beam (Ref. 84). 	 The
EBIRD exhibits characteristics similar to a push-pull transistor ampli-
fier.
	 Considerable research is being conducted in this area (at lower
frequencies than C-Band) and future developments hold promise of meet-
`,' ing the amplifier requirements.
Another possibility is to lower the downlink frequency from C-band
to the 2-3 GHz region. 	 At these lower frequencies transistor amplifiers 	 -
y would most likely meet the requirements in the next three to five years.
! LIT Backlink Transponder. 	 The backlink transponder will be a
two channel single conversion repeater for relaying the backlink message
pulses from the ATC ground centers to aircraft.
	
The major requirements i
on this transponder are listed in Table 36. ^{
a
Table 36.
	 Backlink Transponder Requirements
I
# Receiver
5 Input frequency:	 5050 MHz
Noise figure:	 6 db
Bandwidth;	 500 kHz (2 channels)
Output frequency:
	
940 MHz
.	 y
Translation accuracy
	 1 Ppm
Transmitter
.x
Center frequency:	 940 MHz ..:
N
T Output power:	 1100 watts peak per channel ,
Pulse duty cycle:	 0.01
f
- ;
2'05-
Ii
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NAVSTAR Signal Generator.
	 The equipment required to generate
the navigation ranging signal transmitted to users on the ground is
described in detail in Ref. 6.
	 The basic equipment blocks are:
•	 Precision Crystal Oscillator
•	 Time Base and Range Code Generator
•	 Data Encoder
•	 L-Band Transmitter (1550 MHz)
The precision oscillator is the reference timing from which the time base }
is operated and the ranging signal modulation is derived by the code gen-
erator.	 The data encoder stores the updated satellite ephemeris data
L ' transmitted to the satellite by a telemetry and command station.	 On
command from the time base, it formats the ephemeris data with the r
ranging signal and sends it to the transmitter for modulation and trans-
mission to navigation users. 	 The L-Band transmitter is solid -state and
generates 50 watts of RF output power. 	 The transmitter operates on a
1/8 duty cycle (on for 1. 5 seconds and off for the next seven 1. 5 second
intervals) with timing provided by the time base. <<
.. Data Transponder.	 The data transponder consists of two separate
portions.
	 There is a two channel C-Band to UHF repeater for relay of ?
data from the ATC ground center to aircraft and a t,pvo channel UHF to
C-Band rspeate	 for relaying data from aircraft to the ground center.
The major requirements on the data transponder are listed in Table 37.
Table 37.	 Data Transponder	 - =x
Receivers	 C-Band	 UHF
L Input frequencies:	 5140 MHz	 980 MHz j
s Noise figure:	 6 db	 4 db t
Channel bandwidth:	 50 kHz	 50 kHz
No. of channels:	 4	 4
Output frequency:	 950 MHz	 5170 MHz
Transmitters	 - y
Center frequency:	 5170 MHz	 950 MHz
Output power (each channel):
	
0. 5 watt	 7 watts>
No. of channels:	 41	 4
- r
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5.2.2.2 Mission Characteristics
The sequence of events from injection into transfer orbit to
operational readiness is shown in Table 38.
The correct constellation of satellites requires that four satellites
be placed in 16-degree inclined synchronous orbits with an eccentricity
of 0. 14. An additional two satellites will be placed in an equatorial
synchronous orbit.
For this preliminary sizing study, the velocity required for injec-
tion into the final orbit was calculated ignoring the effect of the eccen-
tricity. This will produce only a small error because of the small orbit
eccentricity. The nominal pre-apogee motor firing (AMF) will be 5251
ft/sec at an angle of 23.0 degrees to the earth's equator, as shown in
Figure 49.
i
r
r
^
r
r
r
t:}
I^
Table 38.	 Mission Profile
1. Spinning injection into transfer orbit. I
2, Ground attitude determination from earth and sun sensor data.
3. Precessive reorientation of spacecraft prior to apogee motor firing.
4. Orbital injection via apogee motor.
5. Despin to 10 rpm.
6. Orient spin axis to coincide with local vertical.
Rt	 7. Despin to spin rate less than 1 rpm, j'
8: Deploy solar arrays.
9• Acquire sun with solar arrays using azimuth sun sensor. .'
10. Acquire earth using roll and pitch earth sensor and
corresponding torquers.
1 l . Yaw spacecraft via signal from elevation sun sensor until array s.+
axis is normal to orbit plane.'.
12. Spin up reaction wheel to bias speed.
13. Adjust orbit to achieve required orbit.
14. Longitude correction to place spacecraft on station.
15. Normal,  cruise with periodic removal of roll/yaw momentum and r
continuous pitch control via modulation of wheel speed and #,
momentum removal with hydrazine propulsion system.
16. Longitude stationkeeping as required.
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Figure 49.	 Nominal Pre-Apogee Motor Firing Geometry
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Let the apogee motor velocity increment be denoted by V A , and its
required thrust direction by a.
	 Because the burn time will be relatively y}
short, the velocity increment may be assumed impulsive.
	
Therefore,
l
V	 sin a = 5251 sin 7°A_
.i	 s
VA cos a = 10, 088 - 5251 cos 7° ir:
from which it follcwvs
VA _ 4880 ft/sec
r.	 r
a _ 7 0 ^ 9 ,
By the same procedure, the velocity required at AMF for the synchronous
equatorial satellite is 5,640 ft/sec.
The higher velocity requirement for apogee injection of the equatorial
satellites is equivalent to approximately 50 pounds of additional solid r
motor propellant.
	 Since the satellite for the 16-degree inclined orbit is
already nearly at the maximum booster capability, the equatorial sated-.
lites must have their payload reduced in order to make up for the addi-
tional propellant required.
	 Therefore,` the equatorial satellites will not
208;
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carry any digital data transponders. The apogee motor will be sized for
the larger propellant capacity and off-loaded for the 16-degree inclined
orbits.
Once the four inclined orbit satellites have been placed in the
proper constellation, they will be slowly perturbed in their orbits by
lunar-solar effects. In order to maintain a fixed position, the satellites
require a few feet per sec per year along the track but approximately
235 ft/sec to maintain a fixed argument of perigee, which would be a
significant propellant requirement for 7-year lifetime. However, it is
only the relative position of the satellites which is important in calcu-
lating aircraft position accuracy. It is estimated that only a slight
degradation in accuracy will occur over the 7-year lifetime if no perigee
stationkeeping is rci4ormed. Since the drift effects are primarily in one
direction, the relative position degradation between satellites can be
minimized by initial orbit biasing so that the satellites si:)wly drift
through their nominal position during their lifetime. Therefore, `
 no pro-
pellant is carried for this function.
5.2.2. 3 Spacecraft Configuration Discussion
,
r
r^
Three spacecraft configurations were considered for the LIT mis-
s ion. The primary points of comparison which effect the configuration
,
are identified in Table 39.
The selected configuration is a 3-axis stabilized satellite utilizing
a pitch momentum wheel and active earth sensors for attitude reference.	 Is
..	 The large spacecraft^^_..e _ _ata  trans _^ •
mission to the aircraft is designed for coverage of the U.S. Because of
the inclined orbits, this requires that the antenna be gimbaled to main-
tain coverage of the U.S. This could be accomplished by an on-board
programmer which is controlled from the ground or the antenna could be
	
s
slaved to a beam directed. from the center of the U.S. The latter approach
is the recommended technique. It is recommended that the antenna be
gimbaled in the roll axis only and that the other axis be controlled by
moving the spacecraft body about the pitch momentum wheel axis.
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Spacecraft Antenna Array
(a) Spacecraft geocentric (a) One axis gimbaled (a) Rotate in one axis - sun
oriented sensor on paddle
( b) Pitch momentum wheel - Other axis steered inp	 S/ C bodyitch by	 (b) Option -Same as (a)normal to orbit plane except add hinge to keep
' (b) Option. - 2 axis gimbaled paddle normal to sun line at(c) Earth sensors all times
- Stepper motors
- RF track or
open loop
(a) Spacecraft oriented to (a) Antenna gimbaled (a) Rotate in one axis - sun
U. S. sensor on paddle
3 axis gas jet system2 RF guided from ground
Need yaw control, pos-
sibly by polarization
(a) Spacecraft sun oriented (a) Gimbaled in ,one axis (a) Array fixed to body
- Pitch momentum wheel - Roll and yaw earth
normal to orbit plane sensors located on
3 - Azimuth sun sensor on antenna
body. - RF rotary coupler
between body and
antenna
v
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VThe solar arrays will have complete freedom about the pitch axis
to track the sun. Because of the inclined orbit, the sun angle could vary i
between a minimum of 7 degrees to a maximum of 39 degrees depending
on the time of year of launch. By properly phasing the four inclined
f'launches, the maximum sun angle for two of the four satellites could be
limited to approximately 36 degrees which would cause a 19 percent loss
of power in the worst case. The other two satellites would have a sun
angle of about 10 degrees with only 2 percent loss of power.
f
5.2.2.4 Attitude Control
Coordinate Frame of Reference.
	 Referring to Figure 50, the
nominal orientation is defined as one in which the body-fixed coordinatep
frame (xb , yb , zb ) is coincident with the conventional orbital reference
frame (xr ' yr, z r ) where xr points in the direction of the positive space-
craft velocity vector, zr points down along local vertical and yr corn-
pletes the orthogonal right-handed frame.
	 Roll, pitch, and yaw errors
are defined as rotations about the x b , yb, zb axes, respectively.
{ Attitude Control Requirements in Transfer Orbit.
	 Attitude control
during the transfer orbit is obtained via spin stabilization at a rate deter-
} mined by the spin table of the injection booster (about 100 RPM). 	 Spin ry
axis attitude and rotational position are determined from passive earth i
and sun sensors which are rigidly attached to the main body of the
a spacecraft.
Precession of the vehicle to new attitudes (i. e. , prior to apogee
2
motor burn and placement into the proper operational attitude) is effected
by axial mass expulsion thrusters offset from the spin axis. 	 Passive
sr.	 _fz.
nutation damping is provided by viscous ring dampers.
Attitude Control Requirements in Operational Orbit.
	
Roll/yaw
control stiffness is achieved by a pitch momentum wheel biased in the
^j
neighborhood of 5 ft-lb-sec. 	 Roll/yaw errors are measured by a rollw
earth sensor and removed by dumping the roll/yaw momentum with yaw
mass expulsion torquers when it exists about the yaw spacecraft axis.
Pitch errors are measured by a pitch earth sensor and pitch control r
torques are generated by modulating the wheel speed. 	 When the pitch
wheel saturates, the momentum is removed by pitch mass expulsion
torquers.
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Figure 50. Attitude Control Configuration Schematic
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The solar array axis is normal to the orbit plane and tracks the sun
in pitch via an azimuth sun sensor and a solar array drive. A single solar
array shaft cannot be used due to physical interference with the solid
apogee motor. Hence, tvNo separate solar array drives are required.
During eclipse, the array drives are deactivated and sun reacquisition is
effected at sunrise.
Mass expulsion thrusters are employed for longitude stationkeeping.
Attitude Control System Description. 	 During the transfer orbit,
earth and sun sensors of the Intelsat III type are employed to determine
the location of the spacecraft spin-axis in inertial space.
	 Output sensor
data is transmitted to the ground station, where it is processed to yield
the spacecraft spin-axis rotation as well as the instantaneous rotational r
F.
position of the spacecraft in time, as shown in Figure 51.	 Two passive
4 earth sensors (one for redundancy) are mounted on the spinning spacecraft
rotor with their optical axes inclined by f6 degrees about the spacecraft
equatorial plane.	 The field of view of each sensor is a square of
k 1.2 x 1. 2 degrees.	 A pulse is generated by each sensor at the instant the
sensor's field of view crosses the earth's horizon.	 Two pulses are gen-
erated by each sensor every spacecraft revolution. 	 The sun sensor
` measures the sun elevation from the spacecraft equatorial plane as well
as the sun's azimuthal or rotational position relative to the spin axis
reference rotational position. 	 For each scan of the sun, the sensor gen-
erates three pulses; a reference pulse, a polarity pulse which designates
the sense of the sun elevation angle, and a timing pulse, whose position 
in time relative to the reference pulse, specifies the magnitude of the
" sun's elevation angle.	 Elevation angles up to ±65 degrees can be is
measured.
The spacecraft is precessed into the proper position for the apogee'
burn (as well as for subsequent positioning maneuvers) by precession
commands transmitted from the ground station to the spacecraft valve
driver electronics which in turn activates the offset axial thruster for the
_prescribed duration. 	 Figure 52 illustrates the precession control
concept. y
x
r{
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Figure 52. Precession, Despin, and Longitudinal Control Concept
After the spacecraft is oriented with its spin axis coincident with
local vertical, it is despun and the solar array deployed. Sun acquisition
follows using the solar array drives as shown in Figure 53. Next the
earth is acquired in both roll and pitch using the earth sensors together
with their corresponding torquers. The pitch control concept is shown in
Figure 54 and Figure 55 illustrates the roll control concept. The space-
craft is then yawed by ground command until the array is normal to the
orbit plane by using the signal from the elevation sun sensor and the yaw
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Figure 55. Roll Control Concept
ROLL
DYNAMICS
torquers. This maneuver cannot be performed at neon as the yaw
reference from the sun is invalid at that time.. During spin-up of the
wheel, the reaction torque about the pitch axis is counteracted by the pitch
gas system.
After spin-up is complete, the pitch errors are controlled by modu-
lating the wheel speed, as shown in Figure 54, and dumping the pitch
momentum with the )itch thrusters when the wheel saturates. Roll /yaw
errors are controlled as illustrated in Figure 56. Note that there are no
orbital restrictions on when roll/yaw momentum can be dumped with the
yaw thrusters as the 'yaw thrusters always produce a yaw torque. Of
course the sampling rate frequency is still twice orbit rate
4
Longitudinal stationkeeping is performed as required using the
a
longitude AV thrusters and the valve driver electronics.
During eclipse, the solar array drives are deactivated via a signal,
from a disabled "eye" on the sun sensor. At sunrise, the array drives .:
reacquire the sun and operation continues.
5.2.2.5 Apogee Motor
The function of the apogee motor is to provide the spacecraft with
the necessary velocity increment near the apogee of the transfer orbit to 	 ^
achieve the final desired orbits. It is fired by ground command at the
appropriate time in the mission sequence. The basicsizing parameters
for the motor, total spacecraft weight and AV, are 1250 pounds and
4800 ft/sec. The selected apogee motor design takes advantage of the
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Figure 56. Roll/Yaw Control Concept
components and configuration design concepts of the current Thiokol
TE-M-442 motor program. The motor consists of a spherical case, a
high expansion ratio contoured nozzle, a high-energy polybutadene pro-
pellant, a pyrogen ignitor and an electromechanical safe-and-arm device.
The motor weights 558.4 pounds and burns 504 lb of propellant and
5 pounds of inert linear material to provide the necessary AV. The motor
is capable of carrying an additional 50 lb of propellant for t' 	 ynchronous
equatorial satellites. Motor characteristics are presented in Table 40,
5.2.2.6 Hydrazine Propulsion
All propulsion required to station-keep and control the attitude of
the satellite is supplied by a monopropellant hydrazine propulsion system.
The schematic for this system is shown in Figure 57. The _subsystem
consists of two positive expulsion propellant tanks, nine thrusters, fill
and drain valves, and a pressure transducer. Expulsion of the propellant
from the tanks is accomplished by blowdown of nitrogen gas acting on an
elastomeric diaphragm. Initial tank pressures are approximately	 £ .
600 Asia and final expulsion pressures, approximately 200 psi which cor-y
	
	
'..respond to thrust levels of 1 to 0.5 pounds.
The AV and propellant requirements are shown in Table 41. In the
continuous firing mode, the specific impulse of the thruster is about
225 sec.
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Table 40. Apogee Motor Performance Characteristics
Specific impulse 295 sec
Maximum thrust 5,600 lb
Burn time 35 sec
Overall length 48 in.
Case diameter 27 in.
q.
(ELASTOMERIC
DIAPHRAGM)
Figure 57. Hvd:azine Propulsion System
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,Table 41. Hydrazine Propellant Requirements
Propellant Weight
Function
	 AV (ft/sec)	 (lb)
Spacecraft orientation 2.0
First injection error correction
	
157 14.8
Spacecraft orientation 2.0
Second injection error correction 	 83 7.7
Spin axis alignment 2.8
Longitudinal trim
	 7 0.8 z :_
Despin (100--..0 RPM)* 2.1
Yaw maneuver 0.02 J'
Sun acquisition 0.01 .
Earth acquisition 0.02
Longitudinal stationkeeping for
	 26 2.8
5 years•
Longitudinal repositioning
	 20 2.0
Attitude control	 5 3.0 ;A_,w
Total Hydrazine 43.8 lb
Moment of inertia conservatively assumed to be 140 slug ft .
5.2.2.7	 Thermal Control
The thermal design for the satellite consists of insulation and two
heat-dissipating radiating surfaces shown schematically in Figure 58. 'f:	 {
The heat-dissipating radiating surfaces consist of second surface
mirrors on the outside with localized louvers beneath them. 	 In orbit,
the solar vector effectively revolves around the spacecraft in a plane
normal to the solar arrays.	 The two radiating surfaces experience 4
maximum illumination during winter and summer solstices.
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Figure 58. Thermal Design Concept
The hot design condition occurs during winter solstice when the sun
illuminates one of the radiating surfaces. At this time, the solar intensity
also increases from the nominal equinox value of 442 Btu/hr-ft 2 to about
460 Btu/hr-ft 2. This condition determines the minimum radiating surface
required to dissipate the heat loads while maintaining a pre-selected
average platform temperature.
As a first approximation, the allowable platform temperature can
be letermined from the following equation:
q/A = he (T unitTplat)
%I
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where
q/A = Ratio of electronic unit power to baseplate area,
Btu/hr-ft2
h	 = Conductance, baseplate to platform, Btu/hr -ft2 _° F jc
j'
Twit = Maximum allowable unit temperature, ° F
Tplate = Average platform temperature, ° F
r,
Normally the unit selected forrthe calculation is the one with the highest
q/A ratio.
	 For this study, the following values were used:
q/A	 2.4 watts/'in2
 (power amplifiers) Ft.
he = 30 G
T	 _ 130° Funit
These values yield a maximum allowable platform temperature of
90° F at the hotspot under the RF power amplifiers.
	 Experience has
a
1'	 s
shown that, with conventional platform construction, sizeable temperature
gradients exist near a concentrated power source.
	 For example, the
Intelsat-III TWT operates at 160° F with a power density of 1.6 watts/in2
and 135° F at l.3 watts /in 2 .	 Therefore, to achieve 130° F, the power t:
amplifier heat radiation density must be constrained to less than 1 watt/in 2. ^.
Assuming this to be the case, an average platform temperature of 90° F ,k
is reasonable.	 It should be noted that in some areas, such as battery
locations, platform temperatures lower than 90° F are feasible by local
application of thermal control techniques.
	 However, large reductions
in platform temperature require significant increases in radiating area._
For example, to maintain an average platform temperature of _70° F (at
320 watts) would require the entire 50 in. .x 50 in. side of the spacecraft
and would result in a significant weight penalty. 3,'
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The louver area requirements are presently undetermined due to
the -many factors involved in establishing this requirement.	 The thermal
design characteristics are summarized in Table 42.
Table 42.
	 Thermal Design Characteristics
Item Properties Remarks
Insulation blankets K	 Btu0. 01x	 hr-ft-0 F 10 layers 1/4 mil Mylar
Blanket outer layer a = 0. 15 (degraded) Silvered teflon, 2 rxiil
= 0.69
Second surface a	 0.1 (degraded) 2Requires about 22 ft
Mirrors E	 0.8 total both sides to dissi-
pate 340 watts at plat-
form temperature of
90 0
 F
Louvers Open	 E	 0.7 Probably required only
Closed E	 0.2 locally in the vicinity of
low thermal mass equip-
ment for eclipse
thermal control
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5.2.2. 8 Electrical Poyrer Requirements
The primary electrical power is furnished by two solar array
paddles which rotate about one axis. The maximum sun angle deviation
from normal to the paddles is about 35 degrees, assuming the 16-degree
inclined orbits are properly phased with the ecliptic plane. The maxi-
mum eclipse time for the inclined orbits is about 70 minutes.
The solar array is sized for the inclined orbit satellites which
include 4 data link channels. The array degradation . after seven years is
approximately 26 percent. The batteries are sized for full eclipse capa-
bility with two batteries. If one battery fails, approximately 60 percent
eclipse capability remains.
The electrical power requirements for the inclined orbit satellites
is shown in Table 43.
Table 43. Electrical Power
Equipment Category Power (W} ?
r	 z.
Communication Equipment }
LIT 100
NAVSTAR 25 Average E.:	 !
LIT Backlink 46 Average i	 s
Data Link (2 1200-bps channels) 60
Converter
, b 25 i
`	 Telemetry and Command 22
Attitude Control 32
Electrical Integration 5 R
Power Control Unit 3
Battery Trickle Charge 12
Total 331 Watts
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5.2.2.9 Antennas
The antenna requirements are dictated by the aircraft links with
the spacecraft for data and LIT which will be handled by a common antenna
at 900 MHz. In order to minimize the RF power requirements, the
antenna shall be designed to cover only the Continental United States with
an elliptical beam of 9.4 by 6. 5 degrees. 	 The antenna will be an elliptical
paraboloid dish whose major and minor axis dimensions are 131 inches
and 90 inches.	 As shown in Figure 47, the antenna will be unfurlable and
also gimbaled in one axis.
The other communication links will be handled by a single fixed
1
circular parabola 3 feet in diameter.
	
A dual feed consisting of stacked
cup cross dipoles will be implemented such that the L-Band feed is opti-
mized for maximum performance. 	 The C-Band feed will be slightly
defocused providing Continental United States coverage. 	 This antenna
will carry both the NAVSTAR link to the aircraft at 1.6 GHz (approxi-
mately earth coverage) and all communications between the spacecraft
and the ground at 5. 2 GHz (LIT, data, and LIT backlink).
;.. The telemetry and command antenna is not defined since the carrier :x	 '
f
-frequency' has not been selected.
	
If VHF is selected, a series of whip wx
antennas at the bottom of the spacecraft could be used during the spinning
portion of flight, and a small directional antenna could be used at the top
of the spacecraft after it is earth oriented.
5.2.2. 10 Mass Properties
The satellite weight breakdown is shown in Table 44.
5.2.3	 Ground Stations
There are three categories of ground stations which interface with
Fa. the CNS satellite system.	 They are:
(U Launch and orbit injection`
•	 Satellite system support f>
•	 ATC mission support
r
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Table 19.	 Satellite Weight Breakdown r
•	
N
w
No. Required Weight lb
Electrical Power 167. 0
Solar array 2 80..0
Batteries 2 67. 0
Power control unit 1 12.0
Shunt element assembly 4 8.0
Electrical Distribution 45.0
Electrical integration assembly 1 15.0
Cabling and connectors 30.0
Telemetry, Tracking and Command 24.4
{ Antenna 1 2.0
Command receivers 2, 3.8
Command decoders 2 6. 6
a Diplexer 1 2.8
{ Telemetry transmitter 2 1.5
Hybrid i 1. 0
A Telemetry encoders 2 6.4 Ip
d RF switch 1 0.3
Payload 90.0 #;.	 aE LIT 1 20.04
NAV S TAR 1 25.0 i
LIT backlink 1 10.0
Data (4 channels) 1 35.0
Hydrazine Propulsi 68.3
,..
'_ Propellant tank assembly 2 14.0 ;r • -
Pressure transducer 1 0.4
?	
.a
,.
Fill and drain valve assembly 1 0.3
Filter 1 .4.
Feed line assembly- 1 2. 0
:. Thrusters 9 5.4
Brackets A/R 1.0
Propellant (N2 H4 ) 43.8
Pres surant f. 0
a- Apogee Motor 558.4 i
- Motor inert f;
Thrust chamber 20.4
Insulation and liner 7.5
Nozzle 13. 9
Safe and arm assembly 7. 2
Miscellaneous hardware 0.4
'Expendable 1
Solid propellant 504. 0
Liner expendable 5. 0
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Table 19. Satellite Weight Breakdown (Continued)
No. Required
	 Weight lb
Antennas
	 61. 9
UHF antenna
Reflector (7. 5 ft x 10. 9 ft)
Feed assembly
Support structure
Antenna gimbal assembly
C -band / L-band antenna
Reflector
Feed
Support structure
Attitude Control
Valve driver assembly
Earth sensor assembly
Sensor electronics assembly
Solar array drive assembly
,Control electronics
Momentum wheel assembly
Sun sensor assembly
Damper
Earth sensor, transfer orbit
Sun sensor, transfer orbit
i	 36. 0.
i	 3.9
i	 7.0
1	 7.0
1	 3.0
2	 2.0
1	 3.0
7.5. 3
1	 1.7
4	 16. 0
1	 4.0
2	 14.0
2	 20.0
1 14. 0
2	 2.0
i	 2.0
i	 1. 3
i	 0.3
i
}
Structure 99. 0
j;
Vertical and horizontal platforms 39.4 T
Side panels 6.5
r"	 Vertical platform and side panel support 6.5
Conical frustrum assembly 28.1
Support struts assembly 7.4 j
Propulsion support assembly 4.4, Safe and arm view tube 0.6
a'	 Miscellaneous attachment hardware 6, i
_.	 Thermal 32. 1 ,,tJ.
Heatsir_k plates 10. 0
Insulation 8.9
Louvers 13.2
Balance weight provision 4.0
Total	 - 1228.4
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The launch and injection functions can be supported by the STADAN
range facilities.	 The CNS satellites should not impose any new or unusual
requirements on these existing range facilities.
	 The rest of the ground
system comprises the following segments:
Segment 1. Four LIT Data Processing Centers (LDPC).
Segment 2.	 Twenty Air Route Traffic Control Centers (ARTCC)y.
Segment 3. One Satellite Command and Control (C & C) Station.
Segment 4. Ground Communications Network (GCN).
Segment 5.	 LIT Calibration Beacon Network.
Figure 59 illustrates the major data paths throughout the ground t.
system.	 Each ground segment is described in the following paragraphs
except for Segment 2 - the ARTCC's which is the only one that is not i
.: peculiar to the CNS satellite system.
	 The actual ATC operations will be
lconducted at the ARTCC's in a manner similar to today's operations. 	 The
LDPC's provide surveillance data to the ARTCC's and transmit LIT back-
link messages to aircraft under command from the ART'CC.	 Thus, the
.t LDPC's serve as the interface between the ARTCC's and the CNS
satellites. 
Each LDPC covers the aircraft in approximately one-fourth of r	 ;'
{ya CONUS airspace and is responsible to the five ARTCC's in its area ofi . t
coverage.	 While surveillance data is available at each LDPC for all of
CONUS, only aircraft in its area are of concern to a LDPC. !	 ,
5.2.3. 1 _Segment 1 - LIT Data Processing Center (LDPC)
All four LDPC's are identical and each receives LIT signals from ..
all six satellites including signals from the LIT calibration beacon net-
work.	 Specifically, the functions of these stations are; i
•	 Identify and track aircraft by processing LIT signals
received from satellite network.
k •	 Disseminate .surveillance data to appropriate ARTCC's.
-F
Transmit collision warning messages (LIT backli.nk)
via satellites to aircraft. - a
The FAA plans to deactivate one of the 21 existing centers.
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Figure 55.	 CNS Satellite Ground System
^. r
{
• Provide any satellite communication links (voice/
data) with aircraft.
The block diagram in Figure 60 shows the general configuration for
one LDPC. It contains the following major sections:
• Six LIT equipments each containing an antenna, receiver,
and pulse processor. One pulse processor is provided
for backup.
• Sixteen PRP correlator and tracking computers (with
backups).
• A computer subsystem (with backups).
• A display subsystem.
& One backlink transmitter (with backup).
•	 A communications terminal. =
LIT Equipment Groups.
	 Each LIT equipment group -receives C-Band
(5100 MHz) signals from one satellite using a 25 foot steerable parabolic
antenna.
	 The antenna is controlled by the acquisition and tracking pro-
grammer (a mini-computer) using pointing data supplied by the computer
r	 ^
subsystem.	 Manual antenna control is also provided. 	 A diplexer for ;	 tii,	 I
each antenna permits the transmission of backlink signals.
t
The IF output from the receiver contains all LIT pulses from the
associated satellite.	 The IF is fed in parallel to 16 pulse processors,
one for each biphase pulse code. 	 A pulse processor consists of a match, d p
filter delay line envelope detector and threshold circuit and pulse time ^t
digitizer,	 The latter is fed time code from a master clock which is com-
mon to the whole LDPC and measures the pulse arrival tinnes referenced
to the master clock.
-:	 - The coded LIT pulses are compressed to a pulse width of 0. 1 µs by
the delay line which contains a code matrix matched to the pulse code.
An envelope detector and threshold circuit follows the delay line. 	 The
detected pulses are then fed to the pulse time digitizer which determines
the arrival time of the pulses.	 The arrival time data is then supplied to
one of the PRP correlator and tracking computers.
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Figure 60.
	 LIT Data Processing Center (One of Four)
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Appendix L contains attachments A and B from a proposal submitted
to TRW by North American Rockwell Autonetics Division for the develop-
ment of a delay line and code matrix to meet the LIT requirements. r
,
Autonetics proposes a surface acoustic wave propagation technique using
a crystal of bismuth germanium oxide. 	 Based on developments to date,
this technique appears to be the most suitable approach for the LIT
requirement.	 Thus a major technology development program for the
delay line compression filters will be unnecessary.
PRP Correlator and Tracking Computers.
	 The LDPC contains a !
total of 16 of these small computers which handle the pulse time outputs t
from all six LIT equipments.	 In turn, the PRP correlator and tracking
computers provide 16 sets of data to the computer subsystem.
The pulse arrival times serve as inputs to the PRP correlator and rh
tracking computer. 	 In the track mode, the computer predicts the time of
arrival of each pulse from an identified aircraft (based on the known PRP)
and if pulses arrive at the predicted times within a one microsecond
tolerance hand, the track is maintained.
	 If pulses are not detected at
the predicted times due to missed detection or the aircraft transmissions
„	 stopping, the track is still maintained for three frames (i. e. , three PRP
intervals).	 If a predicted pulse does not occur on the thirdframe, the
track is dropped and the ATC system is alerted.
When non-predicted pulses occur, the PRP correlation or search
mode is entered.	 When an unidentified pulse appears, the correlator
looks at the next 1- to 1.3-second time frame and associates all unidenti-
fied pulses occurring in that frame with the pulse in question to determine
the candidate PRP's. 	 Unidentified pulses in the subsequent time frame
are then examined to further reduce the number of possible PRP's.	 This -
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ARTCC's in its area.	 Collision warning messages for the LIT backlink are
also formulated in the computer subsystem under control of appropriate
ARTCC's.
Another function of this subsystem is to accumuis.te LIT calibration j;
beacon position measurements.
	
However, only one LDIPC passes this
j' information to the C&C station for determining satellite ephemeris data.{
_Ephemeris data is received back from the C&C station and used by the
computers for tracking aircraft.
Still another function is to compute and calibrate ionospheric error
for each of the LIT calibration beacons. 	 The computer subsystem does
this from a knowledge of satellite ephemeris and exact beacon locations. s
Displays. 	 The display subsystem contains approximately 18 con-
.	 m,' soles.	 These comprise CRT units, alpha-numeric keyboards, and other
monitoring and control devices to permit total_ control of the whole LDPC.
The displays interface with the computer subsystem for all data 'exchanges.
Backlink Transmitter.	 One backlink transmitter (with backup) pro-
vide s the capability for transmission of collision warnings to aircraft. 	 The
transmittek is controlled by the computer subsystem which operates the
transmitter in a pulse-coded mode.
	 The computer also selects an appro-
priate satellite (one of four) using the waveguide switch to route the RF to
.p one of the antenna feeds via a diplexer.
Communications Terminal (LDPC).
	
The communications terminal
centralizes all external interfaces for the LDPC.
	
It contains the high-
speed data sets (modems) which handle the surveillance data and collision
warning data between the LDPC and five ARTCC's.
	
It also contains tele-
type facilities and telephone terminals.	 Teletype is used for transmission
232
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of LIT beacon data from one of the LDPC's to the C&C station. Similarly,
teletype is used for ephemeris data from the C&C station.
5.2.3.2 Segment 3 - Command and Control Station (C& C )
The C&C station provides master control for the six operational
satellites. The station configuration is shown in the block diagram of
Figure 61. In general, it followsthe concept of a conventional satellite
telemetry and command ground station, and is conveniently divided
into the following;
• Two sets of transmitter/receiver equipment with
antennas, receivers, transmitters, telemetry
decommutato.rs and command encoders.
• A telemetry and command data processing computer(with backup) together with displays, line printers,
	 ^.
and tape punches.
• A set of NAVSTAR receiving and data processing
equipment (with backups).
• A tracking data computer with backup.
,{
• A communications terminal. 	 rF	 I
I
The C&C station operates at S-Band for compatibility with the STADAN
	 r'
network. It monitors the health of all six satellites on a roll-call 	 f
basis. These data ar,P processed and disseminated to the controlling
agency and ARTCC's in terms of satellite basic status. Via its command
uplink, the C&C station controls the onboard functions and station keep_ 
ing of the satellites. Another function of this station is to receive
NAVSTAR signals from the satellites and compute oscillator error from a
knowledge of ephemeris and station geography. The command link is used
	 }
r	 to insert data representing oscillator error and ephemeris into the, 	 t
E,	 NAVSTAR memory on board the satellites. Finally, this station acts as
the master for all four LDPC's and performs all satellite ephemeris
t;	 computation.
Transmitter/Receiver Equipments. Each of the two transmitter/
receiver equipments has its own 40 foot S-Band steerable parabolic antenna.
Both antennas are steered by a common acquisition and tracking programmer
which derives pointing data from the tracking data computer. The two'
i^	
s
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Figure 61,	 command and Control Station
antennas operate independently on a programmed basis to interrogate
each satellite in turn, so in effect sharing the workload. A tracking
loop: from the receiver provides antenna lock during acquisition of data.
During that time, NAVSTAR data commands may be relayed to each
satellite.
The subcarrier demodulator strips PCM data from the receivedE
signal and feeds it to the PCM decommutator. This is a fixed-program,
one-format unit of simple design commensurate with the satellite data
output. The PCM decommutator provides data words to the telemetry
and command data processing computer for .further processing. Chart
recorders are provided for quick look purposes.
The command transmitter is modulated by the command encoder.
Commands may be derived from three sources; manual for single
commands, paper tape for sequenced commands, and the navigation
A tt	 ill, 	 t	 1	 d f	 A TAC& a compu er w is	 genera es numerica comman s or N VS	 R
memory data transmission.
	 Commands are monitored by the telemetry
4
and command data processing computer.
Telemetry and Command Data Processing Computer. 	 This is a r	 '
a small scale computer primarily devoted to processing satellite house-
keeping data.	 In addition it verifies by telemetry that commands have
been properly executed. 	 It performs such operations as scale-
'-
factoring, limit checks, and trend analysis for critical parameters. k
It provides data to the operator displays and executes local data i
printouts.	 Periodically it assembles satellite status messages addressed
to the LDPC s.
NAVSTAR Receiving and Data Processing Equipment. 	 The C&C
".. station continuously receives NAVSTAR signals from all six satellites on
I
'.:
one of the fixed antennas. 	 The receiver separates, demodulates, and i
processes these signals in similar manner to the corresponding aircraft
equipment.	 The resulting data is then passed to the navigation data Ak
computer which determines satellite oscillator error. 	 It does this from
a knowledge of the ephemerides obtained from the tracking data computer
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and from the geographic position of the NAVSTAR antenna. Then, for
each satellite, numerical commands containing the oscillator error and
ephemeris data are assembled for transmission via the command
encoder at periodic update intervals (1-4 hours) .
Tracking Data Computer.	 The C&C station generates all satellite
ephemeris for the system using the tracking data computer. 	 One LDPC
supplies teletype data representing the measured positions of all of the
LIT calibration beacons.
	
These data are used by the tracking data
computer to generate satellite ephemeris knowing the exact geographic A
position of each beacon.	 The ephemerides are then transmitted to all
four LDPC's using a direct computer-to-computer teletype link. 	 In t
addition, the ephemeris -Is used internally to the C&C station by the
14AVSTAR navigation data computer.
Communications Terminal (C&C).
	 The C&C station interfaces
s.
w"th the outside world via the communications terminal.	 This containa
all teletype facilities and telephone terminals.{
5.2.3.3 Segment 4 - Ground Communications Network (GCN) F=.
The GCN provides the means of communication between; t
I.
• LDPC's and ARTCC's j
•	 LDPC's and the C&C station
•	 LDPC's/C&C and the outside world (including launch and
orbit injection for the C&C). it
This segment consists entirely of leased lints and leased equipment
(e. g., teletype machines). 	 The configuration for all GCN communicationsi
links is shown in Figure 62.
	 The following paragraphs discuss the i
;rationale in terms of the data transmission requirements.
LIT Surveillance and Collision Warning Data.
	 Appropriate
LDPC's transmit surveillance data to each ARTCC at a rate of
230.4 KBPS on two high-speed data lines for a total throughout of
460.8 KBPS. A maximum data load per ARTCC is estimated at 425 KBPS.
This permits reverse flow to be time shared to the extent of 35 KB in
each second-.
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The reverse flow is used principally for collision warnings
emanating from an ARTCC and intended to be transmitted via the LDPC
Y	
backlink to the addressee aircraft. However, it may also be used for
other less urgent data messages.
The transmission lines for this purpose are estimated on the
basis of a super-group circuit each. Such lines normally operate at
230 4 KBPS For twent ARTCC's a total of 40 lines i c' required Ay	 .. 
given line operates in a synchronous half-duplex mode using data sets
of the WE303B Type. 	 A voice order wire is included for coordination.
The cost of these lines is assigned to the_GCN; cost of the data sets
is assigned to the LDPC's and ARTCC's.
w	 t It is desirable for each LDPC to have a. contingency plan to z
.f provide backup service to the ARTCC's served by an adjacent LDPC.
To provide a dedicated backup network would considerably increase
the cost of these high-speed data lines.
	 Therefore, the recommended
contingency plan is toprearrange a tie-in to the common-carrier
on a pay-when-needed basis.
Ephemeris Data.	 The C&C station has the duty of computing A	 +_
satellite ephemeris for the ground system.
	
It receives LIT beacon
position data from any one LDPC and generates satellite ephemerides- }
which are then transmitted to all four LDPC Is.
These data travel via a direct computer-to-computer asynchronous
link using normal teletype circuits at 110 band with no operator inter-
vention. Therefore, between each LDPC and the C&C station one -.
dedicated half-duplex circuit is required for this purpose.
G
Routine Satellite Status.	 It is necessary for the C& C station to
report satellite status on a low priority routine basis to all LDPC Is. 
1 These data are accumulated in the telemetry and command data
P
processing computer in the C&C station, providing a punched tape >;
output.	 This is hand-entered into the teletype system for transmission
to the LDPC's.
	
This goes via a tied teletype circuit which is also
used for general data exchanges.
	 One such circuit is required between
eachLDPC and the C& C station.
A
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1Communication with STADAN. The STADAN ground station network
will be used for launch and injection. The NASA communications network,
NASCOM, provides worldwide access to any STADAN (or MSFN) station.
The C&C station is therefore provided with a tied teletype circuit to
NASCOM to handle all data and coordination during the launch and
early orbit phase. A tied voice line is also provided.
Special Circuits. The following tied lines are also provided:
• Two voice circuits between each ARTCC. and the
attendant LDPC .
Two voice circuits between each LDPC and the
C&C station.
• Two voice and two teletype circuits between each
LDPC/C&C facility and other agencies (e.g.,
FAA, U.S. Weather Bureau, etc.).
Other Services. For each LDPC/C&C facility, there should be the
normal teletype and telephone tie-in. to the public networks.
5.2.3.4 Segment 5 - LIT Calibration Beacon Network
The calibration beacon network consists of a number (perhaps 50) of
unmanned LIT beacons located at known (surveyed) sites such as
airports, VOR's, etc. The beacons put out identical signals to the
aircraft LIT transmissions and are assigned a permanent block of LIT
u	 .
I	 * ',
codes. , The purpose of this calibration network is twofold.
a) Provide a network of tracking sites for computing
satellite epherne rides .	 L
b) Permit real time calibration of the ionospheric
errors in the vicinity of each beacon.
5.2_.4 Satellite CNS Program
z
This section describes in very simple terms the steps that would
be involved in the implementation of a ,satellite CNS program, including
recommended near -term study, simulation, development and testing
efforts.
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5. 2.A. 1 System Implementation
In order to effect a change from the ground based system to a
satellite system within a reasonable period of time, many things must
occur. Even though all the required technology exists, the management
and political environment must be right; a thorough systems engineering
study is required; and an operational demonstration is needed.
A, possible schedule for implementation could be as given in
Figure 63. Studies of various system elements have been underway and
can be expected to continue. A systems engineering study of the air
traffic control system could be completed within a matter of one to
several years, depending, of course, upon the decision to,go ahead
and the magnitude of the expenditure. The demonstration of satellite
i	 concepts for aeronautical use over the oceans might take place in the
next fewears. Although this demonstrated system would not beY	 g	 Y
exactly the system discussed here, nonetheless, it would permit
I
aeronautical users to gain confidence in the use of satellite systems for
either communications, navigation, or surveillance or combinations
1	 thereof. This, plus the highly detailed systems engineering tasks per-
3
formed, would permit the orbiting of satellites for domestic use
somewhere in the time frame close to 1975. Equipping of the fleet 	 !
could begin shortly thereafter with an operational use possible late{	 a
'	 ' n th' d adi	 is ec e.
f
A
•r
r'
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5. 2.4.2 Recommended Near Term Efforts
Although the basic feasibility and attractiveness of the satellite CNS
system has been established in this study, a number of additional near
term efforts in support of the development of this important capability
are recommended. They include:
a) A more detailed, generalized separation standards
analysis.
b) A separation standards versus flow rate study.
c) An examination of forward link for search and
rescue data.
d) LIT backlink design and costing.
e) A conceptual design study of a ground multilateration
system using LIT signals.
f) A comprehensive LIT coding study.
g) ` A satellite CNS economic analysis.
h) A computer simulation of PRP sorting and tracking.
i) An aircraft maneuver simulation. t
J } An examination of non-hub AT C- services. 
k) An ,examination of possible space shuttle application. t,
1) A brief examination of barometric altitude telemetry.
m) .LIT hardware development and testing.
n) Single- satellite LIT test and demonstration.
If
E,
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5. 3 COST ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION
1
.a
C
y
jk
I^
The purpose of this cost analysis is to answer the fundamental
question "Is there a case for the Satellite CNS System based on the
economics of the situation for both the user and the ATC operatir,g
agency?" The study efforts were limited to examining critical cost
elements of the Satellite CNS system: 1) the Location Identification
Transmitter avionics, especially for general aviation use; 2) the CNS
Satellite costs; 3) CNS Satellite ground system costs; and 4) a limited
comparison of the cost of the overall satellite system compared with
its radar-based counterpart.
This cost estim^.,:e will be made in terms of 1971 dollars since
quantitative inflation trends are quite difficult to predict. Also
extremely difficult to evaluate is the question of trading satellite or
ground station costs versus avionics costs, since the former will be
borne directly by the Federal Government and indirectly by the aviation
user whereas the avionics costs are borne directly by the aircraft
owner. The comparisons here will therefore be made without assuming
a particular ultimate implementation of those funding considerations.
5.3.1 Avionics Costs
#1,
^d As indicated in the requirements analysis, the avionics costs must
be commensurate with the service provided if a particular concept is to
be considered viable. Since previous work had been performed on
communications and navigation, and since the surveillance function
r	 ^	 -
appeared critical from the outset of the study, the emphasis was placed
on the LIT system.
	
E .
i
5.3. 1. 1 Satellite Communications
With regard to communications, the SATCOM usage which has
	 x3
	
	 received appreciable attention to date is related to the over-ocean
application (see for example, Ref. 7, Ref. 85 and Ref. 86). For aircraft
which would use this type of link, the resulting price of the onboard
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equipment is on the order of $10, 000 or more. Although this would
preclude most general aviation users, it is not beyond the means of
r.
commercial transports and many military users. The LIT backlink
concept described in Section 4.3. 1 was analyzed too late in the study
to allow the time and effort required to conduct an adequate pricing
effort. This is considered to be an important step which should be
accomplished in the near future.
	
r
5.3. 1.2 Satellite Navigation
With regard to navigation, Table 45 summarizes the projected
cost and weight of the navigation hardware for three out of many possible
classes of users. Although in all cases these costs are low for the
service provided, it is clear that the very-low-cost general aviation user
will not be able to afford this service. The cost is that projected for
antennas, receivers, computer, and displays.
5.3.1.3 Surveillance
l=LIT Pricing Effort. A detailed analysis was made to determine
IF:
the probable cost of equipping aircraft with the Location Identification 	 t
T	 'tt	 (LIT	 t	 'th	 h	 1	 t'	 Thransmi er	 ) 0  em_wi emp as is on genera avia ion.
	 e
approach taken to determine this cost ; s illustrated in Figure 64. Starting
Table- 45. Summary of Navigation User Hardware
Characteristics
Configuration
Weight(pound,$) Cost(Dollars)
Low Cost 15 5,000
Moderate cost 15 9,600
High performance 40 25,000
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Figure 64.	 LIT Study Cost Analysis Method
from the system concept, quantitative system parameters (such as pulse
width, pulse intervals, transmitter power, and other requirements on the
aircraft transmitter antenna) were evolved.
	 It was decided that the
critical element was general aviation, so the transmitter decision was
consistent with avionics standards and criteria for that class of aviation.
^^ z
..	 ': Based on these requirements, transmitter design implementation
was investigated.
	 From the probable designs, a prime approach was
A4 selected.	 The six alternates listed in Table 46 were evaluated for
various pulse lengths, transmitter powers, and implementation methods: 4.
The prime approach is shown in Figure 65.
_
The two pulse lengths require codes 511 bits and 2044 bits long,
respectively.	 The coding effort concentrated on identifying suitable
{ 511-hit codes.	 The evaluation of the 204-µsec pulse length requires
further analysis of coding, pulse interference and crosstalk, effects of
	
-
' post-detection integration (necessary at. 900 and 1600 MHz because of the
coherency requirements of the ground station matched filter), and
3
transponder linearity requirements.
	
The advantage of the longer- ` code is
r
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Table 46. Transmitter Designs
r'
Design Frequency (MHz) Pulse Length (µs) Peak Power (watts)
A 1600 51 2500
B 1600 204 700
C 900 51 890 f
D 900 204 240	 f
E 450 51 350
F 450 204 90
1-0
z.w
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Figure 65. LIT Transmitter Model A Block Diagram
the reduced peak power required in the transmitter, which has a favorable
impact on transmitter cost.	 In addition to these designs, others which
4
require advances in the state of the art were examined but not priced.
Simultaneously, requirements which might be imposed by the FAA
and other agencies were verified.	 In addition to agency imposed require-
ments, requirements created by the market place and competition were
245
determined (i. e. , what does the prospective buyer expect in terms of
performance, reliability, and environmental performance).
Sufficient design effort was expended to provide a complete parts
listing, a packaging definition, and a manufacturing methods definition
for each approach similar to those given in Table 47 and in Figures 66
and 67 respectively. These selected designs were then estimated to
identify the costs of implementing the different designs. At this point,
comparison among the designs caused three to be eliminated from further
consideration (B, E, and F). Some had insignificant cost differences
while others required higher costs without offering compensating
features. These results also indicated where parts chosen for a design
were expensive, and that some of the implementation might be changed
to reduce the product cost. Iteration through the review of selected
aapproaches and design detailing was utilized to refine the estimates.
This iterative process occurred for a total of five cycles. r
In addition to TRW cost estimates for the LIT, outside suppliers
f
of general aviation avionics equipment were contacted and asked to
participate in determining the potential costs.
	 This process involved
K
two iterations; the first was in 1969 during which the first embryo design
t
' 	 was submitted to several companies, three of which responded.
Followup with one of these companies during 1970 verified their under-
standing of the TRW design, ensured TRW's understanding of existing i
marketing and pricing practices for commercial avionics, and verified , e
the applicability of the design concept to the general aviation market.
Because TRW Systems Group is not engaged in the manufacture
or
,
 marketing of general aviation avionics equipment, it was imperative
that we provide a calibration on our estimates.
	 The maintenance manual,
including drawings, photographs, and a complete parts list for a
representative transponder was purchased L orn a local aircraft dealer.
Using the same ground rules being used for estimating the LIT, this "^
unit was estimated by TRW.
	
Although this was not originally the case,
largely as a result of this process, TRW estimates - though originally.
high - are now comparable to those of the current manufacturer.
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Gate
1 each Transistor, ZN930, Motorola
4 each Resistor, RCR07G102JS,
	 Al-Brad
4 each Caps, P8292ZN . 01 MFD, Aer,)%„x
Pulsed Ame No. I
1 each Tube,	 Y1537, G. E.
1 each Stripline
9 each Caps, CK05BX101K, Aerovox
9 each Caps, P8292ZN, Aerovox
4 each Resistor, RCR07G102JS, Al-Brad
.	 l
N
y
Table 47. Candidate C LIT Parts List
10 MHz Oscillator
I each 10-lv1Hz crystal,	 2 ppm stability
5 each Caps, CD15F101J, Cornell-Dubilier
5 each Resistor, RCR07G102JS, Al-Brad
I each Transistor, 2N5245, T.I.
I each Choke, 7030, Vanguard
1 each Xtal Oven,	 iC169-2, Isotemp
I/C Linear
1 each I/C,	 LM171, National
2 each Choke, 6310, J. W. Miller
4 each Craps, CK12BX101K, Aerovox
3 each Resistor, RCR07G10ZJS, Al-Brad Pulsed Amp No. L
SRD-X10 V'.tltiplier f each Tube, Y578, IMAC.
1 each Stripline
1 each Diode,	 5082-0180, H. P. 9 each Caps, CK05BX101K, Aerovox
!.
Z each Choke, 6310, J. W.
	 Miller 9 each Caps, P8292ZN, Aerovox
each Caps, CK12BX101K, Aerovox 9 each Resistor, RCR07G102JS, Al - Brad
2 each Caps, 424, Elmenco
2 each Resistor, RCR07G102JS, Al-Brad Pulsed Amp No. 3
X-3 Multiplexer 1 each 'Tube, 7211, IMAC
i each Stripline
i each Diode, 5082-0180, H. P. 9 each Craps, CK05BX101K, Aerovox
4 each Choke, 7011,	 Vanguard 9 each Caps, P8292ZN, Aerovox
L each Caps, 424, Elmenco 9 each Resistor, -RCR07G10ZJS, Al-Brad
2 each Resistor, RCR07G102JS, Al-Brad
2 each Caps, CK05BX820K, Aerovox Power Supply s
BT-4 Modulator and Driver 3 each Transistor, 2N2983, 	 Gnitron ^r	 '
( ' 3 3 each Transistor, Special
^' L each Diode,	 5082-0180,	 H. P. 1 each Caps, TVAJ204, Spragiw
t'. 2 each Choke, 9221, Vanguard 5 each Cabs,	 1181'47 .1 11 2.S2,	 Spragoe
4 each Caps, CK12BX220K, Aerovox 2 each Caps, 	 6T,IMP50,	 Sj,i r,guet i
2 each Resistor, RCR07G10LJS, Al-Brad 4 each Caps, C	 Aerovox ^.
t 1 each Int. Circuit, MC3546, Motorola 4 each Diode,	 1 N45b,	 'T. I. a	 '
.. 8each Diode,	 1 N4005.	 T. I.
A-1 Amplifier 12 each Resistors, RCR07G10ZJS, Al-Brad
each Transformer, Special
I each Transistor, ZN2369, Motorola 3 each Inductor, Special
each Caps, CK05BX101K, Aerovox 3 each Choke, Special
Z each Choke, 7011, Vanguard
` each Var. Cap., 424, Elmenco Code Generator
4 each Resistor, RCR07G102JS, Al-Brad
1 each Code generator, ,Special
A=2 Amplifier
r Misc. Material ^ •
1 each Transistor, ZN3866, Motorola
4 each Choke, 9125, Vanguard 1-each P. C. board:
8 each Caps, CK05BX100K, Aerovox 1 each R 	 box	 -
8 each Resistor, RCR07GlOZJS, Al-Brad 1 each Tube socket ' }
A-3 Amplifier A-4 Amplifier
1 each Transistor, !N4429, TRW Semi I each Transistor,	 'N5595, Tlt W Semi
r 4 each Choke, 9125, Vanguard 4 each Choke,	 91.:5,	 V:uii;uard
8 each Caps, CK05BX100K, Aerovox 8 each Caps, CK05BX100h, Agruvux
8 each Resistor, RC07GIOZJS, Ai-Brad 8 each Resistor, RCR07C ; IOZ.IS	 Af - 11rad
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Pricing Results. Following several iterations of TRW estimates
and modifications in design, manufacturers of general aviation equipment
were again invited to participate in estimating the probable cost of LIT.
The Request for Quotation and its attachments are included in this report
as Appendix D. The results of this effort are shown in Table 48. The
results of the TRW costing estimate are shown in Table 49. The price
estimates for the LIT covered a wide range. However, this is not
surprising. A wide range of prices exist for air traffic transponders.
Differences in quality levels and accessories between the various 	 X
manufacturers and models as well as variations in manufacturing and
marketing 'practices among the companies quoting probably also explain
the variance in LIT estimates. Finally, although the vendor efforts were
commendable, neither the time nor the funds existed to iterate on their
engineering/pricing efforts in order to identify ;Nays to reduce the
cost of the LIT. In light of the TRW inrhouse pricing experience, that
point is considered significant.
Table 48. Comparison of Vendor Quotations
10, 000 Unit Radar Transponder
Vendor LIT Quotation Price
King $1,380 $1, 195; 2,150
Wilcox 1,800 2,250; 4,359
Narco 1, 800' 1, 295;	 1,975
Collins 22 000" 5,606
Bendix 2, 750 1, 212; 2, 511; 4,632 r
Genave — 795
TRW 1, _100 —
Average list price $1,800 $2,542** r
From "Flying Annual" January,	 1970 (Ref. 42)
Production quantities not given, but assumed to be between 2000 and 4000.
For 10, 000-unit production average transponder price is estimated
to be $1, 960.
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,Manufacturing Unit Cost FOB Price
Type
1,000	 2,500 10, 000 1,000 2, 500 10,000
A 810	 743 659 970 X890 790
C 623	 575 459 750 690 550
D 445	 419 362 535 500 435
List Price	 Discount Price
Type
1,000	 2,500	 10,000	 1,000	 2,500	 10,000
A 1,945	 1,780 1,580 1, 555 1,430 1,265 f
C 1,495 	 1,380 1,100 1, 195 1,100 8$0
D 11070	 1,000 870 850 • 800 695
i
1
t:
Projected Material Costs in Dollars for Production Quantities of 1, 000 to !0, 000
1
Manufacturing Unit Cost FOB Price
Type ,
1,000
	 2, 500 10,000 1,000 2,500 10,000
A 700	 633 549 840 760 659
C 513
	 465 349 616 560 419
D 356	 330 273 427 396 328
r
List Price Discountt Price
Type t
'1, 000	 `2, 500 10,000 1,000 2;, 500 '10, 000 i
A 1,680	 1,520 1,318 1,344 1,1216 1,054
C 1,232	 1,120 838 986 890 670
D 854
	 792 656 683 634 525
x
t
4
Y..
250.
..	 r a,	 a	 ..•	 •	 r
♦. 	 n
i
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Projection of Technology — The 1980 LIT. One of the most
significant factors to be considered was also the least amenable to precise
analysis. All estimates by TRW and other avionics manufacturers were
based on current designs and production techniques. However, the LIT
system will probably not be available for general use until late in the
1970's. Therefore, the price in 1980, when the majority of the aircraft
are being equipped, is of more interest. The LIT design was analyzed
r
to determine the price changes in relative 1971 dollars which might occur
by 1980. This analysis indicates that a decrease in relative material 	 f
costs is likely. Although components required for the design and
production of LIT are available today, new components may be evolved
	
s=,
which will significantly reduce the complexity of the existing design.
l
Review of the LIT parts list reveals that the high cost items are
primarily those which operate at high power levels (diodes, transistors,
and tubes) and the large scale integrated circuits as listed in Table 50.
	
3,
Technology development programs, both government and privately l
sponsored, are dedicated to increasing the capability of devices for
increased power and complexity. Figure 68 demonstrates the advances
made to date. If the trend is projected to 1980, the results will be;
• A wider selection of devices
s Reduction in total parts count
• Reduction in parts cost.
}
e
RANGE'0F
TRANSISTOR	 ? PROJECTIONUN4EtTAINTYTYPE	 YEAR POWER	 Q3 100.0
SAIL	 1960 30 - 100 mw
2N3959	 1966	 0.4	 3 ` 10.4
2N4431	 19167	 5	 -0
1	 a51.0
l 1970	 10
0.100
1960	 1965	 1970	 1975	 1980
Figure 68. History. and Projection for Transistor Power Level
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Table 50. LIT High Cost Parts
Part Description Quantit- 1970 Figure I Factor 1980EstimatedPer Uric Cost Maturity Cost
10 MHz crystal 1 $10.00 (est) 1970+ 0 $10.00
1CL69-2 Crystal oven, Isotemp. 1 4.65 1970+ 0 4. 65
LM 171 Linear integrated circuit, National 1 4.20 1965-70 2.0/1 2.10
k` 5082-0180 Step recovery diode 5 1.90 1965-70 2.0/1 .95
2N3866 RF power transistor, Motorola 1 2. 00 1965-70 2/1 1.00
2N4429 RF power transistor, TRW 1 9.55 1960-65 10/1 .95
N ,,
MC354G Linear 1C, Motorola 1 1.55 1965-1970 2/1
 .78
Y578 RF power tube, Imac 2 12.00 1970+ 0 12.00
7211 RF power tube, Imac 1 25.00 1970+ 0 25.00
t 2N2983 Power transistor, Vintron 3 3.50 1965-70 2/1 1.75
Special Power transistor 3 1.80(est) 1965- 70 2/1 . 90
Larch scale 1C 1 50.00 1960- 65 10/1 5.00
a " Per Unit (Configuration A)
Cost $156.35 $86.18
ACost 70. 17
^f
7s
[\	
l
1
I
.^ r
w	 f
3 ^f
l
G
Figure 69 shows the price change for integrated circuits during the
s	 past 10 years. Experience indicates that most components will follow
such a curve. During these years, the technology was maturing. When
mature, the cost change with time is small. If those parts which are of
mature (versus immature) technology can be identified, they can be
eliminated from any price projection gymnastics since they will lie on the
flat of the curve. However, immature parts should be projected down-
ward. Table 51 separates the LIT parts on this basis and with reference
f
to Figure 69 indicates the relative maturity. Factoring the costs on this
basis results in the comparison shown in Table 51 (1980, tubes).i
.Assuming that the tubes can be replaced by transistors and that
these will be sufficiently developed to permit a 2:1 cost reduction, the
price drops another 68 dollars, as shown in Table 51 (1980, Transistors
u	 2 500	 't )unl s
1
k
j
1
18 ^"	 t
16
x 14,— t
12 `	 I
.
i
r10
•^a
0
n
8
e
b.
r,
4
x. 2
0 Il
_ 1960	 1965	 1970
Figure 69.	 Price Trend of Digital Integrated Circuits
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Table 51. LIT Price Projections, in Dollars
TLr?e. A (1000 Unite) 1970 1980 ( Tubem) 1980 (Transistors)
Material 690 609 580
Labor 120 120 120
Manufacturing cost 810 72.9 700
FOB price (120% 3) 972 875 840
Retail price (x2) (4) 1,944 1,750 i, 680
`- Discount price (80 of price) ( 5) 1,555 1,400 1,344
Type A ( 2500 Units)
Material 633 552 523
Labor 110 110 110
Manufacturing coat ' '
FOB price 892 794 760 }
Retail price 1,784 1, 588 1, 520
Discount price 1,427 1, 270 1, 216 1:
Type A ( 10, 000 Units)
Material 560 479 450
Labor 99 99 99
k
Manufacturing cost 659 578 549
/. FOB price 791 694 659
Retail price 1, 582 1, 388 1, 31$
Discount price 1, 266 1, 110 1, 054
Type C (1000)
Material 504 423 394'
Labor 119 119 1 19
Manufacturing cost UY X42 513
FOB price 748 650 616
Retail price 1, 496 1, 300 1, 232
Discount price 1,197 1, 040 98E
Type C (2500)
Material 465 384 355
Labor 110 110 it0
^t
Manufacturing cost 5^ ^ 4b5
FOB price 690 5 .0 560
Retail price 1, 380 1, 190 1, t20
Discount price 1, 100 950 890
'type C (10, 000)
*'•' Material 361 280 251
Labor 98 98 98
` Manufacturing cost 459 378 349'
" FOR Brice	 - 551 454 419 s
Retail price 1, 102 908 838
Discount prise 8112 726 670 -,
_. Type D (1000) _
• Material 326 259 237
y	 ,
Labor 119 119 119
t
Manufacturing cost 445 378 3 T
FOB price 534 454 427
Iietail price 1,068 908 854 8;
Discount 854 726 683
,r
Type D (2500)
Material, 310 243 221
:•+ Labor 109 109 109
\1a.nufacturing cost 419 352 336
FOB price 503 422 396
Retail price 1,006 844 -	 792
Discount price 805 675 _	 634
T ype D ( 10, 000)
Material 264 197- 175
Labor 96 98	 i 98
Manufacturing cost 3
FOB price 434 354 328' -
Retail price 868' 708 656
Discount 694 566- ` 525
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r1Note that only rarely is an immature technological device present
in a consumer or commercial product. Thus, current ATC transponders
are composed of relatively mature devices. The LIT, when it reaches
the market, will of necessity also be a mature unit. Thus, its ultimate
price (and configuration) are highly dependent on a continuing increase
in technological capability.
5.3.1.4 Avionics R&D/Acquisition
Since no major R&D acquisition program plan was developed and
costed on this study, only a crude estimate of avionics R&D acquisition
costs can be made. Assuming that 90% of the predicted 1980 registered
-,	 fleet of 237, 500 aircraft will be equipped with Location Identification
Transmitters which cost $1100, the avionics acquisition cost is
$235 million. Adding some $5 million for LIT avionics R&D efforts,
which would no doubt accompany the satellite test program, one
arrives at a figure of $240 million for LIT avionics R&D/acquisition
costs. However, this estimate will not be used in the cost comparison
of Section 5.3.4 because the differences between the avionics costs
f
for the Satellite CNS System and the radar-based system are small when t`
compared to the uncertainty of the estimates themselves.
5.3.2	 Satellite Costs
i
Y
The CSN Satellites will represent a significant cost element for
the FAA and therefore should be compared on a cost basis with competing
techniques.	 The satellite costing effort performed on this study,
although brief, has been based on substantial recent and relevant satellite
design and test program experience.
	 Table 52 summarizes the costs
involved in placing a satellite such as the one described in Section 5. 2. 2
into orbit.	 The spacecraft cost of $7 million is representative of the
spacecraft of the complexity, weight, and power of the CNS Satellite.
Launch vehicle, launch costs, and range costs are representative of those
associated with the Delta 904 launch vehicle except that the $2.4 million
launch costs represents an increase by a factor of over 1.5.
	
This
accounts for the fact that the Satellite CNS System, since it will launch
a spacecraft approximately every ten months, will have a somewhat
lower launch rate than, say, , a scientific or communications satellite
program that might launch three' or four spacecraft at four-month intervals
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Table 52. Satellite System Cost Estimates
-y
f
a
Spacecraft	 $ 7. 0 million
Launch Vehicle (Ref. 87)
	 3.0
Launch Costs (Ref, 87)
	
2.4
Range Costs (Ref. 87)
	
06
Program Management (Government) 1.0
Contingency
	
1.0
Total:	 $15. 0 million per launch
Average: $18. 0 million per year
x >1.5 times normal due to low, irregular launch rate.
and then stop. The program management cost of $1 million is based on
recent military and civilian program experience wherein program 	
t
management costs by the government agency typically run in the 	
f
neighborhood of 8% of total program costs. Finally the contingency 	 i
figure of $1 million is included since it was felt that prudence and
conservatism should be exercised in this cost evaluation. A launch rate
of 1.2 launches per year accounts for the $18 million per year figure.
Table 53 contains rough CNS Satellite development and acquisition'	 S„ .
cost estimates. It was not within the scope of this study to develop a.
detailed research and development program plan. The $110 million
estimate is a rough one based on recent experience at TRW on similar
programs. The acquisition figure of $45 million represents the launching 	 4
of three additional satellites at the conclusion of the development and
demonstration program. Since five satellites would be launched during
that program, it is assumed that at least three of them should remain
operational at the time of the desired initial operational capability. The
additional three satellites (to bring the constellation up to the recom-
mended six satellite-s) at a $15 million in-orbit cost account for the
$45 million figure, bringing the total development and acquisition cost
to $1.55 million.
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Table 53.	 Rough CNS Satellite Development
and Acquisition Cost Estimates
Development (5 Satellite Program)
Contractor	 $ 70 M
Government	 $ 10M i
Test/Demonstration (5 launches) 	 $ 30 lvI r
$110 M
Acquisition
r	
,
—3 Additional Satellites
	 — $ 45 M
Development and Acquisition	 $155 M
5.3.3= Ground System Costs
The total estimated costs of the ground system given in Table 54 r
covers;
a)	 The initial cost of four LIT Data Processing Centers;(LDPC), one Command and Control (C&C) Station, -
the Ground Communications Network (GCN), the LIT {
Calibration Beacon Network, operation/maintenance
of those facilities for the first year, and associated x,
software development. 	 Cost of the 20 Air Route
Traffic Control Centers ARTCC) is not included, z
b)	 The annual operating cost for the above facilities,
not including the first year, rr.
The following sections outline the rationale on which these cost estimates i
have been based.
5.3.3.1	 Program Acquisition
Costs for this activity, which cover all program management,
system design and engineering, installation/ integration and test, and all
support activities are shown in Table 55.
	
This analysis is concerned
with the LDPC's and the C &C station.	 The GCN is entirely leased. from
public communications carriers.
F.
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Table 54. Satellite CNS Ground System Cost Summary
• System Element Total (K$)
A.	 Program Acquisition 9,365
B.	 Segment 1. LIT Data Processing Centers (4 sites) 59,000
Facilities 850
Equipment 9,752	 Initial cost per site
Software 2,500	 through 1 year O&M.
O&M 1,648
Total 14,750
C.	 Segment 3. Command & Control Station 6,280
Facilities 327
Equipment 4,695	 Initial cost through
Software 800	 1 year O&M.
O&M 458
Total 6,280
D.	 Segment 4.	 Ground Communications Network (first year) 15, 925
E.	 Segment 5.	 LIT Calibration Beacon Network (50 sites) 750'
Y
Total Initial Cost through 1 year O&M 91,320
r
F.	 Annual Operating Cost After First Year 25, 055
Table 55	 Satellite CNS Ground System
i
Program Acquisition Costs P	 x
System Element	 KS: i	 .
Segment 1 - LIT Data Processing Centers;
Management	 4,000
Contract Administration	 66
Design and Development	 1,200 (.
System Integration_ and Test 	 '1, 056 j
QA and Reliability	 480 r
Product Support
	 720 s	 ,
7,522 z
Segment 3 - Command and Control Station:
i Management	 1,000
Contract Administration	 9 }
Design and Development	 300
System Integration and Teat	 144 1
QA and Reliability	 120
Product Support	 180 z
1,753
Segment 5 - LIT Calibration Beacon Network
}
Management	 56
Contract Administration, Design/Development, etc.
	 34
90
TOTAL	 9.365
_
a
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Costs are based on prior experience and a knowledge of the system
in the current study. The system design is simplified by the fact that
the four LDPC's are identical and require only one design. The
integration and test covers all factory test at the system level and also
field installation and test.	 t
5.3. 3. 2 LIT Data Processing Centers (Segment 1)
Costs applicable in this category cover:
•	 Facility.	 This includes all site development, surveys,
grading, roads, parking lot, fences and security gates,
utility services, fuel tankage, etc.
	 However, it does
not include the cost of acquiring the site.
	
It also
includes all buildings ready for equipment installation,
foundations and pedestals for six antennas, and an
emergency power plant and switch gear to provide
backup for commercial power. 	 The basis used was	 i=
analyses conducted for similar installations.
•	 Equipment.	 This covers procurement of all equipment
and test equipment for the LDPC's and includes
installation work of special nature such as antennas
and feeds.	 The equipment is shown in the block
diagram of the LIT Data Processing Center. 	 It will
be noted there are six complete receiving subsystems, 	 ?.
one transmitter, and a number of computers.	 No
costs are given for normal telephone equipment. 	 I	 '
Spares for one year have been included to the extent	 {
of 5P
	 gercent of original equipment.
 
	 The cost includes
a- considerable complement of redundancy for relia-
,. bility reasons.	 These costs are based on prior 	 !	 ,
analyses of this type of equipment and ;a knowledge of	 {
` system requirements. 	 Costs of normal equipment 	 #.
installation are separated under (A) Program
Acquisition (Integration and Test). 	 L
f
•	 Software.	 The software is almost entirely identical
for all four LDPC ° s and therefore requires only one
	 y	 s
major development.	 However, the total cost was
y divided between the four LDPCs.	 More or fewer
LDPC's will require an adjustment to share the
software costs accordingly,
i
t
r
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r• Operation and Maintenance. Cos'LL; are given for one
year of operation and maintenance, including costs for
all required station personnel (supervision,; operators,
technicians, etc.). A low overhead is applicable, as
is normal for field personnel operating under local
supervision. The basis for the number of personnel
was a review of the total equipment involved and the
need for 24 hour/7 day coverage. Costs are added
for general building maintenance (cleaning and minor
repairs) and for supplies and power. Contracted
services include those which are specialized requiring
special skills.	 These costs are summarized in
Table 56.
i
5.3.3.3	 Commend and Control Station (Segment 3)
Costs for'the C&C station as given in Table 57 cover;
•	 Facility.	 This includes all site development, surveys, }
grading, roads, parking lot, fences and security gates, E
utilities, fuel tankage, 	 etc.	 It does not include the
.i cost of acquiring the site.
	
Buildings are provided ^
ready for equipment installation.
	
The cost includes
foundations and pedestals for two steerable antennas
and two fixed antennas.
	 Emergency power plant and {#
switchgear is included for commercial power backup.
The basis used was analyses conducted for similar
installations.
•	 Equipment.	 For the C& C station the equipment
a costs cover all procurement and special ty-es ofinstallations (e. g., antennas and feeds).
	 The block
diagram shows the general station configuration.
In many respects, this station is simpler than an
LDPC, principally in terms of the quantity of equip-
ment and this reflects in a lower cost. 	 Spares are ¢
included,: but because of the dual equipment configu-
ration, the spares requirement is somewhat reduced.
The estimate is based on prior experience with this
type of ground station which is fairly conventional.
Costs for installation of normal equipment are included iZi
elsewhere under (A) Program AcquisitYon-(Integration
and Test
{ •	 Software.	 The major item of software is for the track-
ing data processing function.	 Software for other func-
tions comprises that for telemetry/ command processing,
steerable antenna programming, and the NAVSTAR
function.
2,60
Table 56.
	
Satellite CNS Ground System
'.i
Segment 1.
	
LIT Data Processing Centers - Initial Cost per Site
s Unit (K$) Quantity Total (K$)
i
4 FACILITIES:
Site Development (30 acres) 1 250
Antenna Foundations and Pedestals 25 6 150
Buildings ( 10, 000 sq.. ft. @ $35) 1 350
Emergency Power Plant 1 100 }
850 t'
EQUIPMENT; i^
Antennas (25 ft. C -Band w/controls) 375 6 2, 250 ?`
r Master Clock 15 2 30 i";f
Pulse Processors (7 x 16) 3 112 336
# Mini-Computers (7 x 16) 10 112 1,120
Main Computers , 2,000 2 4, 000;
Displays /Console s 50 18 900 a.
Communications Terminal 1 266
Bank-link Transmitters and W G Switches 80 2 160,
Diplexe r s 5 6 30 }t
Acquisition and Tracking Programmers_ 10 6 60 t,	 <(mini-computers)
C-Band Receivers 15 6 90
Spares 500
9, 752
° SOFTWARE: (1/4 of Total for all LDPC' s) 2,500
O&M FOR 1 YEAR (Burdened); y:
Supervisors ( @25K$ - 1 per shift + Station Mgr. & Asst) 7 175-
Operators (@18K$ - 7 per shift) 35 630.`
i f q ip. Techs (@20K$ - 7 per shift)E u 35 700
Facility Engr. (@18K$ - 1 per shift) 5 90 1''
General Building Maintenance (@IOK$) 2 20
•' Su	 lies/PowerPP 3 I
Contracted Services 30
1,648
- TOTAL 14,750
i
1
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Table 57.
	
Satellite CNS Ground System i
Segment 3.	 Command and Control Station - Initial Cost
Unit K$ Quantity Total K$
FACILITIES
Site Development (10 acres) 1 62
Antenna Foundations & Pedestals 25 3 75
-	 Buildings (4, 000 sq. ft. @ $35) 1 140 }
Emergency Power Plant 1 50
327
EQUIPMENT:
Antennas (40 ft. S-Band w/controls and 650 2 1, 300
diplexers) t
Antennas (NAVSTAR type) 5 2 10
PCM Decoms (fixed program w/bit sync.) 75 2 150 i
•	 Command Encoders (w/tape unit) 150 2 300 i
Acquisition and Tracking Programmers 10 2 20 1,(mini-computers)
Receivers (TLM w/subcarrier demod) 15 2 30
Parametric Amplifiers 50 2 100
Chart Recorders (10 channel) 5 5 25
Mini-Computers (TLM and CMD data 10 2 20 '
processing) {}
Computer Peripherals (serves all comp) 1 set 100
5 KW Transmitters (S-Band w/exciters) 130 2 260 i
Master Clock 15 2 30 l=
Communications Terminal 1 100 ?',
NAVSTAR Receivers/Processors 15 2 30 7
Navigation Data Computers (Mini-comp) 10 2 20
-	 Tracking Data Processing Computers 1,000 2 2,000 3f
Displays 50 2 100
Spares 100
4,695
SOFTWARE: 800
O&M FOR 1 YEAR (Burdened); r
Station Manager (@25K) 1 25
Operator-Techs (@20K - 4 per shift) 20 400
General Building Maintenance (@IOK) 2 20
Supplies /Power 3 0
Contractor Services 10
458 rte..
TOTAL: 6, 280,'
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.
• Operation and Maintenance. One year operation and
maintenance costs include all. station personnel using
similar rates as for the LDPC's. The station manager
is not provided for all shifts since it is felt that the
senior operator/technician can fill this role. The tasks
of operator and technician are combined, in keeping
with practice for this type of ground station. The
number of personnel are estimated on the basis of
24 hour/7 day operation. Other costs include general
building maintenance (cleaning and minor repairs).
Contracted services are for those requiring special
skills. Costs for supplies and power are, given.
5.3.3.4 Ground Communications Network (Segment 4)
The ground communications network (GCN) consists entirely
of leased lines and leased equipment for the first year of operation.
The configuration of this network is shown in Figure 70 which illustrates
the layout and number of communication links.
The costs in this segment as given in Table 58 are all for leasings,
and no capitalization of equipment is involved. The largest single cost is
for the supergroup lines for high-speed data between the LDPC's and
their dependent ARTCC I s.  Other costs are for tied teletype and voice
r
lines.between facilities and also for lease of teletype machinery:.
	 No	 L	 ,
costs were included for access to public carriers for teletype and
	 }
telephone communication of general nature.
	 The costs are based on	 1i,
data from a national communications carrier.
5.3.3.5	 LIT Calibration Beacon Network (Segment 5)
Costs for each site as given in Table 59 are based on the following:
•	 Facility.	 No site costs are incurred on the assumption
that each beacon will be installed on FAA property. 	 .:
The cost given is only for a simple equipment mount
%rith a power access.
a	 Equipment.	 This cost includes a. transmitter and
-' antenna in a weather type container.	 Installation
and checkout have been lumped under this heading
because of the large number of sites.
	
Spares are
estimated on the basis of 10% assuming replacement
at the total unit level with spare units being held at
a central location for several sites.
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Table 58. Satellite CNS Ground System
Segment 5. LIT Calibration Beacon Network - Initial Cost per Site
j Item Incurring Cost Total K$
' FACILITY:
•.^ Equipment Mount (including power run). 3 r
i
} EQUIPMENT:
Transmitter and Antenna Assembly 10 i;
t Spares (10% of total cost) 1 ^,
Installation and Checkout of Equipment 0.3
14.3 I
MAINTENANCE FOR ONE YEAR (Burdened); ^.	 Y.•
Al Equipment Tech (60 hours per year) 0.7 1
TOTAL 15.0
Table 59.
	
Satellite CNS Ground Station
j Segment 4.
	
Ground Communications Network
Network Elea, ent	 Yearly Rate
	
Quantity Total K$/Year
Supergroup Lines (with line terminals and
	 367	 40 14,680
•
voice order wire)
Tied TTY Circuits (FDPLX	 110 Bd)	 10	 58 580
-	 ` T%ed Voice Circuits	 10	 58 580
TTY Equipment- (Keyboard/Printers) at LDPC ' s	 1.2	 66 72
TTY Equipment (Keyboard /Printers) at C&C
	 1.2
	
11 13
TOTAL 15,1925
NOTES:
	
1)	 This segment consists of leased services and equipment. Maintenance included.
2)	 Costs of equipment (not leased) for communications terminals in Segments 1
and 3 are included under those segments. t
' 3)	 No cost :e given for telephones or PBX equipment. 3
4)	 No cost is given for services or equipment at ARTCC's or other interfacing-
facilities (e.g., NASCOM or FAA).
5)	 Line costs above are at average of 1, 000 miles.d
r
1
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The transmitter includes self -test capability to
preclude the need for the site to carry special
test equipment.
• Maintenance. This cost for one year is estimated
at 60 hours per year per site. Existing on-site
personnel would provide this service.
5.3.3. 6 System Annual Operating Cost
The annual operating costs identified in Table 60 are incurred
after the first year's operation. They consist of the cost of operation
and maintenance at the same rates as in the first year. Equipment
replacements at all facilities are included. Similarly for the GCN, the	 3
annual leasing cost of lines and equipment has been estimated using the
same rates as before under (D) above.
Table 60. Satellite CNS Ground System-Annual O perating	 E
Cost After First Year
Item Incurring Cost	 K$
LIT Data Processing Centers (4 Sites): 	 r
4
Equipment replacements @ 500 K$ 	2, 000
O&M @ 1600 K$	 6,400
8,400
Command and Control Station;
Equipment Replacements	 100
O&M	 500
600
Ground Communications Network (Leasings):	 16, 000	 ;
.x^
LIT Calibration Beacon Network (50 sites)
3	 Equipment Replacements (2 per year)	 20
Maintenance (60 Hrs. per site) 	 35
55
Total Annual Operating Cost;.	 25, 055-	 ^.
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5.3.4 Limited Cost Comparisons
The essential ATC function which the Satellite CNS system is
recommended to replaceis that of radar surveillance. Therefore, this
section will first compare the investment and recurring cost for conven-
tional and satellite surveillance concepts .
;j As indicated in Section 3.2.4.  1, the current FAA investment in the
ground element of the present radar surveillance system including both
the enroute and terminal area primary and secondary radars, and associated ^,-
remoting equipment represents about $330 million in 1970 and, with the
continued installation of new radar, is projected to grow to over $750 million 1'
by 1980.	 This does not include advance features such as discrete address-
ing as proposed by the ATCAC and approved by the FAA.	 No cost figures
are available for the advanced radar concept recommended by the ATCAC - t:f
z} but it is difficult to conceive of this program involving a smaller cost than I
its much simpler predecessor.
	 The average annual expenditure in the
1980 time frame, as pointed out in Section 3.2.4, would for radar sur-'
veillance be approximately $42 million operations and maintenance, and
i $73 million for facilities and equipment for a total of about $115 million. =	 ,
The equivalent investment figure that is compared with the $750 million i.
would be for the research and development and acquisition of the satellite
s ys tem . {
Table 61 shows the R&D acquisition, annual, and costs for the 3.
" satellite and radar-based ATC system approaches. 	 Although this
a comparison is a simple and straightforward one and is certainly based
on the limited data available, both sides of the table are considered to be
` accurate and representative. 	 Thus one can, by inspection, infer that
the satellite system which provides the three major services indicated
is clearly cost competitive with a radar system providing the two
services indicated.	 Clearly a much more detailed engineering design-
and cost comparison is in order, but it is quite clear that the original
s question "Is there a case for the SatelliteCNS System based on the
economics of the situation for the ATC operating agency?" can be
answered in the affirmative. r	 .
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Parameter Satellite System Radar System(,,-) '
Major Services Surveillance	 Collision Primary Plus Secondary RadarWarning, Navigation ,
R&D/acquisition Satellites
	 $155 M Advanced radar not estimated, but for
Ground stations
	 91 M present radar:
$246 M Radar/ground stations	 $ 750 M
Annual cost Satellites	 $ 18 M Advanced radar not estimated, but
dl-
Ground stations
	 25 M typical figure for present radar;
43 M Operations & maintenance	 $	 42 M ..
°° Faci.lities & equipment 	 73 M
$ 115 M
Total cost through first R&D/ac uisitionq	 $246 IVI Advanced radar not estimated,. but
ten years of operation 10 year operational
	 430 M unknown for present radar;
$676 M 10 year operational	 $1150 M
- R&D/acquisition	 750 M
Total	 $1900 M
Future air traffic control system cost radar elements were not estimated on this study; but we believe
that advanced radar system costs will probably be much greater than those associated with the present
radar concepts that are shown here.
r
y
a
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As indicated in Table 48, "Comparison of Vendor Quotations"
in Section 5. 3. 1. 3, the average list price of the Location Identification
Transmitter is comparable to that of the radar transponder. Further-
more, TRW believes that the LIT price could be decreased below the
radar transponder price with further design efforts (e. g., by going to
the Model D LIT). As pointed out in Section 5. 3. 1. 4 the differences
between the projected costs of the LIT and a radar transponder are
probably smaller than the uncertainty of the estimates themselves.
Furthermore the avionics costs are borne by different people and
organizations and in a different way. Thus, avionics costs are not
included directly as a comparison item, but rather on an acceptability
basis.
5.3 .5 Cost Conclusions
The following conclusions can be drawn from the foregoing analyses:
a) Although the design goal of $400 for the Location
Identification Transmitter price has not yet been
reached, TRW feels that the transmitter can be
;.: made and marketed for something less than the t!.
t ATC transponder, especially when that transponder
is modified to include altitude encoding. I	 s
b)	 The Location Identification Transmitter selling {
price (and for that matter, the AT C radar trans - 's
ponder as well will	 robabl	 eventually be lowP	 )	 p y
	
Y
enough to where mandatory use of this equipment
for the vast majority of aircraft flying in anything ; g
but remote areas will be acceptable to the aviation
public. .
' c)	 The costs associated with maintaining a six-satellite
CNS constellation providing surveillance, short
access time collision warning, a navigation service
to those who can afford it 	 and limited SATCOM also
to those who can afford it can be achieved for sub-
G; stantially below the figure required for secondary
r dar alone..
t
' Certain other pricing efforts would be germane. 	 Certainly the LIT }
backlink costs are important.	 However, that concept was developed
too late in this study to allow the adequate design and costing efforts
f to take place. M
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15 .4 SYSTEM EFFECTIVENESS EVALUATION
The evaluation of the Satellite CNS system described in this report
will take place in four parts . 	 Sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2 will weigh the
recommended system against the Desired System Characteristics and
Specific Design Criteria of Section 3.4. 	 Section 5 .3 .3 contains three
special evaluations concerning:
The degree to which the system can perform an air-derived
^t
collision avoidance 'function; the possible use of the Satellite
CNS system in search and rescue operations; and the degree
1
= to which the system is compatible with approach and landing
_ aid operation.
As a final check, Section .5.3.4 will consider the system capability in
light of the evaluation factors listed in the background to the statement
+ of work. s	 ,
I
i
a
_
5.4.1
	
Desired System Characteristics
•	 User base and costs .	 The surveillance portion of this
concept, i .e ., the LIT, will be economically available
to all aircraft.
	 The accompanying LIT backlink should '
be available to the vast majority of LIT-equipped air- St	 ,
craft.	 The communications and navigations function f
will be within the economic reach of most commercial, !
military, and business aircraft.
:;a • Adaptability.	 The recommended Satellite CNS systemis a high performance system which should provide a
- very high degree of operational flexibility to its ultimate
users .	 Specifically, the accuracy and update rates for
• both surveillance and navigation are quite attractive.
Finally, if it appears that a greater LIT backlink capability
should be required, then the system has the design flexi-
bility to provide this feature by substituting LIT backlink
transponders for data transponder's onboard the satellites ._
R •	 Growth potential. 	 The phase-in rate of the Satellite_CNS
" system will strictly be a function of the needs of the air
traffic control system and the funding constraints for both
the operating agency and the aviation community.
	
There y ,is no functional reason why this Satellite CNS system
would have to displace present systems overnight.- In
terms of growth potential, the communications 'functions
are 'taking place at a higher part of the spectrum where
frequency is more readily made available as , expansion
is required; the navigation concept is unsaturable; and the
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surveillance concept ',makes very efficient use of the spectrum
with additional channels easily added as required. 	 In summaryi,
this system concept could serve domestic ATC well into the a,
twenty-first century.
• Availability.	 Because of the orbits and carrier frequencies
selected, full time coverage over the United States is avail-
able. A total system breakdown will be an extremely rare
event.
	 The probability of such an occurrence taking place
over a 30-year life span is slightly over three percent.
Although it would be possible to use a single ground station
with the Satellite CNS system, for reliability reasons it is s
recommended that several ground stations be used.
•	 RF spectrum utilization.	 The Satellite CNS concept will be x
efficient in terms of RF spectrum utilization.	 The LIT
system uses 25 MHz channels on the uplink.
	 Two channels j
or 50 MHz of spectrum will be required by the turn of the cen-
tury. Another 50 MHz is required for the downlink. 	 The
LIT backlink uses 250 KHz channels.
	 The number of
channels required was not established in this gtudy but at
least two channels will be needed to handle 10
	
aircraft.
Thus, 500 KHz minimum on both the uplink and downlink
will be required.
	 The NAVSTAR system, which is unsatur-
able serving unlimited numbers of users, occupies only
2 MHz. ARSR's and ASR's consume a total of 250 MHz
whereas TACAN/DME uses the entire 960 to 1215 MHz
band (with the exception of ATCRBS at 1030 and 1090 MHz) .
5.4.2
	 Specific Design Criteria
Surveillance
•	 The system meets the postulated enroute position deter-
i
ruination uncertainty allowance and is marginal, i.e.,
meets the upper limit of the approach and departure
allowance. i
•	 The system meets the one to three second update inter-
val requirement. k
"i	 t	 Although detailed design studies have not, of course, been
a part of this study, it appears that satellite ground station _f
and avionics reliability can be expected to meet these
requirements .
• For aircraft in the southern and central United States, good
antenna coverage is achieved for all headings of flight with
bank angles up to 30 degrees_. 	 For aircraft north of a
line between Baltimore; Cleveland; Chicago; Kearney,
Nebraska; and San Francisco there will be some loss
when aircraftattitude exceeds 30 degrees of bank, or
pitch away from the satellite constellation. 	 An aircraft
whose antenna provides upper hemispherical-
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coverage could encounter antenna shading if the aircraft
enters a steep bank or dive to the north or a steep climb
to the south. This shading could (but would not necessarily)
cause the aircraft to drop out of the ATC system, partially
or totally, e .raring the 'period of time that shading existed
For example, if no more than two of the six satellites are
shaded, no dropout occurs . Since the ground station cali-
brates the aircraft clock, a third satellite could be shaded
without loss of position determination capability by perform-
ing ranging calculations for that aircraft. Even further, if
the ground station takes advantage of knowledge of aircraft
altitude (and assuming the altitude does not vary rapidly in
some unknown way) then yet a fourth satellite could be shaded
and still some position determination capability is available.
Finally, if pulses are transmitted through even a single of
the six satellites the aircraft can clearly be identified and
kept in the system although its position can only be predicted
and not determined The wide range of software and hard-
ware solutions clearly deserve further study.
Navigation	 _ t.
•	 The system meets the enroute and the upper range of approach/
departure requirements, and with the use of ground compatible
beacons described in the previous ,section, would meet the landing
accuracy requirements as well.
o	 The drop-out problem is not considered significant here.
Furthermore, the use of multiple antennas is possible for z,
those desiring it
Communication ,..
•	 Short access time collision warning is a required communication
function and is provided by this system.
1
• -Provision for normal traffic vectoring service and emergency
communications for aircraft in remote areas, although 
desirable, would increase satellite costs significantly and
are not recommended
•	 Again, drop-outs will take place under certain conditions of
aircraft attitude and location. 	 The LIT backlink application
is the one in which the consequences of dropout can be con-
°'	 sidered the most serious, since the length of maneuvers can
easily exceed the desired collision warning time. 	 Direct
air -ground link obviously serve as a simultaneous backup
and, for most aircraft, would be provided simultaneously
with the LIT backlink warning. The problem remains for
maneuvering aircraft in remote northern latitudes.
fi
x
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5.4.3	 Special Evaluations
I;
?'
.	 y
5.4.3.1	 Air-Derived Collision Avoidance Systems
k
Since the Grand Canyon disaster in 1956, there has been a very
'f large expenditure of energy and funds on airborne collision avoidance and
proximity warning systems .	 No discussion of air traffic control in the
.a
;. United States would be complete without some treatment of this point.
The Air Transport Association has taken the lead in the develop-
A, ment of an airborne collision avoidance system.	 The ATA Air Traffic r
Control System Planning Group states the airline position '(Ref. 41) as t:.r
, follows:
''For many years, the airline industry has expended consider-
, F
able effort to foster and encourage the development of a suitable Y
airborne Collision Avoidance System (CAS) and Proximity
° Warning Indicator (PWI) .
	
Its interest and activities in this field
of endeavor should not be misconstrued.	 The airlines are con-
vined that a positive fail-safe Air Traffic Control System,
under the ,jurisdiction of a central agency exercising control
from established ground units, is the only real solution to the
mid-air collision problem.
	
In addition, the industry believes
that a central ATC system is essential for the efficient organ-
ization of the traffic flow.
	 However, when fully developed and F
proven, a CAS or PWI may have logical applications as an
adjunct to the ATC system. 	 Useful by-products of the CAS or
PWI may be the ability to perform more efficient in-trail
operations and for pilot awareness of nearby aircraft which
could be on approach to, or departure from, parallel runways.
In no sense are such devices intended or envisioned as a sub- 1:r? stitute for a well-conceived and efficient)	 operated systemy p	 y .
of Air Traffic Control.''
t
In February of 1967, Mr. J. L. Brennan at the Institute of Naviga-
.	 t
tion National Air Meeting on collision avoidance (Ref. 87) stated the FAA
position as follows-
"We do not intend airborne collision prevention devices to be
a'substitute for a ground-based air traffic, control system,
nor do we believe that the ground system should be designed f
to rely on the airborne devices for separation of aircraft.
We believe the best solution to the problem of potential mid-
air collisions is a positive, fail'-safe air traffic control sys-
tem under the jurisdiction of a central agency exercising
control from ground facilities.	 The desirable role of an
airborne collision prevention .device is that of an independent
backup to the primary system. Additionally, it should pro-
vide protection in ,areas and to aircraft not serviced by the
ATC system-"
-	 Kt
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Accordingly, the FAA has concentrated almost exclusively on their
air traffic control responsibilities, but they are looking beyond their
immediate needs and methods of implementation. In this connection
(Ref. 88):
"Currently, most of FAA's resources are going into automa-
tion programs to enhance the air traffic control capability
both in the enroute and terminal areas . In the main, this
consists of providing an automatic data acquisition, process-
ing and display system for the assistance of the air traffic
controllers,. thus improving the effectiveness of the modus
operandi. Though it involves large expenditures, utilizes
techniques and components that represent the best of the
leading edge of the state of the art and promises definite
benefits, it must be recognized as merely patching the pre-
sent system. Functionally, nothing really new is being
added. The controller's fundamental responsibility and
mode of operation will not change materially. The end
result will be that he will still exercise complete control
of each individual aircraft under his jurisdiction, and be
solely responsible (under instrument flight rules conditions)
for separating each aircraft from all others ."
"Through software updating, hardware reconfigurations, and
procedural changes, an automated air traffic control system
using existing control philosophy should meet our forecast
needs .	 However, adding sophisticated equipment and more 	 1 	 ,
people on the ground will eventually reach a point of diminish-
ing returns and sooner or later — hopefully much later — we
will have to alter our system premises .	 The dependence on
the controller to control each individual aircraft throughout
its entire journey from takeoff to landing is the principal 	 ('	 ,
limiting factor in the current system. 	 When the state of the
art will permit, greater system reliance will then be placed
on the pilot's capability of maintaining his own separation 	 r
from other aircraft under all visibility conditions."	 4
A "combined collision avoidance, ATC data acquisition, communications,
-; and navigation system" was also mentioned here as a possible future
approach.
Collision avoidance and stationkeeping then appear to be possible
growth items for the CNS system. 	 The system therefore should be
evaluated in this regard, at least on a qualitative basis.	 The following
observations were made on the Navga.tion/Traffic Control Satellite
Mission Study (Ref. '7) and appear valid today:
•	 If assured miss distances on the order of _0.5 n mi are
desired, then relative position determination uncertainties 	 tl'
on the order of 0 ;. 05 n mi-are called fo.r .
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• Relative altitude dete-rmination uncertainties of greater
than approximately 700 feet {3(-) appear unacceptable if
vertical maneuvers are to be used. Larger uncertainties
can lead to altitude airspace violations .
• An update of position must occur somewhat more frequently
than is required for surveillance or navigation.
r
A range of satellite services could be considered for an air. derived
CAS, ranging from the use of a single satellite to provide a measure of
timing information up to the point where, with four satellites continually
in view, complete three dimensional relative position and velocity as well
as accurate time can be made available to cooperatively equipped users.
In the case of the single satellite systems, it is possible' .that a
workable concept could be configured. The system must be more than
workable, however, in that it would also have to be cost competitive with
other airborne CAS and/or the ground systems complex that it could con-
ceptually replace. The utility of the system is, of course, further contin-
gent upon the utility of the ATA CAS system now under development since
it would be merely a possible alternate to that proposed time synchronization 	
3
J
technique. These considerations have led to the conclusion that further
study of the single satellite techniques is not warranted at this time.,
If on the other hand four satellites were available to provide navigation 	 j f
signals as discussed in Section 2, then the basic information available 	 i
from the :satellites could be used to provide complete information for col-
lision avoidance. Such a navigation system, in principle, operates in
reverse of the process described in Section II for surveillance. Specifically,
the satellites transmit timing signals to the user. Thus, each of four
satellites transmits in time sequence (satellite transmissions are time
division multiplexed) a ranging signal plus data on its orbital parameters
and its onboard oscillator time error. These latter data are required since
the satellite transmissions are time-synchronized by individual high pre-
cision oscillators onboard each satellite. A ground tracking network
determines the relative time error between the oscillators on each satellite
by measuring the time of arrival of the navigation signals from the satellites
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This oscillator correction data plus satellite ephemeris data is transmitted
to the satellites where it is stored in the satellite memory and read out for
transmission to users as part of the navigation signal transmissions . 	 The
data in the satellite memory is updated periodically by the master station
in the tracking network.
	 The ranging signal is of a CW nature.
	 The user
receiver is phase locked onto the carrier and, therefore, provides a
replica of the received carrier.
	 From this the user can make one-way
doppler measurements and with such measurements (and, of course, a
knowledge of the satellite ephemerides) computation of user velocity can
j be made in a fashion analogous to the computation of user position.-
In a collision ''avoidance system based on the use of the same basic
" range and range rate measurements, the satellite ephemerides need not
be used directly.
	 Thus, consider the case where Aircraft A makes one-
way range difference and doppler difference measurements at a given
instant of time and stores this digital information.
	 Aircraft B broadcasts
( similar data (as measured by it at the same instant of time) to Aircraft A.
` The information can be differenced and expanded with a truncated 'Taylor
series as indicated below:
>;< 3
Latitude Difference _
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Vcertain distance away, reducing the number of computations which each
' aircraft needs to make.
z The coefficients of the Taylor series depend upon the satellite
,i locations and hence are time varying but vary slowly and need not be pre-
cisely known.
	 Thus,, these data could be periodically broadcast by the
satellites to the users .
.
The system operation is indicated in Figures 71 and 72.
	 Each air-,
craft receives range, range rate, and data from the same network of
M satellites .	 The ranging signals are processed to determine broadcast
time of the digitized range and range rate data.for a given aircraft.
	
A
basic time frame of three seconds, for example, would allow a one milli-
second time slot for each of 3000 aircraft.
	
A given aircraft transmits
4 his information at the beginning of his time frame.
	 Signals received prior {.
to, say 10 - 14 µsec after each such time frame (depending on the velocity i
a of the aircraft involved) are processed and other signals are ignored.
If a version of the navigation satellite system discussed is imple-
t
r"
:'. mented	 such a collision avoidance system would be practical for man^	 Y	 P	 Y
l
i
i
aircraft, although clearly some would be precluded by the user hardware
costs involved.	 If implemented, it would, nonetheless, offer the advantage
s
of providing complete data in that threat aircraft positions (on the order of
50 ft) and velocities	 on the order of 1 ft/sec
	
are uniquely and accurately
k	
k	 .^ E	 ^supplied in three-dimensional space.
	 The nature of the data processing t
^
is such that it can be done at a fairly low cost and the bandwidth require-
ments for the data interchange are small, on the order of several mega-
cycles being adequate.
	
It could serve as an excellent backup to_ the system
described in Section II for the higher priced aircraft. ^.
r.
An ideal collision avoidance system would have the property that all
,
aircraft posi !l ons and velocities are known in three dimensions with suffi-
y'x cient accuracy and high enough media rate that the ability to predict each
aircraft's future location ('up to, say, one minute ahead) is dominated only f
by normal aircraft maneuvers.	 Further, an ideal system will have the
capability of computing optimum collision avoidance maneuvers and com-
municating these to ,44 , craft for displayin a timely fashion with high relia-
bility and ,a minimum of false alarms.	 Finally, all this must be done at
an acceptable cost.
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5.4-3.2  Integrated Satellite /Ground-Based Sys tems
The satellite based position determination system will clearly be
adequate for the enroute phases of aircraft flight; but on those very few
airports where independently-operated IFR runways must exist very close
together (e.g., 2500 ft) it may be necessary to augment the pure satellite
system.  One possible solution to the ter.: zinal area and landing approach
problem is to combine ground stations with the satellite system in such a
way that:
• An ideal geometry may be developed, which provides the
accuracy required
• A system may be developed, with a data rate considerably
higher than that of the satellite system.
The second is possible since the terminal area system is dealing with a
much smaller user population than is the satellite system.
Two approaches will now be described.
Integrated LIT/Ground-Based System
The LIT technique, which is particularly well suited for surveillance
in the enroute phase of the flight, could provide the basis of a landing aid
system with the addition of ground receivers and a data link. The system,
when only satellites are used, suffers from inadequate accuracy and data
rate . A possible landing aid, which would integrate with the LIT satellite
system, would be as follows:
The aircraft would continue to broadcast its primary pulse every
second to the satellites during the approach phase. In addition, it would
broadcast a second pulse at a much lower power at 10 times the data rate
of the satellite pulse. The lower power pulse would be detected by
-receivers located strategically near the runway. The time and angles of
arrival of the low-power pulses would be processed to refine the position
estimate of the approaching aircraft. High-accuracy, high data rate
position information could then be transmitted via a data link back to the
aircraft for the pilot, probably in the form of an ILS/distance display.
27 9
all that is required is that the user increase its pulse repetition rate for
the low power pulse. Since the power requirements are several orders of
magnitude lower for this pulse, the average power requirement will not be
significantly affected. Timing for the low-power pulse is easily generated.
The addition of data link and display in the aircraft requires additional
expense, but it should be no greater than presently available ILS and
localizer receiver-display system. The cost of such devices requires
investigation.
Integrated/NAVSTAR/Ground-Based System
The primary reason for introducing a ground-based aid to NAVSTAR
is to increase: accuracy and data rate so that the system may be used as a
landing aid. The NAVSTAR accuracy is adequate (50 to 200 feet) for all
other terminal area operations . There are several possible configurations,
"
which take advantage of the satellite system and include the following:
• A system with a master transmitter at the airport, which
radiates a continuous ranging code (similar to BINOR) to
each aircraft as it approaches on the landing path. The
aircraft in turn transponds the code plus data and satellite
position back to several receivers in the vicinity of the
threshold. The position and flight path of the aircraft are
then computed on the ground and transmitted both to a
controller for surveillance and to the aircraft for guidance.
• Another approach is to place several radiating beacons in
the vicinity of the airport threshold, which broadcast
frequency division multiplexed ranging signals. The signals 	 .
are received by the aircraft and used to refine its position
estimate by combining with the satellite signals. The
NAVSTAR computer and some of the RF equipment would be
common to the satellite and ground beacons. Possibly a
cost-effective solution may result for large commercial
aircraft.
5.4.3.3 Search and Rescue Operations
A review of SAR operations has indicated that the majority of SAR
incidents involve aircraft in some stage of distress Historically, search
efforts for downed aircraft have been extensively delayed and many downed
aircraft never found because of a void which exists in current SAR opera-
tions: namely the capability to determine quickly that an aircraft is missing
	
J	 1\
and to establish with reasonable accuracy the location of an aircraft ae^,:,'.Aent.
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It will be seen that the nature of the CNS system is such that the
SAR alert and incident location capability can be fulfilled merely by:
(1; noting the unaccountable loss of LIT signals from a given aircraft or
loss of aircraft altitude, and (2) reporting the fact with fix data to proper
SAR agencies for further investigations . This CNS approach to the SAR
function would not require any additional user equipment. However,
means would be provided at the traffic control station to detect anomalies
and to communicate with SAR agencies such as regional subunits of the
Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service (ARRS), the Civil Air Patrol
( CAP), or the U. S. Coast Guard SAR branch .
In essence, then, a proper satellite CNS system could virtually
eliminate the search, phase of all aircraft SAR operations and would thus
result in a significant reduction of SAR expenditures since a large per-
centage of these are for the support of search efforts . The CNS system
could also obviously be used to guide search parties directly to the downed
aircraft. ATC can also automatically locate and communicate with other
aircraft flying in the area of a crash, thereby providing a capability for
much more rapid SAR assistance.
5.4.4 Factors from the Background of the Statement of Work
The background to the Statement of Work is quoted below with
comments regarding the Satellite CNS implementation accompanying each
factor .
a) "
.
The aviation community to which the proposed satellite
system is intended to be available (commercial, military,
and general aviation) ."
As mentioned in the earlier discussion on user
base and costs, a very large portion of the
aviation community will be brought into the ATC
system, solving the most critical problem,
namely that of mid-air collisions
b) "The geographic regions and phases of flight over which the
proposed system is assumed operational (enroute, terminal,
approach, and taxi phases; contiguous U.S., oceanic, and
transition areas) ."
Excellent coverage over all areas of flight is pro-
vided by the Satellite CNS system, including oceanic
transition. areas . The broad ocean areas in the
Atlantic and Pacific are, of course, not covered
Taxi phases are not considered valid applications
of this concept
.	
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c) "The time at which such a system becomes available for
use."
The system cannot be made fully operational by
1975, but the developmen* if the Satellite CNS
system. is not pacing. Preoperational satellites
can be made available by that time period.
d) "The longevity and growth potential of the proposed system,
and the degree to which it is made flexible for such future
services as collision avoidance."
This system exhibits remarkable longevity and
growth potential, and can clearly grow to handle
the projected load for more than 30 years .
e) "The degree to which the system is consistent and compatible
with existing and planned hardware and operational procedures,
e. g . , the National Aviation System Plan. "
No revolution in planned hardware or operational
procedures is required as a result of implement-
ing this concept, and it can be made consistent
with National Aviation System Plans as envisioned
today. The need for increased capacity at reduced
cost will bring increased automation to the NAS,
and the Satellite CNS is completely compatible with
that philosophy.
f)	 "Such other factors as budget restrictions, project priorities,
approval of frequency allocations, and specification of safety
s tandards . I I
If a system such as this. one can he shown to be
cost effective, budget restrictions and priorities
will not be roadblocks to its implementation.
Frequency allocations,. however, require time,
and substitute frequencies are sometimes needed.
For the Satellite CNS system, the use of 1600 MHz
rather than 900 MHz would be an acceptable sub-
stitute. Safety standards will clearly be improved
with the implementation of this concept.
-
z6. NEW TECHNOLOGY
After a diligent review of the work performed under this contract, it
was determined that no new innovation, discovery, improvement, or inven-
tion was made.
. GLOSSARY(Adapted from Reference 1)
Air Carrier
An aircraft certified by the FAA for the purpose of carrying persons
or goods for hire on an established airway. The term also applies
to an organization operating an air carrier.
Air Derived
Information generated on an aircraft.
Airport Surveillance Radar (ASR)
FAA short-range radar for terminal air traffic control,
Air Traffic
Aircraft; operating in the air or on an airport surface, exclusive of
loading ramps and parking areas.
Air Traffic Control (ATC)i
A service that promotes the safe, orderly, and expeditious flow of
air traffic, including airport, approach, and en route air traffic
c ontro1.
Air Traffic Controller
A duly authorized individual involved in providing ATC
Air Traffic Col col System
All components, human and otherwise, of a system providing ATC
service.
Approach Sequence
The order in which aircraft are positioned while awaiting approach
clearance or while on approach.
AUTOREP
Automatic reporting of aircraft position or raw position data to an
ATC station either directly or via satellite.
Beacon Antenna
An antenna system that radiates radio or radar energy in such. a way
as to act as a beacon for navigation purposes. See "radio beacon"
and "radar beacon,"
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Occurrence where, as a result of equipment malfunction or pilot
error, an aircraft has exceeded safe tolerance from cleared route.
Boresight
Center of the main beam of a radar or radio signal.
Category I Weather
Weather allowing a forward visibility of 1/2 mile. Under Category I,
the pilot should be able to see the runway from an altitude not in
excess of 200 feet.
Category II Weather
Weather allowing a forward visibility of 1/4 mile. The pilot should
be able to see the runway from an altitude not in excess of 100 feet.
Category III Weather
Runway effectively not visible from any altitude and all landing
decisions are left to the pilot. Category III breaks down into three
subcategories.
IIIA. Forward visibility is 700 feet, a distance sufficient
for a landing abort.
IIIB. Forward visibility is 1,50 feet, a distance sufficient
to permit taxiing.
IIIC. Zero forward visibility.
Cell
Computer memory section wherein radar return or transponder
response information is stored and periodically updated---usually
after each sweep or interrogation. Sometimes called bin.
Circle of Equal Probability (CEP)
A circle which would contain 50 percent of points randomly distrib-
uted about its center (CEP = 1. 18 ).
Collision Avoidance System (CAS)
A device installed on aircroft fw the purpose of:
(a) Detecting the presence of other aircraft.
(b) Automatically assessing the potential collision hazard
represented by ,other aircraft.
x
Y
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(c) Providing advance warning to the pilot if a threat is
predicted by the equipment.
(d) Providing appropriate command signals indicating
the proper evasive maneuver.
The CAS device performs its function continuously and automatically
in all types of weather conditions without requiring visual assess-
ment of collision risk by the pilot. Collision avoidance replaces
see-and-be-seen protection by more efficient means of protection
and provides more functions than does PWI: it senses the presence
of an intruder, evaluates the degree of danger, and commands a
specific climb or dive avoidance maneuver. In common with a
stationkeeper, it will work in both IFR and VFR weather, while
PWI effectiveness is often limited to VFR.
Constellation
An array of satellites which is designed to function as a group in the
performance of a particular mission, e. g. air traffic control,
commercial, or military communications.
Controlled Aircraft
Aircraft that are participating and receiving traffic separation ser-
vice from the ATC system.
Controlled Airspace
Same as Mixed Airspace. It starts, in general, at some altitude
above the ground and extends up to Positive Control Airspace. In
terminal area control zones, it extends to the ground.
Controlled Visual Rules (CVR)
Visual flights in which avoidance of collision with all other aircraft
	
r
is assured by the ATC system. To enable the ATC system to carry
this out, CVR. flight is restricted to Positive Control Airspace.
Course J:
The intended direction of flight in the horizontal plane.
A
Cross Track Velocity
Velocity of an aircraft normal to the intended flight path.
Data Link
Any communication channel or circuit used to transmit data from a
sensor to a computer, a readout device, or a storage device.
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rDead Reckonin
A method of determining the position of an aircraft on the basis
of indicated airspeed, compass heading, and the best possible esti-
mate of wind velocity. Dead reckoning is a last resort when all
other navigation methods fail.
Distributed ATC Management
System concept based on having some separation and/or traffic
management functions controlled by airborne pilots and some con-
trolled by a ground agency.
Distance Measuring Equipment (DME)
Airborne and ground equipment used to measure, in nautical miles,
the distance of an aircraft from a radio navigation aid.
Tl'A TT T_ __
A geographical position determined by reference to a radio naviga-
tion aid that provides distance and azimuth information; this position
is defined by a specified distance in nautical miles and a radial in
degrees magnetic from that aid. i
Down Link
Aircraft-to-ground data link.
	 <
En Route ATC Service
Air traffic control provided for aircraft by centers' on an IFR flight
plan while these aircraft are operating between departure and desti-
nation terminal areas.
Fail Soft	 .
Systems capability in which operations continue, but with some
degradation in capacity, when a failure has occurred.
Fix
A geographical position determined by visual reference to the sur-
face, by reference to one or more radio navigation aids, by celestial
plotting, or by another navigational device.
Flight Plan
Specified information relating to the intended flight of an aircraft;it is filed orally or in writing with an ATC facility.
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Flight Path
The combination of altitude profile with horizontal track.
General Aviation (GA)
All aviation that are neither military nor commercial aviation.
Ground. Controlled Approach (GCA)
An approach for lan ding which, is largely directed by a ground
controller.
Ground Derived
Information generated on the ground.
Holding
A predetermined maneuver which keeps an aircraft within a speci-
fied airspace (holding pattern) while awaiting further clearance.
Holding Fix
A specified fix used as a reference point in establishing and main-
taining the position of an aircraft while holding.
Instrument Flight
Flight in which the attitude, altitude and course of the aircraft is at
all times maintained by the pilot's reference to cockpit instruments.
Instrument Flight Rules (IFR)
Flight in which the ATC system assures collision avoidance b -tween
aircraft operating in accordance with IFR and CVR in Positive Con-
trolled Airspace. When operating outside. Positive Control Airspace,
pilot responsibility with respect to collision avoidance differs
according to flight weather conditions. Instrument Flight Rules may
be defined differently in the 1980's than they are today.
Instrument Landing §ystem (ILS)
4
F	 ^
A runway approach system for unfavorable weather conditions con-
sisting of equipment both on the aircraft and on the ground. There
are three basic systems on the ground.: The localize:, which broad-
casts a 100-VIHz signal that locates the fa.r end of the runway, the	 F
glide slope,. which broadcasts a 150-MHz. signal from sides of the
approach. end of the runway and defines -the limits within which the
aircraft must be for proper approach; and the extended center
marker, which broadcasts at 75 MHz from several antennae defining
the center of the extended runway.
^a
Interrogation
Transmission of a signal intended to trigger a transponder. Also
called challenge and challenging system.
Intruder
An aircraft which poses a collision threat to another aircraft by fly-
ing in airspace where it should not have entered or where it has not
been cleared.
Itinerant
Aircraft whose destination airport is different from the point of
departure; as opposed to a local flight which remains at or near one
airport.
Localizer
An ILS radio facility that provides signals for use in lateral guidance
of aircraft with respect to a runway centerline.
Loran
Originally standing for Long Range Navigation, it is a form of hyper-
bolic navigation in which a system of signals is transmitted as pulses.
There are master stations each operating with one slave station.
The difference in time of receipt of radio pulses from one such pair
of stations is measured and the resultant time difference locates the
aircraft on a hyperbolic line. When this is crossed with a second
hyperbolic line from another pair of stations, a fix is obtained.
Letter designations such as A, C, and D denote different broadcast
operating frequencies.
Mark X SIF
The military version of the ATCRBS.
Missed Approach
A runway approach that must be aborted as a result of problems such
as insufficient aircraft spacing, excessive cxosstrack on approach
velocity, or insufficient forward visibility.
Mixed Airspace
Airspace containing aircraft flying under either VFR or IFR. See
"Controlled Air Space. '!
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fMultipath
Electromagnetic energy arrival at a receiver via indirect path(s)
from the source as a result of reflections from either the ground
or from other external reflectors such as another aircraft, own 
aircraft structure, or buildings.
Mutual Interference
Any undesired reception of transmitted energy among elements of
a group of cooperative stations. 	 It occurs when groups of stations
in close proximity use common or adjoining frequency bands in a
system that has no specific provisions for multiplexing.
NAS Stage A and Stage B En Route System
An automated system of en route ATC providing alphanumeric
information on en route radar displays. 	 The present system
°c	 (Stage A) will serve as the basis for the evolutionary growth of the
future automated system (Stage B) . 	 Additional systems to be
incorporated include flow control, conflict detection and resolution,
and electronic tabular displays.
I
National Airspace System and Automatic Radar Control
Terminal System (NAS Stage A and ARTS III)
r
The automation being implemented in the present Third Generation
ASystem.	 The Committee feels that by expanding the semi-automation
of NAS Stage A and ARTS III to include spacing, sequencing, and
conflict prediction and resolution, and by adding data link, two or
three times the present traffic could probably be handled by the
same controller work force.
Navaid
Radio navigation aid.
NAVSTAR '	 L
A high-performance satellite navigation technique based on passive
-:	 reception of ranging signals from satellites and compu,k,ation of
-	 position by multilate ration. 
Near-Midair Collision (NMAC) r;
A NMAC is considered to have taken place when two aircraft t
unintentionally pass -within_250 feet of each other.
NOTAM
-	 Notice to airmen.
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Positive Controlled Airspace (PCA)
Exists above 18, 000 feet in the northeastern portion of the United
States and above 24, 000 feet in the remainder of the country.
	 In
PCA all aircraft are under IFR control and the ATC system provides
separation service between all aircraft.
Primary Radar
That form of radar that depends upon reception of reflected electro- z
magnetic energy for the detection of objects in the area under
surveillance.
Proximity (Pilot) 'Warning Indicator (PWI) l^
I.
A pilot warning instrument which, in its most simple form, is ;^i }
airborne device whose function is to warn a pilot of the proximit•
of other aircraft.
	
It may also provide other information to assistY	 P
the pilot in evaluating the situation, such as relative bearing and !
bearing rate of other aircraft, relative altitude, range, or com-
binations of these parameters.	 After visually locating the intrud-
ing aircraft, the pilot must 'evaluate the threat and select and
execute an appropriate evasive action. 	 A proximity warning system
utilizing existing transponders has been suggested.
Radar
When appearing alone in this report, "radar" is a general term
,f applying to both primary radar and transponder beacons.
Radar Beacon
r
A radar receiver-transmitter that transmits a strong coded signal
f whenever its receiver is triggered by an airborne interrogating 1.
' radar.	 The coded reply can be used to determine positionin terms
of range and bearing from the beacon.
	
Also called beacon, radar,.
and radar transponder.,
Radar Identification
tt
I` In ATC, radar identification is the process of ascertaining that a
r radar target is the radar return from a particular aircraft already
in the ATC system or a'-bout to enter it.
Radio Beacon
A nondirectional radio transmitting station in a fixed geographic -
location, emitting a characteristic signal from which bearing
information can be obtained by a radio direction on an aircraft.
a
7
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Range Ordering
A system used in digitizing whereby transponder signals are ordered
'	 in cells on the basis of range.
is
Reflections
h .1try'
Spurious signals caused by interrogation or reply pulses which are
reflected to the receivers from extraneous objects such as buildings,
hills or other aircraft.
Resectorization
A permanent reorganization of the geographic sectors controlled by
various ATC centers.
1Rectrofit
As applied to planes or air terminals, retrofit is the installation of 	 {
new or improved systems designed to improve performance; e. g.,
retrofit of fan jet engines to a non-fan-jet aircraft, or the construc-
tion of a new runway pattern at an air terminal.
Rho-Theta System
A navigation system based on azimuth (theta) and range ,(rho)- relative
to a properly equipped radar center.
^.	 tRoll Call
A sequential interrogation of approaching aircraft.
1	 Route f
{
}
A defined path, consisting of one or more courses, which an aircraft
travels in a horizontal plane over the surface of the earth.
	 Fj,
Runway Threshold
	
Y
The physical beginning of a runway.
Satellite Airport
In many instances a community is served by several airports, one of
which serves a significant volume of air carrier and/or high per-
formance military aircraft, while the others serve general aviation
aircraft. These latter airports are "satellite airports.
Scan
One complete circular, up-and-down, or side-to-side sweep of the
radar, light, or other beam or device used in making a scan.
	
^xr.
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See and Avoid
That type of flight operation in which pilots are required by Civil
Air Regulations to avoid collision with other aircraft by observing
specific right of way and other rules of flight.' This is usually
referred to as VFR flight.
Selective Calling Technique (Selcal )
A multiple access technique which allows a ground station to call a
particular aircraft, ringing a bell in the cockpit (much like a tele-
phone call) thus relieving the pilot to the need to monitor a voice
channel.
Sensitivity Time Control (STC)
See "Gain Time Contro.
Separation Assurance
Provision for both strategic conflict- avoidance and tactical"collision
avoidance from central ground jurisdictions by command control to
aircraft.
Separation Minima or Separation Standards
t 1
The minimum longitudinal, lateral, or vertical distances by which
aircraft are spaced through the application of ATC procedures.
Short Takeoff and Landing (STOL)
Aircraft that have performance characteristics requiring shorter.
runways than standard fixed-wing aircraft.
{Side Lobe
Undesired radiation from a directional radar antenna, as opposed to
the antenna's main beam. The side lobes -tend to give false position 	 y
information as a result of extraneous reflections.
Side Lobe Suppression (SLS) 1
A signal generated to suppress the effects of side lobes. This is
occasionally also achieved by 'mechanical changes In antenna designs.
Side Effects
Terrain (or building) influences (reflections) on an ILS glide slope
or localizes ;signals.
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Stationkeeping
Stationkeeping helps maintain order in a structured aircraft popula-
tion, as in military formation or pattern flying, and can do the same
in high density landing and take-off conditions at busy civilian air-
ports, or en route in transatlantic air lanes. The stationkeeping
display is either a. plan presentation of the relative positions of all
aircraft or a flight; director display indicating how to fly in order to
maintain proper logitudinal, lateral, and vertical position relative
to selected reference aircraft. The use of airborns stationkeepers
enables aircraft to maintain safe relative positions and flight direc-
tion without visual contact; VFle, spacings can be maintained more r
precisely with proper stationkeeping equipment than without.	 Station-
keeping can also be provided from a control ground statio Y.
t Sweep
I
One complete cycle of a radar system designed to cover or survey a
certain area or volume of space, where the scan is accomplished by
electronic means, rather than by mechanical motion of an antenna
system, as in scanning radar.	 See "Scan.
Tactical Air Navigation ( TACAN)
F^
A system of navigation in which a single UHF transmitter sends out
signals that actuate airborne equipment and provides range and bear-
ing indications with respect to the transmitter location when inter-
rogated by another transmitter on the aircraft.
	
Each TACAN station
broadcasts a location-identifying Morse code signal at regular s
inte rval s.
Terminal Area
Airspace and surface area, including airports, within a predesignated
boundary and up to a predesigna:ted altitude above the surface.
j
Tower Bright Display
A radar-scope system designed to be viewed" in a normally lighted
room.
Track
The flight path of an aircraft over the surface of the earth.
_	 k
`. Traffic Pattern
The traffic flow that is prescribed for aircraft landing at, taxiing
K
on, and taking off from an airport.
_.	 e
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Transition Airspace
Theboundary within which exists terminal airspace. Transit on
airspace lies 40 to 60 miles from the terminal and is the area where
an en route controlled aircraft will normally be held, when necessary,
prior to commencing approach. It is the area of transition from en
route ATC to approach ATC.
Transponder
An airborne automated radar receiver-transmitter from which a
coded response is triggered by interrogation from a ground trans -
mitter.	 Response normally contains information on aircraft identi-
r
fication, altitude and airspeed, and occasionally, heading, altitude
rate, and position.
	 See "Interrogation. j
Trilate ration I
A system by which an aircraft is located by DME relative to two ;.
separate known locations between which the distance is known. The j
resultant triangle precisely locates the aircraft.
Tube ^.
Predesignated three-dimensional path through airspace, normally
assigned under high density and instrument flight conditions to air-
craft having maximum equipment.:
Uncontrolled Aircraft
Those aircraft not participating in or receiving traffic separation
service from the ATC system.
	 This term does not include those
i flights receiving control service from control towers having only
e	 ,; visual surveillance in performing control service.
Uncontrolled Airspace
'_,
Underlies Controlled or Mixed Airspace.
	 Aircraft operating solely
` in Uncontrolled Airspace are not presently required to carry navi-
gation, communications, or transponder equipment; however, com-
munications equipment meeting a limited channel capability
requirement is needed for operations conducted at a tower 'equipped
field.
Vertical Takeoff and Landing (VTOL)
Aircraft which have performance characteristics permitting vertical
or almost vertical takeoffs, landings, and climb and descent angles.
{	 e
r
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Very High Frequency Radio Omnirange (VOR)
t `
A ground based radio station that propagates an unlimited number of
"radials. " On board an aircraft, the signals are converted to visual
direction indications expressed as magnetic compass courses to and
from the transmitter station.
VFR Hi^,h way
Predesignated route/altitude path through airspace used under visual
flight conditions, by aircraft having minimum equipment.
Visual Flight Rules (VFR)
Visual flight in which avoidance of collision with other aircraft is
dependent upon every pilot seeing other aircraft and avoiding them.
To enable pilots to perform the collision avoidance function, the
rules take certain weather conditions into account, and specify basic
if rules of the air. "
VORTAC
An air navigation system combining VHF omnirange (VOR) and
TACAN equipment.
I
'j ADF — Automatic Direction Finder
:. AIA—Annual Instrument Approaches
AIAA--American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
AIO—Annual Itinerant Operations
ALPA—Air Lane Pilots Association
' AMF —Apogee Motor Firing
xAOC—Automatic Overload Control
i AOPA—Aircraft Owner's and Pilots Association
APC ..—Area Positive Control
ARINC--Aeronautical Radio, Inc.
M
ARO—Airport Reservation Offices:
ARSR--Air Route Surveillance Radar ?'
ARTCC--Air Route Traffic Control Center
ARTS—Automatic Radar Control Traffic System
# ASDE--Airport Surface Detection Equipment
ASR-°--Airport Surveillance Radar
j., ATA--Air Transport Association of AmericaATC-°--Air Traffic Control
ATCAC—Aix Traffic Control Advisory Committee
ATCRBS—Air Traffic Control Radar Beacon System
ATCS---Air Traffic Control System
ATCT --Air Traffic Control Tower 1;
ATIS--Automatic Terminal Information Service j
ATR—Air Transport Rating
CAP—Civil Air Patrol
CAS—Collision Avoidance System
CEP--Circle of Equal Probability z'
H CNS—Communications, Navigation, and Surveillance
CONUS --- Continental United States (or Contiguous U. S. } F	 ;
CTOL----Conventional Take-Off and Landing
CVR—Controlled Visual Rules
DAS—Data Acquisition System
DME--Distance Measuring  Equipment
DOD—Department of Defense} DOT—Department of Transportation
DVOR -- Doppler VOR
ECAC —
 Electromagnetic Compatibility Analysis Center r;
ERP-- Effective Radiated Power
FAA-Federal Aviation Agency
F&E —Facilities and Equipment
yY.z FL—Field Level r
FSS-Flight Service Station'
GCA—Ground Controlled Approach; occasionally
Ground Collision Avoidance
GCN--Ground Communication Network
G/S — Ground Station
ICAO---International Civil Aviation Organization
IFR -- Instrument Flight > Rules t
ILS -- Instrument Landing System
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ABBREVIATIONS (Continued)
IPC—Intermittant Positive Control
KHz—Kilohertz
LDPC—LIT Data Processing Centers
LIT—Location Identification Transmitter
LOS— Line of Sight
LRCO—Limited Remote Controlled Outlet
MAC—Midair Collision
MEA—Minimum En Route Altitude
MHz — Megahertz
MSL—Mean Sea Level t:
NAS—National Airspace System
NAS Stage A and ARTS III—National Airspace System and Automatic
Radar Control Terminal System
NASA—National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NAVCOM —Navigation Plus Communications Avionics
NBAA—National Business Aircraft Association
NDB—Nondirectional Beacon r*
NEF—Noise Exposure Forecast
NMAC —Near Midair Collision =
INPA—National Pilots Association
O&M--Operations and Maintenance
PAR — Precision Approach. Radar
PCA—Positive- Controlled Airspace
prf — pulse repetition frequency
PRP-- Pulse Repetition Period
	 -
PWI— Proximity (pilot) Warning Indicator)
RAPCON—Radar Approach Control
RCO—Remote Controlled Outlet
RSLS--Receiving Path Side-Lobe Suppression
:. RTCA SC-I17—Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics, Special
Committee 117.
	 Special Committee 117 refers to a group working
on improvement of ILS.
RTR--Remote Transmitter Receiver
3
RVR---Runway Visibility Range
SAR--Search and Rescue
SECRA—Secondary Radar Beacon
5FO—Single Frequency Outlet
SLS—Side-Lobe Suppression
SSO--Self Sustained Outlet
STC—Sensitivity Time Control
STOL--Short Takeoff and Landing
TACAN—Tactical Air Navigation'
TCA— Terminal Control Area
TVOR---Terminal VOR
UHF— Ultra High Frequency
VFR—Visual Flight Rules
VHF—Very High Frequency
VOR— Very High Frequency Omnirange
VOR/DME-VHF Omnirange/Distance Measuring Equipment
VORTAL--VHF Omnirange:/Tactical Air Navigation
VTOL.-Vertical Takeoff and Landing
298
!	 t
r`
1
r
REFERENCES
1. Department of Transportation, Air Traffic Control Advisory
Committee Report, Vol. I, December 1 969.
2. "Aviation Facilities Planning, " A Report by the President's
Special Assistant, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington,
D. C., 1957. f.
3. "Report of Task Force on Air Traffic Control, " Project Beacon,
FAA, Washington, D. C., October 1961.	 1,
i<
4. U. S. National Standard for the IFF Mark X (SIF)/Air Traffic 	 !'
Control Radar Beacon System Characteristics, Amendment 1,
10 October 1968.
5. N. K. ,Shaw and A. A. Simolunas, "System Capability of Air
Traffic Control Radar Beacon System, " Proc. IEEE, 58 (3),
March 1970.
6. "Study of a Navigation and Traffic Control Technique Employing
Satellites, " TRW Report No. 08710-6012-RO-00, 19 December 1967.
7."Navigation 	 Control Satellite Mission Study, " TRW Report
No. 09778-6010-RO-00, June 1969._
F	
'I
{ 8. Starr and Horowitz, "Application of Optimal Control Theory to =	 '
Satellite-Based Air Traffic Control in the North Atlantic,
March 1970.
9. FAA Statistical Handbook of Aviation, 1968 Ed., Department of
Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration. ;^'
4
i 10. Air Progress, June 1970.
11.	 ` Stanley Kass, "Controller Information Display Requirements Based^
';r Upon a Traffic Model Developed for the 1980-1990 Air Traffic
Control System, " Raytheon Corporation, 31 March 1969.
,w
12. Proposal to Study the Applications of Satellites to Communications,
Navigation and Surveillance for Aircraft Operating Over the Con- kt tiguous United States, Prepared for NASA Electronics Research
Center under RFP No. ERC/R&D PS -066, Technical Proposal
x.l 14671. 000, 25 October 1969
13. FAA Circular 90 -45.
14.- Department of Transportation, Air Traffic Control Advisory
Committee,2eport, Vol. 2, Appendices, December 1969.
f
299
REFERENCES (Continued)
15. "Design for the National Airspace Utilization System, " Federal
Aviation Agency, Systems Research and Development Service,
Summary of i st Ed., September 1962.
16. "National Aviation System Plan-- 1971-1980, " Department of
Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, March 1970.
17. The National Aviation System Plan-1970-1979, Book 1, Department
of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration.
s .t
'	 18.	 "Approval of Area Navigation Systems for Use in the U. S. National
Airspace System, " AC No. 90 5 Federal Aviation. Administration,
Department of Transportation, 14 June 1969.
19. Staff Study: "Los Angeles Basin V/STOL Service Requirements,
FAA Western Regional Headquarters.
20. FAA Near Mid-Air Collision Report of 1968.
21. "National Aviation System Policy Summary, " Department of
Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, March 1970.
22. N. Blake Technical Paper on a Data Acquisition System Relating
i
1	 /
t
to Long-range and Terminal Radar and on Associated Development
Effects, Presented at the National Planning & Review Conference, s
ATC Data Acquisition Concept Session, 14-17 April 1970.
23. General Opr. rating and Flight Rules, Changes 1-39 included, Federal
Aviation Regrulotions Part 91 (effective 25 February 1969) p. 9. I
24. - Instrument Flying Handbook AC 6,1-27, Federal Aviation Agency 1
Flight Standards Service, 1966.
25. M. Levin, "V/STOLS for the Airlines, Unclogging the Short-Haul
Corridors, " pp.
	 22-31, May 1970.
26. "Mid-Air Collision Statistics, 11 National Transportation Safety
Board, DOT, 21 July 1967.
27. "In-Flight Collision Near Urbana, Ohio
—
Douglas DC-9'Tann
' Company- Beechcraft Baron B-55, " Aircraft Accident Report,
Trans-World Airlines, Inc., 9 March 1967.
	 Adopted 19 June 1968.
National Transportation Safety Board, DOT.
28. Walton Graham and Robert H. Orr, "Separation of Air Traffic by
Visual Means: An Estimate of the Effectiveness of the See-and-
Avoid Doctrine, "- IEEE, March 1970.
300
era..., > ... i. 	 _	 :.	 ......_.:.. _..	 ..	 -
REFERENCES (Continued)
^I
29, Aircraft Accident Report, Piedmont Aviation Inc., Piedmont Airlines
Division Boeing 727, N68650; Lanseair Inc., Cessna 310, N31215;
Mid-air Collision, Hendersonville, N. C., 	 19 July f967.	 Adopted
5 September 1968, National Transportation Safety Board, DOT.
30. Staff Study:
	
"Air-Ground Communications Performance'in Terminal
Areas, " FAA Notice N 1300. 18. i
31. Staff Study:
	
"Performance of Facilities Serving the Eleven Major #
Airport Terminal Areas, " FAA Notice N 6040. 16 (RI5: SM 6040-OT),'
13 August 1968, ij;
32. "Air Navigation and Air Traffic Control Facility Performance and
Availability, " (RIS:	 SM 6040-r20) Report for Calendar Year 1968,
10 April 1969.
33. "Air Navigation and Air Traffic Control Facility Performance and
Availability, " (RIS:	 SM 6040-20) Report for May 1969, 24 June 1969.
I"
34. Staff Study:	 " A Performance Analysis of Airport Surveillance I	 `
Radar and Associated Radar Beacon Systems, " FAA Notice N 6310. 8 j(RIS:	 SM 6310- OT), 27 May 1968. i
35. Staff Study:
	
"An Analysis of Air Route Surveillance Radar Subsystem
Performance, " FAA Notice N 6340. 12 (RIS: SM 634.0- OT),
24 October 1968.
36. "Radar Microwave Link (RML) System Path Fade Outages Study,j FAA Notice N 6350. 6, 18 September 1969.
37. Staff Study:
	
"An Analysis of RCAG Systems Performance, " FAA
Notice N 6500. 7 (RIS:	 SM 6500-OT), 13 March 1968.
s
38. Staff Study:	 "An Analysis of FSS Communications Systems -
N Performance, " FAA Notice N 6500. 8, 2 April 1968
39. Staff Study:
	
"Performance Characteristics of Type T U- 9 /T V - 36: .
and T-282 Ground-to-Air Radio Transmitters, " `FAA Notice:,-
r ^< N 6500. 11, 4 March 1 969.
';	 ± 40. Staff Study:	 "An Electrical Power Performance Analysis of Major
Hub Terminal Facilities, CY-1967, " FAA Notice N 6980.18V
4 September 1 968. r	 ^.
41. "Recommendations for a National Air Traffic Management System,
ATA Air Traffic Control System Planning Group, 15 May 1969.
42., "1969 Profile of Flying and Buying, `" AOPA Pilot, 1969. ?
301
yy
x.
REFERENCES (Continued)
43. Flying Annual, 1970 Ed., Aviation Division, Ziff-Davis Publishing
Company, New York.
44. J. M. Holt and R. M. Anderson, "Analysis of Warning Times for
Collision Avoidance Systems, " IEEE, Trans. Aerospace Electronic
Systems, AES-4, pp. 305-314, March 1968.
45. "The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, " Special
Issue on Air Traffic Control, Proc. IEEE, 58 (3), pp. 	 289-518,
March 1970.
46. M. Kayton et al., "Air Traffic Control," Textbook on Aircraft
Avionics, Chapter 16. ?'
47. I. L. Ashkenas, "A Study. of Conventional Airplane Handling rQualities Requirements, " U. S. Air Force Flight Dynamics
Laboratory Technical Report AFFDL-TR-65-138, Part I,
November 1965.
48, C. G. H. Scholten, Elements for a New Departure in Air Traffic
Control, Phillips International Institute of Technological Studies,
Eindhoven, Netherlands, 1 April 1969.
49. L. W. Porter, "On Optimal Scheduling and Holding Strategies for
the Air Traffic Control Problem, I'M.  A. Thesis, MIT, September
1969. f	 ;
50. J. M. Holt and G. R. Marner, "Computer/Simulation Study of
Air-Derived Separation Assurance Systems in Multiple Aircraft i
Environment, " 5RDS Report No. RD-69-31, Collins Radio Company
Final Report, Contract No. FA-WA-4598, October 1969.
51. K.- E. Willis, J. B. 	 Currier, and P. Flanagan, "Intermittent
Positive Control, " Proc. IEEE, 58 (3), March 1970.
52. "Experimental L-Band SST Satellite Communications /Surveillance
Terminal Study, " Boeing Company, November 1968._
53.` "Characterization of the Present ATC A/G/A Communication i.
Subsystem and Its Environment, " Future Air-Ground-Air
Communication Subsystem Investigation, Part B, Communications •-
Systems, July 1966.
54. "New Concept Air/Ground Communication System, " Collins Radio
Company, September 1968.
55 TRW IOC No. 8300. 4. 1-44, J. H. Craigie to D. D. Otten, Subject:
Discussion with Neal Blake, FAA; 27 May 1970.
302
REFERENCES (Continued)
56. Near Mid-Air Collision Report for 1968, Federal Aviation Agency,
July 196 9.
57. J. B. Woodford and R. L. Dutcher, "A Satellite System to Support
an Advanced Air Traffic Control Concept, " March 1970.
58. Letter from C. H. Fitch, Vice President Operations, Aeronautical
Radio, Inc., to J. H. Craigie, 10 March 1970.
59. A. J. Mallinckrodt, "Ionospheric Dispersion, " TRW IOC No.
8300. 5-36, 30 April 1970.
60. A. B. Boehmer, "Binary Pulse Compression Codes, " IEEE, Trans.
Info. Th. IT-i3, April 1967. ,
61. J. R. Klauder, A. C. Price, S. Darlington, and W. J. Albersheim,
"The Theory and Design of Chirp Radars, " Bell System Tech.
Journal, 39, (4), July 1960.
62. R. H. Barker, "Group Synchronization of Binary Digital Systems,
Communication Theory, Butterworth, London, 1953.
63. Henning F. Harmuth, "A Generalized Concept of Frequency and
Some Applications, " IEEE, Trans. Info. Th. , IT-14, May 1969.
64. Robert Gold, "Optimal Binary Sequences for Spread Spectrum
Multiplexing, " IEEE Trans. Info. Th., October 1967. },{
65. Robert A. Scholtz and Lloyd R. Welch
	 "Mechanization of Codes 4	 p	 ,
with Bounded Synchronization Delays, " IEEE, Trans. Info. Th. _, x„
IT-16,
	 (4),	 July 1970. i
66. W. L. Eastman, "On the Construction of Comma-Free Codes,"
-
IEEE, Trans. Info. Th. , IT -11, April 1965.
.
67. I. S. Reed and G. Solomon, "Polynomial Codes Over Certain
is
Finite Fields, " Jour. SIAM, 8, (2), June 1960.
68. W. Wesley Peterson, Error Correcting Codes, MIT Press, t
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 19r. r
69. J.,E. Dye, "Ground and Sea Return Signal Characteristics of
Microwave Pulse Altimeters," Trans. Symposium on Radar
Return, University of New Mexico, pp. 	 1 i 1-114, 1959; f
USNOTS, NOTS TP 233:8, l i -12 May 1959.
70. L. N. Spinner and V. L. Bencinenga, "Advanced Scanning Beam
Guidance System for All-Weather Landing, " FAA Report
No. RD 68-2, February 1962. r
L
t
303 f
C
i
t
I:
!°
i
71. F. W. Iden, "Glide Slope Arrays for Use Under Adverse Sitting
Condition, " IRE, Trans, ANE, p 100, June 1959.
72. P. D. Shaft, "Limiting of Several Signals and Its Effect on
Communication System Performance, " IEEE, Trans. on Comm.
Tech., December 1965.
73. R. W. Hamming, "Error Detecting and Error Correcting Codes,
Bell System Tech. Jour, 26 April 1950.
74. M. I. Skolnik, Introduction to Radar Systems, McGraw-Hill
Book Co. , New York, 1962.
75. R. L. Garwin, "Satellite Systems for Navigation, Air Traffic
Control, Collision Avoidance, etc.," 23 August 1967 and
Supplement 18 April 1968.PP	 P
76. Final Report, TRW Systems Group to NASA, "Study of a	 r p.Navigation and Traffic Control Technique Employing r
Satellites, " Vol. i - Summary, TRW 08710-6012-R0-00,
NASA No. N68-31277, December 1967.
77. Final Report, TRW Systems Group to Navy Space Systems
Activity, "Constellation Study for Satellite Navigation with
Passive Ranging," TRW No. 11409-6001-R0-00, Navy
t
No. X68- 18630, 10 May 1968.
78. Final Report, TRW Systems Group to Navy Space Systems
Activity, "Navigation Satellite Constellations Study, " !;
TRW No. 09424-6001-T000, Navy No. X68-16944,
14 November 1967.
79. Final Report, TRW Systems Group to USAF /SAMSO, "Satellite.
System for Precise Navigation, System 621B (U),
Volumes i through 7. (S) AD 395 212L, AD 393 237L,
AD 395 238L, AD 395 193L, AD 395 213L, AD 395 194L,
AD 395 314L, respectively, M January 1969. r.
80. M. J. Waxman, "Minicomputer Study, " TRW Internal Study
submitted on TRW IOC 5000.5. 7-138, 5 June 1969.
81. TRW IOC ' 8300. 4. 1- 50 from J. H. Craigie, Subject: "Notes -from iMeeting with Mr. Ben Alexander, 6 May 1970, 11 27 May 1970.
82. "Universal Air-Ground Digital Communication System
Standards, " RTCA Doc. No. DO-136, 7 March 1968.
83. Proposal to RCA Ltd for a "Canadian Communications Satellite,"
TRW Proposal No. 14251. 005, ; Rev. A,'' 20 ;February 1970:
304
eREFERENCES (Continued)
}
84. C. B. Norris, Jr., "The Capabilities of Electron-Beam
Semiconductor Active Devices, " IEEE, Tube Techniquesq	 i.Conference, New York, September 1968.
85. "Systems Engineering Study of Aeronautical Satellite Services,
Philco-Ford Corp. Final Report to Communications Satellite Corp.,
Document No. TR- DA1583 (1), Vol. 1, Summary, 15 December 1967.
	 .
86. "Global Satellite System for Telecommunications, Air Traffic 	 1 /
Control and Navigation, " Final Report, DIOSCURES Project 1972-
1985, Centre National D'Etudes Spatiales (CNES), July 1969.
87. E. W. B onnett, "The Delta Story, " Report No. DM19 -13 7 5,
McDonnell Douglas Corporation, August 1969.
88. J. L. Brennan, "Status --Airborne Collision Avoidance System
Program, " in Proceedings of the ION National Air Meeting on
Collision Avoidance, Dayton, Ohio, 23-24 February 1967.
-89. J. D. Blatt, "National Airspace System—Its Future Growth, "
Speech given at Fort Monmouth, N. J., U. S. Army Electronics
Command, 6 March 1968,
SATELLITE DATA
PAYLOAD 2 LIT 100 W 20 LB
2 LIT BACKLINK 46 W 20 LB
1 NAVSTAR 25 W 25 LB
2 DATA LINK 60 W 20 LB
OTHER SATELLITE FUNCTIONS 100 W 637 (1146) LB
331 W 722 (1231) LB
DESIGN LIFE/MTTF	 7 YEARS/9.8 TO 12.5 YEARS
LAUNCH VEHICLE	 THOR DELTA 904
^i
SATELLITE CNS SYSTEM -REFERENCE DATA
I
r	
e
1
COMMUNICATIONS
c^R^^re
ByC`
,^` qT9 
aqrq'\ IL
ti.
^l DIRECT A/G
**,,ZHF)
NAVIGATION
	
SURVEI LLANCE
SLIT PULSES
RANGING SIGNALS
if
,LIT PULSES
VHF
GROUND STATION ATC STATION GROUND STATION ATC GROUND STATION
PARAMETE R DATA LIT BAC KLINK PARAMET ER F RANGING PARAMETER RANGING
CHANNELS 2/SAT. 2 CHANNELS 1 CHANNELS 2
CAPACITY/CH 1200 BPS 100 MESSAGES/ CAPACITY UNLIMITED CAPACITY/CH 50,000 UPDATES/
FULL DUPLEX SEC CARRIER FREQ 1550 MHz CARRIER FREQ 912.5 MHz -UP
CARRIER FREQ 5140-5170 MHz(Gnd) 5050 MHz UP BANDWIDTH 2 MHz 5087.5 MHz DOWN950-980 MHz(A/C) 940 MHz DOWN BANDWIDTH 50 MHz
BANDWIDTH 100 KHz/SAT 500 KHz
NOTE: SAME SATELLITES FOR ALL THREE FUNCTIONS. CARRIER FREQUENCIES ARE TENTATIVE.
SYSTEM DATA
6-SATELLITE 16 0
 X-CONFIGURATION
-200 FT ACCURACY (1v ALT, HORIZONTAL CEP)
PROBABILITY OF OUTAGE, 30 YR LIFE = 3.3%
LIT SYSTEM CAPACITY
ATCAC AIRCRAFT POPULATION FORECAST
1995 - 54,000 PEAK AIRBORNE
525,000 REGISTERED
LIT CHANNEL CAPACITY (25 MHz BAND)
50,000 AIRCRAFT POSITION UPDATES/SEC
500,000 AIRCRAFT ID'S' ASSIGNABLE *
'k FROM PRODUCT OF 31,255 PRP'S AND 16 BIPHASE CODES
4.
t
